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Dear Reader,
That people are getting older may not be a new 
phenomenon,  but  the  speed  of  this  process 
and the numbers involved are striking. What 
is clearly a very welcome development on an 
individual  level  also  has  important  implica-
tions for society as a whole. On September 23, 
2004, Allianz Group and the CFS attempted to 
shed some light on the economic consequences 
of these ongoing demographic changes with a 
joint conference on “Capital Markets In the 
Long Term: Demography, Economic Develop-
ment and Funded Pension Systems”. The focus 
of the discussion was on the long-term impact 
on capital markets and pension systems, and 
the speakers tried to identify the direction and 
magnitude of potential changes as well as the 
likelihood of an eventual asset meltdown. The 
setup of the event was novel in that the CFS   
joined forces with a major ﬁnancial market par-
ticipant in organizing a research conference – 
in this case with Allianz Group. Our objective   
was to combine insights from academia with 
those from the ﬁnancial community in order 
to provide a more comprehensive outlook on 
capital  market  developments.  This  coopera-
tion was well reﬂected not only in the different 
presentations by panel members but also in the 
audience, which showed that the conference 
was appealing to market practitioners and aca-
demic researchers alike.
Michael Heise
Volker Wieland
Foreword5
Manfred Neumann (University of Bonn) and 
Klaus  Masuch  (ECB)  discussed  inﬂation, 
growth, and productivity. Manfred Neumann 
looked at changes in the relationship between 
money  growth  and  inﬂation  resulting  from 
the start of EMU and concluded that the ECB 
ought to tighten money growth. Klaus Masuch 
instead made the case for price stability and 
low  inﬂation  uncertainty  as  a  result  of  a 
credible monetary policy regime and showed 
that thereby macroeconomic stability would 
obtain as a by-product.
Michael Schröder and Martin Schüler 
(both  Center  for  European  Economic  Research, 
Mannheim) jointly presented the results of a 
survey  on  capital  markets  and  demography 
that had been commissioned by Allianz Group. 
The focus of the study was on long-term effects 
with a 15-year horizon, and the survey sample 
consisted predominantly of banks, with the 
remainder made up of corporates and insur-
ance ﬁrms. The survey predicts an increasing 
importance of capital markets in the future 
and shows an expected shift towards higher-
risk assets and into emerging markets. The 
presentation was followed by a lively debate 
on potential sampling biases and worthwhile 
extensions of the survey.
After  lunch,  Dirk  Krüger  and  Michael 
Haliassos  (both  Goethe  Universit  Frankfurt) 
discussed savings drivers and the importance 
of demographic trends. Dirk Krüger showed 
that based on a standard life-cycle model of 
consumption and saving, rich countries should 
see an increase in domestic savings and capital 
exports until around 2020, after which there 
would then be a decline in savings and an in-
creasing inﬂow of foreign capital. These trends 
would become even more pronounced through 
a change in pension policy from the current 
pay-as-you-go system to fully funded pensions. 
However,  the  level  of  investments  should 
largely be insulated from such savings patterns 
through  internationally  integrated  capital 
markets. Michael Haliassos looked at the link 
between household demographics and savings 
compositions. Considerable differences across 
households can be observed in their decision 
whether or not to participate in risky invest-
ments, which are to a large part due to entry 
barriers in the form of ﬁxed participation costs 
or simply a lack of information. In contrast, 
households that do participate in risky invest-
ments  display  greater  homogeneity  in  their 
portfolio compositions.
Conference Summary6
Savings and interest rates were the topic of 
a  follow-on  panel  with  Joachim  Winter 
(Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of 
Aging) and Helmut Reisen (OECD). Joachim 
Winter discussed the results of a simulation 
using  a  multi-region  OLG  model.  He  ﬁnds 
a future decline in the savings rate resulting 
in minor declines in capital growth and the 
return on capital. While the latter would only 
be little affected by a fundamental pension re-
form, it is however heavily inﬂuenced by inter-
national capital mobility. Helmut Reisen ar-
rived at predictions on saving patterns similar 
to Dirk Krüger’s, suggesting that international 
demographic differences should make invest-
ments in non-OECD countries more attractive 
over the coming decades. The consequences 
of demographic changes will signiﬁcantly out-
weigh potential beneﬁts from better global di-
versiﬁcation.
In the ﬁnal panel, Alan Pickering (European 
Federation for Retirement Provision)  and Peter 
Lockyer (Allianz Dresdner Asset Management) 
speciﬁcally  addressed  pension  security  and 
asset  management.  Alan  Pickering  pointed 
out that there will necessarily be a signiﬁcant 
amount of risk inherent in any pension system 
and that this risk cannot entirely be laid off. 
An important prerequisite for the long-term 
success of a pension system is a framework that 
provides the right incentives for regulators and 
politicians alike. Peter Lockyer’s presentation 
looked at risk management for deﬁned beneﬁt 
and  deﬁned  contribution  systems  and  a 
desirable scope of regulation.
All  presentations  suggested  that  an  asset 
meltdown is a very unlikely scenario over the 
foreseeable future and that the importance of 
capital  markets  is  instead  likely  to  increase 
further. 
Marcus Pramor (CFS staff)7
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Welcome  to  today’s  joint  conference  hosted 
by the Center for Financial Studies and Alli-
anz Group. This is truly what you would call a 
Public Private Partnership – the CFS has done 
most of the work, and we at Allianz Group have 
provided a little money.
Allow me to express my gratitude to the CFS 
–  in  particular  Volker  Wieland  and  Marcus 
Pramor – for organizing the conference and 
inviting such distinguished speakers.
We shall use this conference to venture a look 
at the trends that will shape capital markets in 
10, 20, 30 years from now. 
Our point of departure is the demographic sit-
uation. We know that, although the world pop-
ulation will continue to grow, the age structure 
will also be changing dramatically. A shrinking 
working  population  will  be  shouldering  the 
burden of a growing number of retirees.
This aging process will be particularly strong 
in the developed countries. Acknowledgment 
of this fact has increased in recent years and has 
prompted some initial reactions. Pay-as-you-
go pension systems have been scaled down and 
incentives for funded systems put in place.
There  is  widespread  concern  that  the  aging 
process will have major adverse effects on capi-
tal markets. The baby-boomers – who in most 
countries won’t retire until 2015-2020 – will 
substantially increase their savings, acknowl-
edging that retirement provision from PAYG 
systems is going to be inadequate and encour-
aged by taxation changes.
The central question is how an increasing capi-
tal supply will affect capital markets. Will high 
demand for bonds, equity and real estate push 
down interest rates as well as returns on the 
other markets?
And what happens when the baby-boomers re-
tire and sell off their assets? Will asset prices 
collapse and lead to rising returns?
We have structured today’s discussions by di-
viding the topics up between various panels, 
all of which will look at the driving forces be-
hind long-run capital market trends. 
Let me mention that our recent research at 
Allianz has also been devoted to these top-
ics  and  we  shall  be  publishing  a  report  on 
this issue next week. Allow me to say that 
preparing  this  conference  has  also  provided 
much inspiration.
The ﬁrst panel will look at the inﬂation com-
ponent in nominal interest rates and the gen-
eral prospects for growth and productivity in 
the years to come.
Our view is that increased tolerance for inﬂa-
tion – and the build-up of excess liquidity – 
will push up the price level in the next couple 
of years. However, in the longer term pros-
pects for inﬂation are positive, private savings 
will increase and governments will ﬁnally face 
up to the demographic challenge by reining in 
deﬁcits.
But what about real interest rates? Are they 
set to fall strongly given the abundant supply 
of capital? And will the increasing shortage 
of labor reduce labor intensity of production 
Opening Remarks8
and thereby push down the return on capital? 
Certainly, the capital intensity of production 
will increase in the next 10 to 20 years but 
there are some factors which will limit the de-
cline in the rates of return:
1)   the increase in savings will not be as strong 
as some suspect (savings patterns are not in 
line with ideal life cycle).
2)   The demographic situation is not identical in 
all countries. In the US the population is set 
to grow to 400 million in 30 years’ time, re-
sulting in high demand for capital. In Japan 
the aging phase has already begun, the drop 
in savings boosts the need for capital, pos-
sibly generating substantial rates of return 
in the not too distant future. Nor should we 
forget the emerging market economies. On 
balance they are not big importers of capital 
today. But the situation varies from region 
to region. Asia has enough internal savings, 
but central and eastern Europe and Latin 
America are in need of funds. 
3)   Further countervailing factors in terms of 
falling rates could be technology and hu-
man capital. In our view, the digital revolu-
tion of recent years will have lasting effects 
on productivity. And, with an increase in 
capital spending and a shortage of labor, hu-
man capital will increase signiﬁcantly – ob-
viously another factor that will limit the fall 
in real rates of return.
We  are  therefore  conﬁdent  that  the  capital 
markets will be able to cope with the demo-
graphic changes ahead of us. Higher savings 
will be channeled into investment, the income 
of  future  working  generations  will  increase 
and that will limit the impact of asset sales of 
the older generation.
A possible scenario could be the following: 
nominal interest rates will increase somewhat 
in the next couple of years due to slightly high-
er inﬂation (10yr yields in euro area 5 to 6%) 
and more stable economic policies. Then, as in-
creased savings set in and governments step up 
their consolidation efforts, rates will go down 
to where they have been recently (around 3%). 
In the very long run, with growing budget def-
icits, more pressures on monetary policies and 
asset sales by the older generation, rates will 
recover but markets will not collapse – at least 
not for demographic reasons.
This  of  course  sounds  daringly  precise  and 
I hope that the speakers and all of you will 
challenge  these  ideas  in  the  course  of  our 
discussions.
Michael Heise (Allianz Group)9
Price stability and 
macroeconomic volatility  
in the euro area – the positive 
supply-side effects of  
credible and predictable  
monetary policy
1     I am grateful for comments by, and discussions with, F. Altissimo, H.J. Klöckers, A. Lojschová, A. Musso, S. Nicoletti Altimari, 
M. Rostagno and Ad van Riet. Moreover, A. Lojschová provided substantial support by preparing the Tables and Charts. The views 
expressed in this paper are not necessarily the views of the ECB or the Eurosystem.
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Abstract
This paper discusses the relationship between 
credible monetary policy and macroeconomic 
volatility during and after the regime shift to 
price stability in the euro area. For many euro 
area countries this regime shift took place in 
the  1990s,  during  the  convergence  process 
resulting from the Maastricht Treaty and the 
need  to  fulﬁll  the  convergence  criteria  for 
joining the euro area. Looking at euro area 
aggregates, the new regime of price stability 
in the whole euro area seems to have started 
around the years 1996-97, while the main in-
stitutional regime change to a culture of stabil-
ity for the whole euro area is marked by the 
start of the single monetary policy conducted 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) in Janu-
ary 1999. The paper has two main messages.
 
First  it  presents  some  stylized  facts,  which 
illustrate  the  increased  macroeconomic 
stability achieved in the euro area as a result 
of the convergence process in the 1990s and 
the introduction of the euro. While it does not 
provide new econometric tests for breaks in 
the volatility or persistence of macroeconomic 
time series, the material presented clearly il-
lustrates that, both during and after the regime 
shift to price stability in the euro area, macro-
economic volatility was reduced and stabilized 
at low levels, contrary to what was expected 
before by those observers who stressed that 
the  euro  area  was  not  an  optimal  currency 
area. The paper also indicates that there ap-
pears to have been a fall in reduced-form es-
timates of the persistence of price and wage 
inﬂation over more recent sample periods. If 
more structural econometric analysis were to 
conﬁrm that this reﬂects a lower degree of ef-
fective indexation of prices and wages to past 
inﬂation, it would represent an improvement 
in wage and price-setting behavior and, thus, 
the aggregate supply relation of the euro area 
economy. Such a change would support the 
conduct of monetary policy and would result 
in  lower  nominal  and  real  macroeconomic 
volatility for given exogenous shocks.
Second, the paper discusses various channels 
through which a credible monetary policy can 
lead to positive supply-side effects which help 
to reduce macroeconomic volatilities and sup-
port employment. It argues that a credible and 
predictable monetary policy may, over time, 
reduce the degree of indexation of price and 
wage-setting to past inﬂation, and at the same 
time it may also be associated with a perceived 
increase  in  nominal  stickiness  as  individual 
prices and wages may be less often susceptible 
to change in an environment of stable prices. 
Furthermore,  a  systematic  and  predictable 
monetary  policy  enhances  the  risk  manage-
ment  of  corporate  ﬁrms,  banks  and  house-
holds, thereby improving production and in-
vestment decisions. Against this background it 
is argued that, if there is hysteresis in unem-
ployment,  these  structural  changes  induced 
by monetary policy become even more impor-
tant. In contrast, additional responsibilities for 
the central bank in terms of actively stabilizing 
employment or output are likely to be coun-
terproductive, as they risk undermining one of 
the main reasons for the improved structure of 
the economy, namely the credibility and pre-
dictability of monetary policy. 
1 Introduction
In various respects, the performance of the 
euro area economy during the last six years 
has been remarkable. It is true that labor pro-
ductivity growth has been weak since the mid 
1990s  and  unemployment  is  still  much  too 
high. However, a closer look at the develop-
ments  which  monetary  policy  can  inﬂuence 
more directly and strongly shows that a regime 
shift to greater macroeconomic stability seems 11
to have taken place during the second half of 
the 1990s. This was associated with the Maas-
tricht Treaty, the convergence process and the 
introduction of the euro. The euro area not 
only entered a new era of price stability, but it 
also seems to have experienced a great decline 
in nominal macroeconomic volatility. There 
are no visible signs of costs in terms of higher 
real  macroeconomic  volatility;  on  the  con-
trary, the volatility of some real variables has 
also declined in recent years relative to the av-
erages observed during the 1980s and 1990s. 
There is no doubt that euro area averages hide 
the fact that macroeconomic dynamics were 
quite different across the euro area countries. 
For example, some countries achieved a re-
gime of price stability as early as the 1980s, 
while others fully converged only rather late 
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, this paper mainly 
focuses on euro area averages, and only occa-
sionally refers also to some country speciﬁc 
developments.
It was not only the stability-oriented monetary 
policy of the ECB, and, before 1999, of the 
national central banks which made the success 
of the euro possible. Social partners contrib-
uted via wage moderation, ﬁscal policies were 
more disciplined than before and some posi-
tive  structural  reforms  were  implemented. 
Certainly, it would have been better had these 
contributions been more decisive and stron-
ger. However, it would be a serious mistake 
to underestimate their importance for mac-
roeconomic stability and job creation simply 
because their positive effects have been dimin-
ished by uncertainties and hesitation regarding 
further reform projects and overshadowed by 
major adverse supply shocks in recent years. 
Without wage moderation, ﬁscal discipline and 
structural reforms, the euro area would not 
have experienced the improvements in terms 
of macroeconomic stability and employment 
growth, which have actually been observed.
 
Particularly striking progress has been made in 
the area of macroeconomic stability. Since the 
ECB became responsible for monetary policy 
in the euro area, HICP inﬂation has averaged 
2% – only slightly above the “below, but close 
to 2%” at which the ECB aims over the me-
dium term. During the last two decades, the 
average inﬂation rate was 4%. 
A remarkable feature of the change in eco-
nomic performance is the strong decline in 
macroeconomic volatility. 
With  the  convergence  process  during  the 
1990s, inﬂation volatility fell strongly and it 
has remained low since the introduction of the 
euro. In most cases this decline had already 
started during the early 1990s. For example, 
the standard deviation of quarterly HICP inﬂa-
tion in the euro area (measured as a moving 
window over the last 24 quarters) fell from 
around 0.6% during the late 1980s to around 
0.2% in the mid 1990s. 
Inﬂation expectations have also been remark-
ably stable in recent years. Average long-term 
consensus inﬂation expectations have fallen by 
one percentage point, from 2.8% in the 1990s 
(until the end of 1998) to 1.8% in the last six 
years; the average volatility of these long-term 
inﬂation  expectations  has  declined  substan-
tially by four ﬁfths from 0.5% in the 1990s to 
0.1% in recent years. The dispersion of inﬂa-
tion and inﬂation expectations within the euro 
area is now also much lower than during the 
previous two decades. 
Most importantly, these achievements in the 
area of price stability did not come at the cost 
of  higher  unemployment  or  real  volatility. 12
On the contrary, the unemployment rate has 
averaged 81⁄2% during the last six years and 
has therefore been on average 1.3 percentage 
points  lower  than  during  the  1990s.  The 
annual employment growth rate has acceler-
ated from an average of around 1⁄2% during 
the 1980s and 1990s to more than 1% since 
the start of the single monetary policy. Real 
GDP growth has been as high on average as 
during the 1990s.
Moreover, there are some hints that the per-
sistence of price and wage inﬂation in recent 
years  has  been  lower  than  before.  If  this 
reﬂects a more forward-looking behavior of 
those setting prices and wages, it would tend 
to contribute to lower volatility of employment 
and output. Indeed, in spite of major supply 
shocks which have hit the euro area since the 
late 1990s, the average standard deviation of 
quarterly real GDP growth has declined from 
levels between 0.5 and 0.6% in the last two 
decades to around 0.4% since the introduction 
of the euro. A very similar development can 
be observed for real consumption growth, and 
the volatility of employment growth has also 
moderated from above 0.3% in the 1990s to 
0.2% since 1999.
Interestingly, the decline in the volatility of real 
activity took place a few years after the mod-
eration of inﬂation volatility was observed. 
A reduction in macroeconomic volatility can 
also  be  observed  outside  the  euro  area.  As 
regards the United States, Bernanke (2004) 
recently  called  this  phenomenon  “the  great 
moderation”.  Blanchard  and  Simon  (2001) 
report a long-term decline in output volatility 
for a number of G7 countries since the 1960s. 
They show that a ﬁrst major decrease in out-
put volatility (measured as a rolling standard 
deviation of output growth using a window 
of 20 quarters) took place as early as the late 
1960s (France) and the mid-1970s (Germa-
ny). In the United States output volatility had 
substantially  increased  since  the  late  1960s 
until the early 1980s. Following the sharp dis-
inﬂation during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s it 
declined by half to around 0.5% since the mid-
1980s and stabilized at this level since then. 
During  the  1990s,  output  growth  volatility 
declined further (in particular in Germany) 
and/or  stabilized  at  low  levels  (at  around 
0.5%) in all G7 countries except Japan, where 
a sharp increase was observed from the mid-
1990s onwards. All in all Blanchard and Simon 
(2001) ﬁnd a trend decline in output volatility 
since the 1960s, temporarily interrupted by an 
increase in inﬂation volatility. 
Increased macroeconomic stability has numer-
ous  beneﬁts.  While  higher  volatility  of  real 
growth per se might also reﬂect a welcome 
change like an increase in potential growth, 
reduced  volatility  of  inﬂation,  and  output 
(relative to potential) enhances the efﬁcient 
functioning of the market economy and re-
duces  costs  related  to  risks,  uncertainties, 
hedging activities and adjustment to shocks. A 
lower persistence of inﬂation and wage growth 
allows monetary policy to react less to inﬂa-
tion shocks related to supply disturbances than 
would otherwise be the case. 
How can the decline in macroeconomic vola-
tility  be  explained?  Bernanke  (2004)2  and 
Papademos  (2003a)3  argue  that  credible 
monetary  policy  played  an  important  role. 
Blanchard and Simon (2001, p. 18) ﬁnd that 
2      “… improved monetary policy has likely made an important contribution not only to reduce volatility of inflation … but to the reduced 
volatility of output as well.” Bernanke (2004), p 9.13
“the sharp decline in output volatility in the 
1980s  appears  mostly  the  result  of  a  sharp 
decline  in  inﬂation  volatility.”  In  addition, 
structural policies, luck (reduced volatility of 
exogenous shocks) and improved ﬁscal policies 
have been cited as potential candidates. There 
can be little doubt that these “non-monetary” 
explanations  are  needed  to  provide  a  full 
picture. Nevertheless, in this paper no attempt 
is made to estimate the relative contribution of 
these and possibly other factors for the euro 
area. Instead, it concentrates on the channels 
by which monetary policy may contribute to 
increased  macroeconomic  stability  mainly 
from a theoretical perspective. 
Certainly,  low  inﬂation  and  well-anchored 
inﬂation expectations are mainly attributable 
to the credible conduct of monetary policy. 
However, while the importance of credibility 
for the success of monetary policy in anchoring 
inﬂation expectations and reducing disinﬂation 
costs has been discussed and recognised for a 
long time, an intense debate on the precise 
contribution  of  monetary  policy  to  improv-
ing features of the supply side of the economy 
and thereby to reducing both nominal and real 
macroeconomic volatilities has emerged only 
more recently.4 
If a credible monetary policy contributes over 
time to a supply-side improvement in the form 
of reduced persistence of changes in prices and 
wages and lower nominal and real volatility, 
this will have signiﬁcant implications. Cred-
ible  monetary  policy  would  then  gradually 
also  enhance  employment  in  the  long  run, 
especially in the case of negative supply shocks 
and  if  hysteresis  effects  are  important.  The 
old critique that tight monetary policy aimed 
at  price  stability  via  hysteresis  effects  may 
induce lasting increases in unemployment may 
thus be turned upside down, namely into a 
strong argument in favor of monetary policy 
credibility. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: The second section assesses the de-
gree  of  macroeconomic  stability  achieved 
in the ﬁrst six years of the euro. It is largely 
descriptive,  comparing  trends  and  average 
volatilities during this period with the 1980s 
and  1990s.  The  third  section  investigates 
mainly  from  a  theoretical  perspective  the 
question how monetary policy contributes to 
low volatility, not only of inﬂation but also 
of real activity and unemployment. It argues 
that credible and predictable monetary policy 
can, over time, change the structure of the 
supply side of the economy in the direction of 
reducing the importance of backward-looking 
elements and uncertainty in private behavior, 
thereby enhancing macroeconomic stability. In 
this context it discusses the relation between 
monetary policy on the one hand and price 
setting, wage formation and risk management 
on  the  other  hand.  It  also  presents  some 
available evidence on the persistence of price 
and wage inﬂation. The conclusions are set out 
in the fourth section. 
3     “Following the experience of high and variable inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s, monetary policy in many countries has put 
greater emphasis on attaining and maintaining price stability over the medium and longer term rather than on stabilizing short-term 
output fluctuations. This change … has helped to deliver not only lower and less variable inflation, but also more stable output growth.” 
Papademos (2003a).
4         See in particular Bayoumi and Sgherri (2004a and b); Bernanke, (2004). Issing (2001) stresses that structural features of the   
economy may be endogenous to the process of monetary unification. In particular, he argues that the traditional conditions which 
constitute an optimum currency area (flexible goods and labor markets, similarity of the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism across the currency area, etc.) were not met ex-ante for the euro area, but may well be fulfilled ex post, partly as a result of   
the process of monetary union. Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations.    
Note: Data before January 1990 compiled from monthly rates of change of national CPIs excluding owner occupied 
housing (except Spain). Fixed euro conversion rate used for weights. The last observation refers to February 2005.
Sources: ECB and ECB calculations. 
Note: Unweighted standard deviation of HICP inflation (EU 12); monthly data, not seasonally adjusted.
The last observation refers to February 2005.
Chart 1a: Inflation in the euro area  
(Annual percentage change)
Chart 1b:Standard deviation of inflation across euro area countries 
(In percentages)
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1990s: low nominal and real 
macroeconomic volatility 
In  the  euro  area,  or  more  precisely  in  the 
countries which now constitute the euro area, 
inﬂation was high and volatile from the 1970s 
until about the mid-1990s. Chart 1a shows that 
in the euro area in the early 1980s inﬂation 
was still around 10%. In the second half of the 
1980s it came down to around 2%, but then 
accelerated to above 4% in the early 1990s. 
In  many  euro  area  countries  price  stability 
was only established in the second half of the 
1990s, around the years 1996-1997. Stability 
oriented policies which were put in place some 
time before, supported by the need to fulﬁll 
convergence  criteria,  had  ﬁnally  achieved 
regaining credibility. Of course, the euro area 
aggregate hides that inﬂation trends initially 
were  quite  divergent  across  countries,  but 
then strongly converged. Chart 1b shows the 
standard  deviation  of  inﬂation  across  euro 
area countries. Again, the second half of the 
1990s saw the beginning of a new regime with 
substantially lower dispersion of inﬂation rates 
within the euro area. 
Most of the tables presented in this paper show 
the average level and the average standard de-
viation for a number of macroeconomic vari-
ables over three periods: the last two decades, 
the last decade (excluding 1999) and the ﬁrst 
six years of the euro. In addition, some of 
the tables presented below also compare the 
last nine years with the previous nine years.5 
Furthermore,  some  Charts  are  presented 
which show rolling 24 quarter windows for 
standard deviations or 40 quarter windows 
for estimation of simple autoregressive pro-
cesses.
Certainly, (unconditional) volatility measures 
are rather rough measures. Other simple or 
more complex measures may give different re-
sults. No attempt is made here to distinguish 
between expected and unexpected macroeco-
nomic  developments.  Nevertheless,  it  seems 
useful to illustrate the differences in macro-
economic developments since the introduction 
of the euro and/or the second half of the 1990s 
with the period before based on these simple 
measures. 
2.1 Low and stable inﬂation expecta-
tions and moderate wage developments 
Inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
Both  the  level  and  the  volatility  of  various 
inﬂation  measures  have  been  partly  sub-
stantially lower in the last six or nine years 
compared  to  1980s  and  early  1990s.  The 
volatility  of  consumer  price  inﬂation  since 
1999  is  somewhat  lower  in  the  euro  area 
than in the US, but the volatility of changes 
in the GDP deﬂator and the consumption de-
ﬂator are similar in both currency areas (see 
Table  1).  Interestingly,  as  can  also  be  seen 
from Charts 2a and b, the volatility of con-
sumer price inﬂation in the euro area fell to 
very low levels already by the mid-1990s and 
has stabilized since then. Chart 2b shows that 
the decline in inﬂation volatility took place 
roughly in parallel in the four largest euro 
area countries.
Average realized HICP inﬂation in the last six 
years was 2% and thus only slightly above the 
ECB’s deﬁnition of price stability. However, 
this  deviation  can  be  explained  by  the 
unfortunate clustering of adverse price shocks 
in recent years (e.g. food prices, oil and other 
commodity prices and administered prices and 
5       This notwithstanding, comparing the 1980s and 1990s with the years since January 1999 has the advantage that the start of the single 
monetary policy conducted by the ECB marks a clear institutional regime change, which, however, should not hide the fact that this 
regime change was prepared and preceded by national regime changes in the preceding years.
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indirect taxes). Importantly, in spite of these 
shocks, both the level and standard deviation 
of long-term consensus inﬂation expectations 
could be stabilized at low levels in the period 
since 1999 (see Table 2 and Chart 3). This is also 
the case for the ten-year break-even inﬂation 
rates (see Table 2 and Chart 4). 
Chart 4 shows that break-even inﬂation in the 
United States has been not only more volatile 
at high frequencies in recent years, but also 
experienced a clear upward shift since around 
mid-2003.  While  it  ﬂuctuated  between  1.5 
and 2.0% between mid 2001 and mid 2003, 
since  2004  it  seems  to  have  stabilized  at  a 
higher level, in a range around 2.5%. In con-
trast,  euro  area  break  even  inﬂation,  while 
also elevated somewhat in the course of 2004, 
seems  to  have  decoupled  from  the  upward 
trend in the United States more recently. 
Short- and long-term interest rates 
An indicator which provides particular inter-
esting evidence on the positive effects of mon-
etary policy credibility in the euro area are 
long-term interest rates and in particular for-
ward rates many years into the future. Forward 
interest rates for contracts which start say in 6 
or 10 years, should not be signiﬁcantly affected 
by anticipated, possibly gradual responses of 
Table 1: Various measures of inflation  
(Quarter-on-quarter percentage changes; year-on-year percentage changes in 
brackets; seasonally adjusted)
Euro Area US Euro Area US
HICP/CPI 1) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
1.00 (4.06)
0.66 (2.81)
0.52 (2.00)
0.80 (3.21)
0.47 (1.88) 
0.98 (3.88)
0.74 (3.10)
0.63 (2.49)
0.92 (3.73)
0.61 (2.42)
0.65 (2.49)
0.31 (1.07)
0.21 (0.48)
0.24 (0.79)
0.22 (0.52)
0.64 (2.03)
0.35 (1.14)
0.32 (0.72)
0.34 (1.05)
0.30 (0.70)
Consumption 
deflator 2)
1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
1.18 (4.75) 
0.67 (2.81)
0.51 (2.04)
0.88 (3.57)
0.45 (1.87) 
0.87 (3.47)
0.59 (2.49)
0.50 (1.96)
0.80 (3.27)
0.46 (1.83)
0.82 (3.17)
0.47 (1.63)
0.19 (0.29)
0.36 (1.16)
0.29 (0.89)
0.52 (1.80)
0.31 (1.08)
0.23 (0.45)
0.30 (0.98)
0.22 (0.52)
GDP deflator 2) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004 
1.18 (4.76)
0.65 (2.70)
0.48 (2.00)
0.89 (3.65)
0.42 (1.76)
0.83 (3.29)
0.56 (2.31)
0.49 (1.94)
0.71 (2.90)
0.45 (1.81)
0.78 (3.04)
0.50 (1.78)
0.19 (0.46)
0.39 (1.28)
0.31 (0.95)
0.53 (1.90)
0.25 (0.84)
0.18 (0.37)
0.24 (0.74)
0.18 (0.41)
  Average   Standard Deviation
Sources: Eurostat, National data and ECB calculations.
1)     Based on quarterly data, calculated as averages of monthly data. Data before January 1992 compiled 
from monthly rates of change of national CPIs excluding owner occupied housing (except Spain).
2)     From 1991 Eurostat data for the euro area, prior to this data taken from AWM model database   
(see G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre (2001)).Chart 2a: Rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in  
HICP inflation in the euro area and the United States  
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations. 
Note: rolling standard deviation with window of 24 quarters. The last observation included is the 4th 
quarter of 2004.
Chart 2b: Rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in  
HICP inflation in some euro area countries  
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations. 
Note: rolling standard deviation with window of 24 quarters. The last observation included is the 4th 
quarter of 2004.
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������Chart 3: Inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area
(Annual percentage changes; monthly data)
Sources: Eurostat, Consensus Economics Forecasts and ECB calculations.
Note: Longer-term inflation expectations from Consensus Economics Forecasts refer to a horizon of 
six to ten years, while those from the Survey of Professional Forecasters refer to five years ahead. 
Consensus inflation expectations until December 2002 are constructed on weighted average of five 
largest euro area countries, accounting for more than 80% of euro area GDP. The latest observation 
for overall HICP inflation refers to February 2005.
Chart 4: Ten-year maturity break-even inflation  
rates for the United States and the euro area  
(In percentages; daily data)
Sources: French Treasury and Reuters. The last observation refers to 31st March 2005.
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Table 2: Expected long-run inflation rate
Euro Area US Euro Area US
Consensus Economic 
Forecasts 1)
1990-1998
1999-2004
2.77
1.84 
3.47
2.50
0.47
0.09
0.50
0.12
10-year break-even 
inflation rates 2)
2001-2004 1.99 1.98 0.18 0.40
  Average Level   Standard Deviation
Table 3: Interest rates in euro area and in the United States
(percentages per annum)
Euro Area US Euro Area US
Long-term interest
rate 1)
1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
9.90
8.23
4.70
8.79
6.78
4.92
2.64
1.98
0.56
2.59
1.04
0.83
Short-term interest
rate 2)
1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
9.31
7.62
3.23
6.95
4.87
2.97
3.07
2.79
0.95
2.98
1.29
1.87
Implied forward
overnight interest rate 
ten years ahead3)
1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
8.01
7.73
5.76
–
–
–
0.96
0.93
0.37
–
–
–
Implied 1 year forward 
rate 9 years ahead4)
1999-2004 5.84 6.73 0.54 0.78
  Average Level   Standard Deviation
Sources: Consensus Economics, Reuters.
1)     Long-term inflation expectations at horizon of six to ten years. Data available on semi-annual 
frequency since 2003 (before the euro area data based on forecasts for FR, DE, IT, ES and NL).
2)     Based on daily data. Euro area data (maturity=2012) from November 2001, US data (maturity=2011) 
from February 2001.
Sources: BIS, ECB, ECB calculations, Eurostat, National data, Consensus Economics Forecasts, Reuters, 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
1)   Based on monthly data. 10-year government bond yields or the closest available bond maturity. 
2)   3-month money market interest rates; EURIBOR from January 1999 onwards. 
3)   Monthly data for Germany. 
4)   Daily data available from 1999.20
monetary  policy  to  past  and  current  devel-
opments.7 Long-term forward rates are thus 
mainly inﬂuenced by long-term inﬂation ex-
pectations,  by  the  natural  real  interest  rate 
expected to prevail in the long-run and by in-
ﬂation and other risk premia. The long-term 
(forward) natural real rate, however, should 
not be very volatile. Low volatility of forward 
rates expected today for many years into the 
future should thus normally be a good indicator 
for a high degree of credibility attached by ﬁ-
nancial markets to monetary policy. Table 3 
shows a substantial decline in the volatility of 
both long-term and short-term interest rates 
since the last decade. It is striking that the vol-
atility of interest rates in the euro area was still 
about twice as high as the one in the United 
States during the 1990s, while in the last six 
years this relation has reversed, with euro area 
interest rate volatility now being substantially 
below what can be observed in the US. This is 
especially the case for short-term rates, where 
the  standard  deviation  since  the  1990s  has 
dropped by two thirds in the euro area, while 
it has increased by half in the United States. 
Also the expected volatility of long-term euro 
rates seems to have somewhat decoupled from 
the one of United States interest rates during 
the last years (see Chart 6).
An impressive feature of the time series of the 
German forward overnight interest rates 10 
years ahead (see Chart 5) is the substantial and 
largely permanent decline which took place 
between  1997  and  the  introduction  of  the 
euro. (The average forward rate fell by about 
2 percentage points in the last six years com-
pared to the 1990s.) The convergence of long-
term rates in the late 1990s to very low levels 
is discussed in a recent contribution by Trichet 
(2005b) who attributes this success to a shift 
to a more credible policy regime. The deter-
mined and credible policy of national central 
banks, supported by a sound macroeconomic 
framework provided by the Maastricht Treaty, 
could convince markets in this period that the 
ECB would be uncompromising in its role as 
guardian of price stability.8 
While lower long-term real growth expecta-
tions  may  have  contributed  to  the  decline, 
lower  macroeconomic  volatility  likely  has 
contributed  to  low  and  stable  inﬂation 
expectations and lower risk premia in the last 
years. Even Germany now seems to enjoy a 
higher degree of monetary policy credibility 
and predictability than before the introduc-
tion of the euro. 
This high degree of monetary credibility, but 
also wage moderation, an increased propensity 
to save and other factors dampening aggregate 
demand, enhanced ﬁscal discipline since the 
mid-1990s (see Chart 7) and not least lower 
productivity  and  population  growth  (see 
Chart 8) all contributed to a situation where 
monetary policy could afford to, or had to, 
keep short term real rates substantially lower 
7     Central banks normally do not immediately reverse their policy rate moves. On the contrary, short-term interest rates in empirical 
estimates of monetary policy reaction functions tend to show a certain degree of positive auto-correlation over time. The literature 
speaks of interest rate inertia, history dependence or smoothing. The more monetary policy is expected to behave in such a gradual 
manner in the future, the stronger is the impact of a given current rate change (or economic shock) on medium-term interest rates. 
However, even if some shocks we observe today are regarded as rather persistent, and even if monetary policy is expected to exhibit a 
high degree of inertia or gradualism, it is unlikely that monetary policy can significantly influence (risk adjusted) long-term real forward 
rates, say 6 or 10 years into the future.
8     “This brings me back to 1997. The evidence that we gather from that episode is very difficult to rationalise and highly controvertible 
(…). But my reading of the episode is that it is consistent with a shift to a more credible policy regime. (…) Not only did the remain-
ing spread between the converging economies and the core countries progressively disappear. Thus, the remaining ambiguity about 
the very nature of the convergence process finally dissipated. But many commentators and market participants – not to mention 
policymakers – noted that the benchmark yield curve itself was changing shape in a direction that demonstrated an additional clear 
break in expectations.” Trichet (2005b).Chart 6: Implied bond market volatility in euro area and United States 
(Percentage per annum; ten-day moving average of daily data)
Source: Bloomberg.
Note: The implied volatility series represent the nearby implied volatility of the near contract generic 
future, rolled over 20 days prior to, as defined by Bloomberg. This means those 20 days prior to expiry of 
the contracts, a change in the choice of contract used to obtain the implied volatility is made from the 
contract closest to maturity to the next contract. The last observation refers to 31st March 2005.
Sources: Consensus Economics, Deutsche Bundesbank and ECB calculations. The last observations refer to 15th 
March 2005.
Note: Implied forward overnight interest rate ten years ahead – data for Germany. Consensus forecasts 
refer to a horizon of six to ten years ahead and are calculated as the sum of real GDP growth and infla-
tion expectations. Until December 2002, consensus forecasts are constructed as the weighted average of five 
largest euro area countries.
Chart 5: Implied forward overnight interest rate ten years ahead and 
Consensus Economics forecasts for long-term nominal GDP growth
(Percent, annually compounded)
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than in the 1990s in order to maintain price 
stability.
Indeed, as can be seen from Table 4, short-
term real interest rates averaged only 1.2% 
during the ﬁrst six years of the euro, while 
they averaged 4.8% during the 1990s. As in-
ﬂation or inﬂation expectations did not accel-
erate in recent years, it can be concluded that 
the factors mentioned contributed to a decline 
in the natural real rate of interest. Of course, 
simple averages are a rather rough and prob-
lematic estimates of the natural real rate. In 
any case, while it is already very demanding 
to estimate this concept ex post, it is much 
more difﬁcult to make predictions about the 
development of the natural real rate over the 
coming years.9 
Wages and unit labor costs 
Another  factor  behind  the  high  degree  of 
monetary stability in recent years is the wage 
moderation which likely has contributed to the 
relative large increase in employment growth, 
in  an  environment  of  overall  modest  real 
GDP growth. Table 5 shows that the average 
increase  in  nominal  wages  during  the  last 
six years fell by about two percentage points 
relative to the 1990s. Given that inﬂation on 
average fell only by around three quarters of 
a percentage point (see Table 1), a signiﬁcant 
moderation in real wage growth took place. 
This wage moderation ensured that in spite 
of weak labor productivity growth real unit 
labor cost declined, supporting conditions for 
employment growth. In parallel to real wage 
moderation,  the  volatility  of  nominal  and 
1970s
1980s
1990s
1990-1998
1999-March 2005
The current range of measueres 1)
-0.4 (1.9)
 4.3 (4.0)
4.5 (3.6)
4.8 (3.8)
1.2  ( – )
0.0 - 0.5
-5.2 -(2.3)
0.2 (1.4)
1.5 (1.3)
2.4 (1.3)
-0.4 ( – )
3.6 (8.0)
6.9 (7.7)
9.1 (6.5)
9.1 (6.5)
2.9  ( – ) 
1970s
1980s
1990s
1990-1998
199-March 2005
The current range of measueres 1
0.5 (3.2)
4.9 (4.8)
5.2 (4.5)
5.4 (4.6)
2.7 ( – )
1.7 - 2.2
-3.6 (1.7)
0.1 (2.4)
3.0 (2.8)
3.2 (2.8)
1.3  ( – )
3.9 (5.4)
7.1 (7.8)
6.9 (6.8)
6.9 (6.8)
4.1 ( – )
1)     Average of interest rates in March deflated with latest HICP, HICP excluding energy and unpro-
cessed food and consensus forecast.
  average   Absolute minima  Absolute maxima
Short-term real interest rates (three-month-EURIBOR since 1999)
Long-term real interest rates (10-year bond yield)
Table 4: Measures of real interest rates
(Percentages per annum; monthly data; German rates in parentheses)
9   For a discussion of the neutral real interest rate see ECB (2004).Chart 7: General government fiscal position in the euro area 
(Percentage of GDP)
Source: European Commission. 
Note: Euro area deficit data exclude the proceeds from the sale of UMTS licenses, which were particu-
larly large in 2000 (the euro area deficit/surplus including those proceeds is equal to 0.1% of GDP). 
Last observation: 2004. European Commission estimate/forecast for 2005-2006.
Chart 8: Measures of trend productivity growth in the euro area
(Percentages per annum; quarterly data)
Source: Area Wide Model. The last observation included is the 4th quarter of 2003.
Note: Labor productivity is real GDP per employed person; total factor productivity is the Solow re-
sidual of the aggregate production function. See also G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre (2001).
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real  unit  labor  costs  declined  substantially, 
in spite of various adverse shocks to oil, food 
and administered prices. This might signal a 
favorable change in the wage formation process 
in  the  euro  area,  which  reﬂects  increased 
credibility of monetary policy and at the same 
time  contributes  to  lower  unemployment 
volatility.10
2.2 Lower volatility of some real 
growth indicators 
It is of course not possible to draw any strong 
conclusions  concerning  the  contribution  of 
monetary  policy  from  just  comparing  the 
standard deviations of various real economy 
variables  during  recent  years.  Nevertheless, 
it is reassuring that the volatility not only of 
inﬂation,  inﬂation  expectations,  long-term 
interest  rates  and  nominal  wage  changes, 
but  also  of  real  variables  like  real  GDP 
and  employment  growth  has  partly  been 
signiﬁcantly lower in the euro area since 1999 
both compared to the last and the last two 
decades (see Charts 9 a and b; Table 6).
Chart 9a shows that the volatility of real GDP 
growth (measured as average over the past 24 
quarters)  dropped  from  levels  around  0.5-
Compensation per employee 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
1.56 (6.39)
1.06 (4.57)
0.59 (2.45)
1.52 (6.33)
0.54 (2.25)
0.84 (3.05)
0.80 (2.95)
0.23 (0.36)
0.68 (2.30) 
0.27 (0.55)
Nominal unit labor costs 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
1.08 (4.28)
0.64 (2.69)
0.39 (1.65)
0.88 (3.59)
0.32 (1.36)
0.90 (3.05)
0.74 (2.37)
0.37 (0.82)
0.64 (1.88)
0.43 (0.96)
Real unit labor costs 1) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
-0.10 (-0.44)
 0.00 (0.00)
-0.09 (-0.35)
-0.01 (-0.04)
-0.10 (-0.41)
0.55 (1.20)
0.58 (1.30)
0.31 (0.54)
0.54 (1.26)
0.42 (0.72)
Table 5: Labor cost developments in the euro area  
(Quarter-on-quarter percentage changes; year-on-year percentage  
changes in brackets, seasonally adjusted)
10     An increased flexibility of real wages (possibly related to a lower degree of indexation to past inflation) can be expected to be associ-
ated with higher (short-term) real wage volatility and lower volatility of unit labor costs in case of supply shocks. In other words, real 
wages become more aligned with labor productivity.
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations.
Note: Data available since1991, prior to this data taken from AWM model database (see G. Fagan, J. Henry 
and R. Mestre (2001)). 
1)   Nominal unit labor costs deflated by the GDP deflator.
  Average   Standard Deviation 0.6%  during  most  of  the  last  two  decades 
to  around  0.3-0.4%  in  the  late  1990s.11 
Interestingly, this fall in real volatility in the 
late 1990s comes some years after the decline 
in inﬂation variance (see Charts 2a and 2b).
The reduced macroeconomic volatilities must 
be  seen  against  the  background  of  the  high 
degree of uncertainty caused in recent years by 
an unusual clustering of major real disturbances 
and  shocks  like  oil  and  commodity  price 
shocks, food price shocks, the bursting of the 
stock market bubble and the major risks and 
disturbances related to terrorist attacks and 
the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. It is not difﬁcult 
to imagine how ﬁnancial markets in the euro 
area, intra-European exchange rates and possi-
bly also interest rates would have been affected 
without the existence of the euro.
Concerning trends, real GDP growth averaged 
around 1.9% since 1999, and thus was only 
Chart 9a: Rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in real 
GDP in euro area and United States  
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
11     This fall in real volatility in the late 1990s is particularly pronounced in Germany and Spain. In Italy it comes a few years later and in France 
real volatility had already stabilized at very low levels since the second half of the 1980s (see Chart 9b). Interestingly, while the standard 
deviation in real GDP growth in recent years, compared to the late 1990s, fell further in Germany, Italy and Spain, and stabilized at a low 
level in France, the euro area aggregate increased slightly over the same period from around 0.3 to 0.4%. This may reflect an increased 
synchronisation of the business cycle within the euro area and/or increased volatility in smaller euro area countries.
Sources: Eurostat, ECB calculations and AWM database. 
Note: rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in HICP inflation with window of 24 quarters. 
The last observation included is the 4th quarter of 2004.
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slightly lower than the average realized over 
the last two decades. It may also surprise some 
observers, especially those who are very much 
concentrated on the German economy, that 
employment  growth  since  the  introduction 
of the euro was on average 1% per annum, 
double as high as during the period of high and 
volatile inﬂation (see Table 7).
The following section discusses why the reduc-
tion of macroeconomic volatility might, in part, 
also reﬂect a positive impact of credible mon-
etary policy on the supply side of the economy.
3 How credible and predictable 
monetary policy can improve the 
structure of the supply side of  
the economy 
It is now widely accepted that monetary policy 
should aim ﬁrst and foremost at price stability. 
Not least the experience of the Great Inﬂation 
during the 1970s and the costs associated with 
the related loss of monetary policy credibility 
and  macroeconomic  stability  convinced 
researchers, politicians and, of course, central 
bankers of the importance of low and stable 
inﬂation.12 
Chart 9b: Rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in real 
GDP in some euro area countries 
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations. 
Note: rolling standard deviation of quarterly changes in HICP inflation with window of 24 quarters. 
The last observation included is the 4th quarter of 2004.
12     The US Federal Reserve, although having a dual mandate, is also very clear that price stability has clear priority and serves the 
achievement of the other objectives: “For our part, the Federal Reserve will pursue its statutory objectives of price stability and 
maximum sustainable employment – the latter of which we have learned can best be achieved in the long run by maintaining price 
stability. This is the surest contribution that the Federal Reserve can make in fostering the economic prosperity and well-being of our 
nation and its people.” A. Greenspan (2005).
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Table 6: Volatility of real economic variables  
(Quarter-on-quarter percentage changes; year-on-year percentage  
changes in brackets; seasonally adjusted)
Sources: Eurostat, National data and ECB calculations.
1)     From 1991 Eurostat data for the euro area, prior to this data taken from AWM model database (see 
G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre (2001)). 2) Civilian data for United States.
3)     Measured as ratio of real GDP to total employment. Euro area data on total employment from 1980, 
on real GDP from 1991 (prior to this data taken from AWM model database).
4)     Percentage of labor force. Eurostat data for the euro area from 1993, prior to this data taken from 
AWM model database.
Euro Area  US
Real GDP 1) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.54 (1.34)
0.49 (1.33)
0.39 (1.20)
0.58 (1.57)
0.37 (1.08)
0.79 (2.08)
0.53 (1.50)
0.56 (1.55)
0.52 (1.40)
0.52 (1.40)
Real Consumption 1) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.56 (1.32)
0.54 (1.21)
0.39 (1.09)
0.61 (1.43)
0.40 (1.00)
0.67 (1.58)
0.51 (1.37)
0.39 (1.00)
0.51 (1.20)
0.38 (0.95)
Employment 2) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.29 (1.06)
0.34 (1.24)
0.20 (0.78)
0.34 (1.27)
0.20 (0.75)
0.43 (1.28)
0.35 (1.00)
0.44 (1.05)
0.36 (1.09)
0.38 (0.97)
Productivity 3) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.46 (0.82)
0.40 (0.81)
0.29 (0.67)
0.45 (0.83)
0.30 (0.67)
0.57 (1.12)
0.39 (0.86)
0.65 (1.12)
0.38 (0.76)
0.56 (0.94)
Unemployment rate 4) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
1.38
0.99
0.48
0.90
1.01
1.43
0.97
0.82
0.76
0.71
Standard Deviation28
Sources: Eurostat, National data and ECB calculations.
1)     From 1991 Eurostat data for the euro area, prior to this data taken from AWM model database   
(see G. Fagan, J. Henry and R. Mestre (2001)). 
2)   Civilian data for United States.
3)     Measured as ratio of real GDP to total employment. Euro area data on total employment from 1980, 
on real GDP from 1991 (prior to this data taken from AWM model database).
4)     Percentage of labor force. Eurostat data for the euro area from 1993, prior to this data taken   
from AWM model database.
Table 7: Average growth rates of GDP, consumption and employment 
(Quarter-on-quarter percentage changes; year-on-year  
percentage changes in brackets; seasonally adjusted)
Euro Area  US
Real GDP 1) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.50 (2.10)
0.46 (1.96)
0.46 (1.88)
0.58 (2.41)
0.49 (1.98)
0.77 (3.20)
0.76 (2.96)
0.73 (3.04)
0.70 (2.81)
0.85 (3.40)
Real Consumption 1) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.49 (1.99)
0.45 (1.83)
0.42 (1.83)
0.55 (2.33)
0.48 (1.90)
0.82 (3.38)
0.78 (3.06)
0.90 (3.74)
0.69 (2.83)
0.96 (3.85)
Employment 2) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.14 (0.54)
0.12 (0.49)
0.25 (1.08)
0.15 (0.64)
0.27 (1.08)
0.38 (1.58)
0.32 (1.28)
0.24 (0.97)
0.35 (1.47)
0.31 (1.22)
Productivity 3) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
0.36 (1.56)
0.35 (1.47)
0.21 (0.79)
0.44 (1.76)
0.22 (0.89)
0.39 (1.59)
0.44 (1.66)
0.49 (2.05)
0.35 (1.32)
0.54 (2.15)
Unemployment rate 4) 1980-1998
1990-1998
1999-2004
1987-1995
1996-2004
9.09
9.79
8.50
9.38
9.14
6.64
5.93
5.04
6.16
5.01
Average29
Improvements  in  overall  welfare  associated 
with credible monetary policy do not show up 
to any great extent in trend GDP growth, es-
pecially over the short- to medium-term hori-
zon. Both well-anchored inﬂation expectations 
and  better  predictability  of  interest  rates 
reduce uncertainty concerning future real in-
come and wealth. This in turn enhances the 
welfare of individuals averse to risk, even if 
it is not associated with higher GDP levels. 
On  the  contrary,  to  the  extent  that  lower 
macroeconomic risks allow some economiza-
tion on inventories and hedging activities, they 
may have a temporary negative effect on mea-
sured GDP growth. 
Fiscal and structural policies as well as wages 
and labor market features determined by social 
partners are the main factors having an impact 
on employment growth, job creation and the 
volatility of real activity. In addition, cyclical 
developments are greatly affected by external 
disturbances like shocks to global growth, in-
ternational traded goods and commodity pric-
es. Nevertheless, a credible monetary policy 
can inﬂuence the supply side of the economy 
and thereby help to reduce real macroeconom-
ic volatilities.13 This section investigates this 
channel of monetary policy. It is less present 
in the public debate, which often concentrates 
on the short-term demand effects of monetary 
policy, but potentially has far-reaching impli-
cations for welfare and for the conduct of mon-
etary policy.14
There are three aspects which are relevant in 
this context. The impact of monetary policy 
on  the  price  and  wage  formation  process 
(and, thus, on the importance of past inﬂation 
in  the  aggregate  supply  curve),  on  the  risk 
management  of  private  and  public  agents, 
and on longer-term employment in the event 
hysteresis effects are relevant.
3.1 A credible monetary policy tends 
to reduce the persistence of price and 
wage inﬂation 
A more credible monetary policy anchors in-
ﬂation expectations better and, thus, reduces 
inﬂation  uncertainty  and  persistence.15  In  a 
world of uncertainty and learning, systematic 
private  behavior  may  be  affected  by  the 
perceived  degree  of  credibility  and  predict-
ability of monetary policy. In particular the ef-
fects of new policy announcements on private 
behavior will depend on past experience with 
similar announcements and on the soundness 
of the institution. 
With  agents  having  built  up  trust  in  stable 
prices, there is less reason for them to change 
their inﬂation expectations and, thus, current 
prices and wages at the micro level, if there is a 
change in current or past inﬂation on the mac-
ro level. Building such trust normally takes 
time16 and the process needs to be supported 
by a convincing institutional design and a suc-
cessful track record. The latter becomes more 
important  if  the  former  is  less  convincing, 
13     “… transparency contributes to macroeconomic stability and long-term growth by enhancing the price and wage setting mechanism, and 
by improving the functioning of the labor market. A credible monetary policy strategy oriented towards price stability contributes to 
moderate nominal and real wage developments. Workers do not have to ask for extra wage increases to compensate for inflation risk and 
firms know beforehand that they will not be able to pass higher wages on to consumer prices. Overall, transparent and credible monetary 
policy enhances firms ability to manage their production costs, retain profitability and create new jobs.” Trichet (2005a).
14     Bayoumi and Sgherri (2004b) argue that “most of the fall in US: output volatility between the early 1980s and now can be ascribed to 
improved supply-side responses resulting from better monetary policies.” (p. 16).
15     “ … inflation persistence need not necessarily be an inherent feature of the economy, but can be also attributable to monetary policy 
itself. The credibility of the central bank is crucial in this regard. … This underlines the importance of giving clear signals in order to 
properly anchor inflation expectations; in this way, a credible policy regime that is focused on price stability will have the potential to 
reduce the persistence of inflation. This is also a key finding of the IPN: empirical estimates of inflation persistence fall significantly 
when accounting for shifts in the mean of inflation, which could be related to changes in the monetary policy regime.” Issing (2004).
16     See Bayoumi and S. Sgherri (2004b).30
and vice versa. In any case, a more credible 
monetary policy should, over time, reduce the 
degree of backward-looking or indexation ele-
ments in private sector decisions on wage and 
price-setting. The structure of the aggregate 
supply curve changes such that there is less 
weight on past inﬂation in the determination 
of current inﬂation. This welfare-enhancing 
change of the supply side of the economy im-
plies a lower (intrinsic) persistence or inertia 
in inﬂation and, thus, an improved short-term 
trade-off between inﬂation and real activity. 
This in turn tends to reduce the volatility of 
real activity associated with shocks to inﬂa-
tion. A similar effect can be expected from the 
increased  predictability  of  monetary  policy, 
which reduces uncertainty about future eco-
nomic conditions and should make private de-
cisions more forward-looking. 
For the United States T. Bayoumi and S. Sgh-
erri (2004a) ﬁnd strong evidence that a more 
predictable monetary policy appears to make 
the  supply  response  gradually  less  sluggish. 
They ﬁnd a close and statistically signiﬁcant 
long-term link between changes in uncertain-
ty regarding aggregate demand that are due to 
uncertainty in predicting the real interest rate 
determined by the central bank and the coef-
ﬁcient on past inﬂation in the Phillips curve, 
with no evidence of reverse causation. This has 
a number of important policy implications. In 
particular “it implies that there is a direct con-
nection between some of the more recent im-
provements in the US economy, such as the fall 
in output volatility, and the conduct of mon-
etary policy. If a more stable monetary policy 
eventually makes the inﬂationary response of 
the economy less backward-looking, this re-
duction in inﬂation inertia can make the entire 
supply side of the economy more ﬂexible, re-
ducing output ﬂuctuations. In short, it appears 
that some of the seemingly magical improve-
ments in the supply side of the US economy 
since the early 1970s can be attributed to Fed-
eral Reserve behavior.”17
It is not unlikely for there also to have been 
a similar effect in the euro area in more re-
cent years.18 While the period since the second 
half of the 1990s may still be too short to ﬁnd 
strong and signiﬁcant econometric evidence 
for such a change of the supply side of the euro 
area economy, it is interesting to observe the 
development of the persistence of price and 
wage inﬂation over more recent periods.
Fortunately, a major research project devel-
oped by the ECB and the 12 national central 
banks of the Eurosystem is under way to study 
price rigidities and inﬂation persistence in the 
euro area. This Inﬂation Persistence Network 
(IPN)  has  already  produced  a  large  volume 
of  studies  on  various  aspects  of  the  topic, 
which are summarized in an interim report 
by Angeloni et al. (2004). They report that a 
number of studies ﬁnd that both reduced-form 
and  structural  estimates  of  inﬂation  persis-
tence are reduced if the estimates cover more 
recent samples or stable monetary regimes, or 
at least if breaks are allowed for which reﬂect 
shifts to lower inﬂation objectives that took 
17     T. Bayoumi and S. Sgherri (2004a). They also stress: “Linking monetary policy and supply responses … first calls into question the 
large body of work that assesses monetary rules by assuming that such rules have no impact on underlying private sector behavior. 
While such analysis may be useful for the short-term impact of changes in monetary rules, the analysis in this paper suggests that it 
is fraught with difficulty as a guide to the longer-term consequences of a policy shift. Second, the inertia associated with the public 
first learning about the new policy rule and then incorporating it into their supply-side responses helps explain why the disinflation 
of the 1980s was so difficult.” 
18     “Some have argued that inflation persistence is the by-product of monetary policy regimes that are unable to anchor long-term in-
flation expectations. If so, we should see in the coming years dramatic drops in inflation persistence in all euro area countries… ” 
Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004).31
place in most industrialized countries during 
the 1980s or 1990s. Angeloni et al. (2004) 
conclude:  “The  bulk  of  the  micro  evidence 
points to signiﬁcant stickiness in price setting 
in the euro area. … The evidence collected by 
the IPN in favor of signiﬁcant “intrinsic” in-
ﬂation persistence seems at the moment to be 
weaker than that supporting the existence of 
price level stickiness. … Finally, time series 
estimates seem to provide direct and indirect 
conﬁrmation  that  inﬂation  regimes  possibly 
linked to expectations and to monetary policy, 
matter in determining the persistence of the 
inﬂation process.” 
Indeed, Gadzinski and Orlandi (2004), using 
the sample period 1984 to 2003, ﬁnd evidence 
of an intercept break at the end of 1995 for 
euro area HICP inﬂation. Including a dummy 
for this break they ﬁnd a point estimate of the 
persistence parameter of 0.64 (90% interval: 
0.41-0.98).19  However,  they  do  not  report 
estimates for the sample following this break, 
presumably because the sample is rather short 
and, moreover, as is also the case with some 
other studies, they do not ﬁnd evidence for a 
break in the level of persistence.20 
Nevertheless, given that a new regime of cred-
ible price stability was established during the 
second half of the 1990s with the introduction 
of  the  euro  and  the  associated  convergence 
process, one may argue that it is reasonable 
to look also at estimates which cover just this 
shorter sample period, i.e. the new price sta-
bility regime.21
For this reason, the following Charts (see Charts 
10a-b; 11a-c; 12a-b) show rolling estimates of 
the persistence coefﬁcient of quarterly changes 
in HICP inﬂation and nominal wages, in most 
cases using a window of ten years (one set of 
Charts uses two lags and the other three lags 
of the change in inﬂation in the estimation of 
the simple autoregressive process). The mea-
sure of persistence is based on the estimate of 
p from the following equation (1):      
         22
Interestingly,  the  estimates  of  inﬂation 
persistence (but less so for wage growth) vary 
quite a lot when moving from two to three 
lags of inﬂation in the estimated AR model. 
19     As indicated above, the individual euro area countries have shown quite different dynamics of inflation during the last two decades. 
For example, Levin and Piger (2004) find strong evidence of a break in the mean of the inflation process for Italy in the mid 1990s 
(and, in the early 1990s, also for the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden), while they find very little evidence for 
such a break in the case of France, Germany, and the Netherlands. 
20     Levin and Piger (2004) also find breaks in the mean of the inflation time series for the United States and many other industrial-
ized countries, but not in the dynamic parameters of these processes. Nevertheless, they conclude that once they allow for a break   
in the mean “many of the inflation series exhibit very little persistence” and more generally, “… high inflation persistence is not 
an inherent characteristic of industrial economies” (p.6). Bilke (2005) also finds no break in the level of persistence concerning   
French data. Nevertheless, Bilke shows a Chart (see Fig. 5) with estimates of French CPI persistence based on 10 years rolling   
regressions which reveals that point estimates fluctuate around zero for sample periods covering the last 10 to 12 years. 
21     Levin and Piger (2004), when using Bayesian estimates instead of classical estimates, find evidence of structural breaks in the   
autoregressive  parameters  of  CPI  inflation  in  France  and  Germany.  Interestingly,  for  these  countries  the  classical  estimates   
detect no break in the mean and relatively high persistence. It could therefore be suspected that in cases where the (implicit)   
inflation objective and the conduct of monetary policy have changed rather gradually over time, the classical tests fail to detect a 
single break in the mean (perhaps as there were effectively many small breaks) and, thus, overestimate the degree of persistence.   
For example, French inflation declined gradually from around 6% in 1984-1985 to levels below 2% since the second half of the 
1990s, but standard tests presented in Levin and Piger fail to find a break in the mean. However, given that France experienced a 
clear regime change during this period, there can be no doubt from an economic point of view that the inflation process in more 
recent years is different from the one observed before the regime change.
22     The number of lags included is either two or three. For Charts 10a-b and 11a-c π refers to the quarterly change in HICP inflation. For 
Charts 12a and b π refers to the quarterly change in nominal compensation per employee. It should be stressed that such least-square 
estimators of the persistence parameter are biased downward, in particular for large (true) persistence values. In these Charts, no 
correction for this bias is included. This shows that results concerning inﬂation 
persistence may be rather sensitive to the pre-
cise speciﬁcation (number of lags) used and 
may therefore need to be interpreted with a 
grain of salt. 
For the euro area, both speciﬁcations show that 
the degree of persistence in price and wage in-
ﬂation over the most recent ten-year windows 
clearly fell compared with the estimates ob-
served over previous windows. While this is 
certainly not a formal test for a break in the 
persistence  of  inﬂation  associated  with  the 
start of the price stability regime in the euro 
area, it is at least not inconsistent with inﬂa-
tion persistence in the euro area being lower 
now than it was a few years ago.
The persistence estimates in the four largest 
euro area countries also fell compared with 
the values observed during the last years of 
the 1990s. However, there is a larger degree 
of  heterogeneity  than  that  observed  for  the 
ten-year windows ending during the ﬁrst half 
of the 1990s, which seems mainly due to the 
relatively rapid decline in inﬂation persistence 
observed (for the ten-year windows ending) 
during  the  last  ﬁve  years  in  Germany  (and 
France for the model with K=2). Interesting-
ly, this heterogeneity in the most recent years 
seems very much diminished (in particular for 
K=2), if one looks at a slightly shorter window 
of 32 quarters (see Chart 11c).
Chart 10: Rolling estimate of the persistence coefficient of quarterly 
changes in HICP inflation in the euro area and the United States
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Chart 10a: two lags of inflation (K=2); window of 40 quarters
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�������������Chart 11: Rolling estimate of the persistence coefficient of quarterly 
changes in HICP inflation for some euro area countries 
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Chart 11a: two lags of inflation (K=2); window of 40 quarters
Chart 10b: three lags of inflation (K=3); window of 40 quarters
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations. See equation (1). The last observation included is the 4th quarter of 2004.
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������Chart 11b: three lags of inflation (K=3); window of 40 quarters
Chart 11c: two lags of inflation (K=2); window of 32 quarters
Sources: Eurostat and ECB calculations. See equation (1). The last observation included is the 4th quarter of 2004.
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������Chart 12: Rolling persistence coefficient of quarterly changes in 
compensation per employee in the euro area
(in percentage points; quarterly data; seasonally adjusted)
Chart 12b: three lags of nominal wage growth (K=3);  
window of 40 quarters
Chart 12a: two lags of nominal wage growth (K=2); window of 40 quarters
Sources: Eurostat, ECB calculations and AWM database. See equation (1). The last observation included 
is the 4th quarter of 2004.
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If thorough econometric and structural analy-
sis were to conﬁrm that the fall in price and 
wage inﬂation persistence reﬂects a decline in 
intrinsic persistence (e.g. a decline in the in-
dexation of prices and wages to past inﬂation), 
there would be signiﬁcant consequences for 
monetary policy.23 
3.2 A predictable and systematic 
monetary policy tends to enhance 
risk management and macroeconomic 
stability
Although often neglected, there is a further 
supply-side effect which stems from a cred-
ible and transparent monetary policy frame-
work  and  tends  to  reduce  macroeconomic 
uncertainty and volatility. Effective monetary 
policy transparency implies that the system-
atic responses of monetary policy to new de-
velopments, or, in more technical terms, the 
main features of the reaction function of the 
central bank, are relatively well understood 
by the private sector. A good understanding of 
monetary policy in this sense reduces uncer-
tainty about future macroeconomic develop-
ments and allows private agents to better man-
age and hedge their risks.24
Risk  management  can  be  improved  if  pri-
vate agents can better predict the systematic 
responses  of  policy  rates  to  various  macro-
economic  developments.  For  example,  the 
conditional  covariance  risks  associated  with 
long-term  ﬁnancing  and  investment  deci-
sions  (e.g.  concerning  the  choice  between 
equity and debt and between ﬁxed and vari-
able  rate  debt)  can  then  be  better  assessed 
and managed. This in turn would reduce the 
overall  risks  associated  with  investment,  ﬁ-
nancing and employment decisions and, thus, 
improve the welfare of agents averse to risk. 
For example, better risk management at ﬁrm 
level will make the individual external ﬁnance 
premium  less  vulnerable  to  macroeconomic 
shocks,  thereby  stabilizing  employment  for 
given wages. Anticipating this, ﬁrms will have 
incentives to increase employment and invest-
ment in human capital as it becomes less likely 
that they will have to reduce employment due 
to  rising  external  ﬁnance  premia.  Overall, 
better risk management tends to lead not only 
to a higher level and efﬁciency of investment 
and employment, but also to greater resilience 
of  the  economy  to  macroeconomic  shocks, 
thus enhancing macroeconomic and ﬁnancial 
stability and job creation. 
Increased  credibility  and  predictability  of 
monetary  policy  should  also  help  to  reduce 
macro risk premia in ﬁnancial market prices. 
For example, if long-term inﬂation uncertainty 
is reduced, inﬂation risk premia in long-term 
interest rates should fall. Moreover, if markets 
understand that in an environment of price 
stability short-term real rates tend to be high-
er in periods of strong real growth and lower 
in periods of weak growth, they will regard 
long-term  bonds  as  a  certain  hedge  against 
persistent real income ﬂuctuations, which may 
reduce or even turn negative the so-called co-
variance risk premium included in long-term 
interest rates. The signiﬁcant fall of the levels 
and volatility of long-term interest rates ob-
served since 1997-98 (see Charts 5 and 6 and 
23     See Issing (2004) for a discussion of the implications of a given degree of inflation persistence for the conduct of monetary policy.
24     “… the central bank’s communication should ensure that markets understand the systematic responses of monetary policy to economic 
developments and the current assessment of the central bank. Successful central bank communication supports predictability and 
correct price formation in financial markets, contributes to efficient allocation of funds and reduces uncertainty about future interest 
rates. In an environment where the predictability of interest rate movements and their relation with key macroeconomic developments 
is well understood, firms can better manage their balance sheets. This reduces both their vulnerability to economic shocks and their 
risk management costs and creates the conditions for better investment decisions.” Trichet (2005a).37
Table 3) may in part also be explained by these 
effects of predictable monetary policy.
How can monetary policy contribute to a bet-
ter  understanding  of  the  likely  conditional 
relation  between  interest  rates,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  other  macroeconomic  variables 
which  also  impact  on  economic  conditions 
and balance sheets of ﬁrms, banks and private 
households, such as inﬂation, real growth or 
asset prices, on the other hand? It is, of course, 
not possible for the central bank to publish a 
quantitative reaction function specifying the 
likely response of policy rates to all possible 
future  contingencies.25  What  is  needed  is  a 
transparent  strategy  that  outlines  the  main 
principles and the analytical and procedural 
framework governing the systematic conduct 
of policy over time, including an ongoing ex-
planation of day-to-day policy decisions. Such 
a rule-based framework26 enhances credibility 
and predictability and allows the private sec-
tor to better form interest rate expectations 
and at the same time to fully understand the 
conditional nature of these expectations. From 
the point of view of both the central bank and 
the market, this seems preferable to announc-
ing a likely path for future policy rates, as such 
announcements always risk being misunder-
stood,  in  particular  because  of  their  highly 
conditional nature.
 
3.3  Monetary  policy,  wage  formation 
and unemployment volatility 
Importantly,  the  positive  supply-side  effects 
of credible monetary policy discussed here do 
not necessarily require that the level of individ-
ual prices or wages becomes less sticky, in the 
sense that a higher frequency of price or wage 
changes is observed. On the contrary, if workers 
and ﬁrms have more conﬁdence in monetary sta-
bility and predictability, they may tend to reduce 
the information and transaction costs associated 
with  preparing  and  implementing  changes  in 
individual prices and re-negotiating wages, im-
plying that nominal rigidity at the micro level 
may appear to have increased. For example, as 
regards wage rigidity, if workers have gained the 
belief that monetary policy behaves in a credible 
and symmetric manner and is determined to 
avoid second-round effects related to cost push 
or supply shocks, they no longer need to fear 
that high and persistent inﬂation may erode their 
real income. The average duration of wage con-
tracts may then over time become longer, while 
(implicit or explicit) indexation of wages to past 
inﬂation is reduced, although “indexation” to the 
inﬂation objective of the central bank might be 
increased. 
This is possibly a surprising result. Over time 
successful monetary policy may tend to dampen 
persistence in wage and price inﬂation, but at 
the same time increase the measured degree 
of (symmetric) nominal wage stickiness at the 
micro level.27
In any case, credible and systematic monetary 
policy  may  impact  on  the  wage  formation 
process and thereby on the supply-side of the 
economy. For example, based on the under-
standing that the transitory ﬁrst-round effects 
25     “The public needs to have as clear as possible an understanding of the rule that the central bank follows in deciding what it does. 
Inevitably, the best way to communicate about this will be by offering the public an explanation of the decisions that have already been 
made; the bank itself would probably not be able to describe how it might act in all conceivable circumstances, most of which will 
never arise. But it is important to remember that the goal of transparency should make the central bank’s behavior more systematic, 
and to make its systematic character more evident to the public… ” Woodford (2001, pp. 17-18).
26     See ECB (2001).
27     A recent study for the US economy by Edge, Laubach and Williams (2003) that focuses on the response of prices and wages to 
technology shocks finds that prices adjust very flexibly and moreover there is no intrinsic inflation inertia. However, it estimates a 
high degree of inertia in nominal wages and also some wage inflation persistence. The authors acknowledge that this latter result is 
difficult to reconcile with micro-evidence, which suggests more flexible wages.38
of  supply  shocks  on  inﬂation  are  accepted, 
while it is absolutely clear that second-round 
effects  will  be  counteracted,  more  longer-
term nominal wage contracts which are not 
indexed to past inﬂation might be chosen. The 
transitory ﬁrst-round impact of supply shocks 
on inﬂation will then directly affect real wages, 
given that (most) nominal wages are ﬁxed for 
some time. This ensures that negative supply 
shocks have a smaller downward impact on 
unemployment than in the case where wages 
are indexed to past inﬂation. However, in or-
der to accept such an endogenous fall in real 
wages in the event of adverse supply shocks 
(and to resist the attempt to effectively index 
wages to past inﬂation), workers and unions 
need to be sure that monetary policy acts in 
a “fair” or symmetric manner and lets posi-
tive supply shocks result in transitorily lower 
inﬂation, such that real wages in this case can 
rise without a need for re-negotiation of nomi-
nal wage levels. Such a change in the process 
of wage formation may be welfare-enhancing 
as less wage indexation contributes to lower 
volatility  of  unemployment  in  response  to 
supply  shocks.  It  may  also  make  monetary 
policy  easier,  as  it  could  help  to  better  an-
chor economy-wide inﬂation expectations and 
avoid policy rates having to react aggressively 
to the initial inﬂationary impact of supply dis-
turbances. Of course, it would be even bet-
ter if nominal wages would quickly respond to 
supply shocks, which would further contribute 
to dampening volatility of unemployment, but 
minimizing (intrinsic) persistence in wage in-
ﬂation and/or indexation of wages to current 
and past inﬂation would already be an impor-
tant improvement.28
It  is  certainly  the  case  that,  in  order  to 
empirically assess the possible impact of price 
stability on the wage formation process, there 
is a need to better understand the wage setting 
and the wage formation process in the euro 
area, and in particular any changes which may 
have taken place in this respect in recent years. 
It would be particularly important to obtain 
a full picture of all the components of hourly 
wage  and  unit  labor  costs,  including  taxes, 
variable  compensation  and  bonus  payments 
and effective working time.
3.4 Supply-side effects of monetary 
policy and the hysteresis argument 
Two  decades  ago,  Blanchard  and  Summers 
(1986;  1987)  started  the  hysteresis  debate. 
They argued that any increase in the actual rate 
of unemployment will, if it lasts sufﬁciently 
long, likely lead to an increase in the natural 
rate of unemployment. There are various po-
tential sources of hysteresis. First, unions may 
be mainly interested in the welfare of those who 
are employed (insider-outsider problem). This 
would imply that real wages are set at too high a 
level, making it impossible for the unemployed 
to ﬁnd new (ofﬁcial) jobs. Second, those who 
are unemployed for some time lose their skills 
due to a lack of training on the job or learning 
by doing. This makes it more difﬁcult for them 
to ﬁnd a new position, in particular if employ-
ers are averse to risk and face large hiring and 
ﬁring costs. Third, if ﬁscal policies react by in-
creasing unemployment beneﬁts and employ-
ment protection, incentives to accept new jobs 
will decline and ﬁrms will demand less labor, 
in particular if taxes are expected to rise as a 
result of increased government expenditures. 
28     The main contribution for lower unemployment must of course come from other measures. The contribution of real wage develop-
ments is discussed by Issing (2000a): “… real wage increases in relation to labor productivity growth should take into account the 
need to strengthen, where necessary, and subsequently maintain the profitability of employment-creating investment. In principle, as 
a very broad guideline real wage increases in line with productivity gains would ensure no upward pressure on unit labor costs while 
not necessarily contributing to further employment and growth. … in order to improve employability, wage agreements should take 
into account differentials in productivity levels according to qualifications, skills and geographical areas.”39
It is crucial to see that all these explanations 
for hysteresis require that real wages do not 
adjust ﬂexibly enough to clear the labor mar-
ket. Against this background, it is somewhat 
surprising  that  the  hysteresis  argument, 
which  identiﬁes  labor  market  rigidities  and 
regulations as the ﬁnal source of a persistent 
impact of actual unemployment on the natu-
ral rate, has been used by some observers to 
ask for monetary accommodation to prevent 
persistent increases in unemployment. Giving 
monetary policy such a responsibility would, 
however, be misguided, not only because it is 
very difﬁcult to estimate the unemployment 
gap in real time. Most importantly, it would 
endanger the credibility of monetary policy 
and undermine both the positive supply-side 
effects of monetary policy discussed above and 
the incentives for governments and social part-
ners to remove the structural rigidities which 
are at the source of too high unemployment lev-
els. Not least the “Great Inﬂation” during the 
1970s has shown that imposing an activist sta-
bilization role on monetary authorities implies 
major risks for economic performance. “… in 
a dynamic economy with agents continuously 
learning, the rise in inﬂation resulting from 
the policy errors and the activist approach to 
stabilization policy unmoored inﬂation expec-
tations, eventually resulting in the stagﬂation 
of the 1970s. Towards the end of that decade, 
the fatal ﬂaw in activist policy strategies was 
recognized. Out of this experience grew the 
realization that active control of resource utili-
zation should be downplayed and that policies 
focusing on price stability could achieve better 
outcomes in terms of the stabilization of both 
inﬂation and unemployment.”29
More  recently  Blanchard  (2003)  admitted 
that “I still do not have a good sense today of 
how  important  this  [hysteresis]  channel  is.” 
In any case, if hysteresis is indeed an impor-
tant feature of the European labor markets, 
it  becomes  even  more  important  to  ensure 
that real wages can adjust quickly enough to 
new economic conditions, are not indexed to 
past inﬂation and do not include risk premia 
for  uncertain  inﬂation.  As  discussed  above, 
credible monetary policy can, over time, con-
tribute  to  this  aim.  Overburdening  central 
banks  with  extended  mandates  risks  being 
counterproductive. 
4 Conclusion
Macroeconomic volatility in the euro area has 
fallen substantially during recent years com-
pared with the levels observed in the 1980s or 
the early 1990s. The persistence of price and 
wage inﬂation also appears to have declined, 
which in turn seems to have supported the 
stabilization of inﬂation and output volatility 
at low levels in spite of major supply shocks 
hitting the euro area in recent years. There are 
good theoretical arguments that credible mon-
etary policy has contributed to this success by 
inﬂuencing price and wage-setting behavior. 
If credible monetary policy contributes to re-
duced indexation of prices and wages to past 
inﬂation, and possibly also to a longer dura-
tion of the level of individual prices and wages, 
it is of course problematic to assume that any 
observation of a low frequency of price and 
wage  changes  necessarily  implies  that  there 
are severe “rigidities” or “nominal inertia” that 
can and should fully be removed by appropri-
ate structural reforms. 
The  discussion  in  this  paper  has  remained 
largely descriptive and theoretical. Thorough 
empirical and structural analysis is needed to 
29   Orphanides and Williams (2004).40
investigate the link between monetary policy 
and macroeconomic volatility in the euro area 
more  closely.  Nevertheless,  a  few  tentative 
conclusions concerning the key principles of 
the conduct of monetary policy may be drawn 
at this stage. 
First, monetary policy credibility and predict-
ability allows price and wage setters to build 
trust and, over time, to change their supply 
behavior,  reducing  (de  facto)  indexation  to 
past inﬂation and instead using the quantitive 
deﬁnition  of  price  stability  provided  by  the 
central bank as a guide for updating nominal 
wage  contracts.  A  strong  and  quick  short-
term response of nominal and real wages to 
supply shocks, with negative (positive) shocks 
leading  to  lower  (higher)  real  wages  would 
certainly appear optimal for reducing unem-
ployment volatility. However, the transaction 
and uncertainty costs related to frequent re-
negotiation of nominal wages may be signiﬁ-
cant, preventing a very high degree of nominal 
and  real  wage  ﬂexibility.  In  this  case,  the 
principles followed by monetary policy may 
have important implication for the wage pro-
cess and employment volatility.
The  ECB’s  monetary  policy  has  a  medium-
term orientation and tailors its response to the 
nature and magnitude of shocks. For example, 
in the case of cost-push shocks monetary pol-
icy may respond more gradually than in the 
case of aggregate demand shocks or labor cost 
shocks. First-round effects of supply shocks on 
the price level are normally accepted, while 
second-round effects are clearly not and will 
therefore be counteracted. Against the back-
ground of such a monetary policy design and 
with nominal wages ﬁxed for some time (and 
otherwise linked to the price stability objec-
tive of the central bank and not to past inﬂa-
tion), real wages would automatically react to 
supply shocks, as inﬂation is allowed to tem-
porarily respond to such shocks. In this way, a 
credible monetary policy aimed at price stabil-
ity with a medium-term orientation contrib-
utes to dampening unwarranted ﬂuctuations 
in unemployment related to supply shocks.30 
Of course, this mechanism will not normally 
be  sufﬁcient  to  fully  avoid  employment 
ﬂuctuations  related  to  supply  shocks. 
Moreover, monetary policy can only deal with 
aggregate  shocks  and  keep  area-wide  prices 
stable. This implies that labor market reforms 
and social partners need to actively ensure that 
real wage developments as close as possible re-
ﬂect trends and differentials in the productivi-
ty levels of workers, as well as the geographical 
and  sector-speciﬁc  unemployment  situation, 
in a way which is conducive to full employ-
ment everywhere.
Second, monetary policy transparency is cru-
cial if monetary authorities want to exert posi-
tive supply effects. This also includes exchang-
ing information with governments and social 
partners (this allows each player to better un-
derstand the objectives and reaction functions 
of  the  other  player,  thereby  building  trust 
without endangering the independence of any 
participant).
Third, and more generally, a high degree of 
credibility and predictability can be seen as 
the main asset of a central bank. Putting this 
asset at risk involves substantial real costs for 
30     Such an approach was outlined in early 1999 by the ECB (1999). Issing (2004) discusses the medium-term orientation of monetary policy 
and explains: “This also means clearly explaining to the public how monetary policy tailors its response to the nature and magnitude of the 
shocks hitting the economy. Specifically in the case of cost-push shocks, like the ones seen in the last few years, a more gradual monetary 
policy response might be required than in the case of demand shocks or shocks coming from labor cost developments.”41
the  whole  society.  The  fact  that  to  a  large 
extent these real costs become fully apparent 
only with a substantial lag, namely after price 
and  wage-setting  behavior  has  structurally 
changed and it ultimately becomes unavoidable 
to tighten monetary policy substantially in or-
der to re-establish credibility, should not cause 
observers to confuse the direction of causality. 
The ultimate reasons for the normally large 
costs in the form of reduced macroeconomic 
stability and higher unemployment associated 
with inﬂation and disinﬂation are too lax and 
misguided policies in the past which under-
mined credibility and predictability, and de-
stabilized  expectations,  not  the  tight  policy 
which is ﬁnally needed to re-establish cred-
ibility and price stability.31
Finally,  the  positive  supply-side  effects  of 
credible monetary policy do not require direct 
responsibility on the part of the central bank 
for output stabilization or other real variables. 
On the contrary, a direct mandate for output 
stabilization may lead to excessive and asym-
metric activism which, in the end, may risk 
destabilizing the economy.32
The  critique  sometimes  raised  by  observers 
that a tight monetary policy aimed at price 
stability via so-called hysteresis effects damp-
ens employment and output for a persistent 
period of time, if not permanently, needs to 
be seen against the background of the points 
raised  before.  The  hysteresis  argument 
effectively  acknowledges  that  labor  markets 
and wage setting are not ﬂexible enough to 
ensure full employment. Putting the burden 
on monetary policy thus not only neglects the 
main reason for hysteresis, it also disregards 
the positive impact of credible and predict-
able monetary policy on the supply side of the 
economy and the related long-term gains in 
terms of lower macroeconomic volatility and 
uncertainty.  If  there  was  indeed  hysteresis 
in  unemployment,  these  supply-side  effects 
would tend to contribute even more to higher 
employment  levels  in  the  long  run.  Asking 
monetary policy to take active responsibility 
for  unemployment  developments,  however, 
would risk undermining credibility and pre-
dictability  and  thus  endanger  these  positive 
supply-side effects. Or, in the words of Issing 
(2000b) “… the existence of hysteresis places 
a premium on ensuring that the central bank 
avoids  a  situation  in  which  disinﬂation  be-
comes necessary.” 33 
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Executive Summary
This  study  deals  with  the  interrelations  be-
tween  ageing  societies  and  capital  markets. 
The implications of the ageing of populations 
and the consequent reform of the pension sys-
tems on the capital markets are highly complex 
and depend on a variety of developments and 
factors. In contrast to the problem of ﬁnanc-
ing public retirement income provision, this 
aspect has been tackled only in a few studies 
so far.
Ageing societies and the necessary reform of 
the overburdened state-administered pension 
systems  will  have  a  signiﬁcant  impact  on 
the market for retirement provisions and on 
capital markets in general. The acceptance of 
taking (at least partly) personnel responsibility 
for old-age provision is rising and the demand 
for private pension products will be boosted 
by cuts in the public pension systems.
In this context, there arise a number of inter-
esting question which our study tries to dis-
cuss: What is the future role of capital mar-
kets for old-age provision? Which investment 
alternatives  will  gain  in  importance?  How 
are  savings  in  general  be  affected?  What  is 
the impact on securities prices? How likely is 
a so called asset meltdown (i.e. a rapid fall in 
securities prices due to a withdrawal of assets 
by the retiring baby-boomers)? Can interna-
tional diversiﬁcation help?
Our study is based on a survey among ﬁnan-
cial experts. A questionnaire comprising 10 
questions on the demography-capital markets 
nexus was sent as part of the monthly ZEW 
Financial Market Survey to ﬁnancial analysts 
from  banks,  insurance  companies  and  large 
industrial enterprises. From the 375 experts 
participating  in  the  ZEW  Financial  Market 
Survey, 247 replied our questionnaire which 
produces  a  rather  good  response  rate  of 
65.9%. Their assessment of the effects of age-
ing societies on capital markets is presented 
and discussed.
According to the questionnaire’s focus which is 
threefold, the main results are the following:
1.   Expected future role of capital mar-
kets and speciﬁc investment products 
for old-age provision      
Capital markets in general are expected to 
be more important for retirement provision 
in the future. The awareness of the relation-
ship between risk and return is expected to 
become more pronounced. This is reﬂected in 
the expected relative importance of speciﬁc 
investment  forms  and  products:  Low  risk-
products  such  as  money  market  accounts, 
time  deposits,  bank  savings  schemes  and 
bank deposits are expected to become less 
important for old-age provision as compared 
with other investment alternatives in the re-
tirement  portfolio.  Occupational  pension 
schemes, investments funds as well as direct 
investments in stocks and bonds are expected 
to  gain  in  importance.  Life  insurance  and 
real estate (particularly self-used real estate) 
will slightly increase in importance. This is 
interesting as these assets already represent a 
relatively large share of the total investment 
portfolio of private households.   
   
When interpreting these results it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that the assessments 
refer to the relative importance within the 
retirement portfolio of the households. Thus, 
it might well be the case that more assets 
are invested in a speciﬁc product in abso-
lute terms, even though the product will be 
less important in relative terms. This can be 
explained by a possible increase in the total 
amount invested by private households.47
2.   Impact  of  the  demographic  change 
and the reform of pension systems on 
the  savings  behavior  of  households 
and,  consequently,  on  the  capital 
market return       
The  majority  of  respondents  expects  the 
savings ratio after retirement to decline but 
to stay positive, i.e. does not reckon dissav-
ing behavior to take place. Often it is feared 
that such a decline in savings after the re-
tirement of the baby-boom generation may 
cause securities prices to fall dramatically 
(asset  meltdown  hypothesis).  According 
to the surveyed experts this fear is unwar-
ranted, although on average the respondents 
expect  a  slightly  negative  effect  on  stock 
prices. With respect to the bond market al-
most no negative effect is predicted.
3.   Role and importance of international 
diversiﬁcation       
An often cited reason for the absence of se-
vere negative effects on capital markets is the 
possibility  of  international  diversiﬁcation. 
Indeed, the majority of ﬁnancial experts is of 
the opinion that international diversiﬁcation 
can help to mitigate the negative effects of 
ageing societies. The regions and countries 
that are expected to experience an increase 
in the share in the future retirement port-
folio are emerging markets. These comprise 
countries  in  Middle  and  Eastern  Europe, 
China, and other Asian countries with the 
exception of Japan. For Western Europe a 
drop in the portfolio share is predicted.
1 Introduction 
It is an inescapable fact that the combination 
of  higher  life  expectancy  and  lower  fertil-
ity  rates  results  in  ageing  populations.  This 
phenomenon applies to many industrial coun-
tries especially in Europe. It has substantial 
implications for social policy, in particular for 
Europe’s state-administered pension systems. 
These are, for most part, ﬁnanced on a pay-
as-you-go (PAYG) basis. Today’s workers are 
forced  to  ﬁnance  yesterday’s  workers’  pen-
sions. PAYG systems are based on the assump-
tion that workers hugely outnumber retirees. 
This, however, no longer holds true in many 
European countries. The current worker-pen-
sioner ratio in Europe has fallen to about three 
workers for each pensioner, and it is predict-
ed to fall to a mere three workers for every 
two pensioners within 30 years (Economist, 
2003a). Patching up the overburdened PAYG 
system by cutting beneﬁts or raising contribu-
tion rates is no longer sufﬁcient. Consequently, 
a reform of the public pension systems seems 
to be required and in particular a shift from 
the PAYG to funded systems.
Countries  such  as  Great  Britain,  the  Neth-
erlands, Switzerland as well as Scandinavian 
countries have already shifted much of their 
pension  burden  from  the  state  pension  sys-
tem  (ﬁrst  pillar)  to  occupational  systems 
(second pillar), and to private systems (third 
pillar)  where  the  individual  pensioners-to-
be save for themselves (Economist, 2003b). 
In Germany, as in countries like Austria, It-
aly, and France, such a reform has just been 
started. These reforms and of course also the 
pure  demographic  change  have  implications 
for the capital markets. 
The interrelations between ageing societies and 
capital markets are in the focus of our study. 
In contrast to the problem of ﬁnancing public 
retirement income provision, this aspect has 
been tackled only in a few studies so far. 
In  light  of  the  crisis  of  the  state  adminis-
tered pension systems the awareness for the 
necessity  of  private  pension  provision  rises; 
and thereby also the total volume of retire-48
ment savings. Reforms are partly on the way, 
for example in Germany with the introduc-
tion of the so called “Riester”- and “Rürup”-
products. This raises particularly the follow-
ing questions that are dealt with in the study: 
How does this higher demand affect capital 
markets in general? How will speciﬁc invest-
ment  products  develop?  How  will  private 
savings in general be affected? What is the 
impact on securities prices? How likely is a 
so called asset meltdown (i.e. a rapid fall in 
securities prices due to a withdrawal of assets 
by the retiring baby-boomers)? Can interna-
tional  diversiﬁcation  help  to  mitigate  these 
negative repercussions?
As is outlined in section 3 the effects of age-
ing  societies  on  capital  markets  are  very 
complex and depend on a variety of develop-
ments and factors. A few studies have tried 
to predict the outcome based on simulation 
models. In contrast, our study is based on a 
survey amongst ﬁnancial experts. Their as-
sessment of the effects of ageing societies on 
capital markets is presented and discussed in 
the light of earlier theoretical and empirical 
studies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section describes our survey and 
the questionnaire. Section 3 gives a brief over-
view of the issues discussed in the literature. 
Sections 4, 5 and 6 present the results of the 
survey amongst ﬁnancial experts. The ques-
tionnaire’s focus is on the following aspects: 
The expected future role of capital markets and 
speciﬁc investment products for old-age provi-
sion (section 4); the impact of the demographic 
change and the reform of pension systems on 
the savings behavior of households and, conse-
quently, on the capital market return (section 
5); and the role and importance of internation-
al diversiﬁcation (section 6).
2 Survey and Questionnaire
As  mentioned  above  the  awareness  of  con-
sumers for the necessity of private retirement 
savings is increasing. Their assessment of re-
tirement investment products is known from 
consumer surveys and appears in the actual 
allocation of assets (as is shown in section 4). 
However,  when  trying  to  assess  future  de-
velopments it seems to be more appropriate 
to  consult  experts  that  overlook  the  whole 
spectrum of ﬁnancial markets and products. 
Therefore, this study relies on the assessment 
of ﬁnancial experts that regularly analyze in-
ternational capital markets and international 
economic conditions.
A questionnaire (see Appendix) comprising 10 
questions on the demography-capital markets 
nexus was sent as part of the monthly ZEW Fi-
nancial Market Survey. 375 ﬁnancial analysts 
from banks, insurance companies and large in-
dustrial enterprises participate in this survey. 
Among the respondents are experts from the 
ﬁnance, research and economic departments 
as well as traders, fund managers and invest-
ment consultants. 247 replied our question-
naire which produces a rather good response 
rate of 65.9%. Table 1 gives the composition of 
the participants in the ZEW Financial Market 
Survey according to countries of origin and 
sectors.
With respect to the sector, three-quarters are 
working for banks. 13% and 9% of the ana-
lysts are from industrial enterprises and insur-
ance companies, respectively. Although, the 
lion’s share of participants comes from Ger-
many – only 10% come from abroad – the 
results of our survey may also be interpreted 
in a European context. The ﬁnancial experts 
that regularly respond to our survey are used 
to analyze international ﬁnancial markets and 
the world-wide economic conditions. Thus, it 49
can be expected that the results of this survey 
are not only representative from a German but 
also from a European point of view, because 
most of the respondents are regularly analyz-
ing both world-wide economic developments 
and international capital markets.
3 Demographic Chnage and the 
Effects on Capital Markets – a 
Review of the Literature
The implications of the ageing of populations on 
the capital markets are highly complex and their 
explanation  requires  consideration  of  many 
factors.  There  are  both  direct  and  indirect 
effects  (Börsch-Supan  et  al.,  2003):  Direct 
effects  are  the  purely  demographic  effects 
without any change of the present pay-as-you-
go pension systems. Indirect effects arise from 
the  necessity  that  an  ageing  population  re-
quires a reform of the pension system. In many 
ageing countries such a reform towards a more 
capital funded system has already been started. 
These changes also affect capital markets. The 
different effects of ageing societies on capital 
markets are of course strongly interdependent 
and cannot be investigated separately.
Table 1: Composition of the participants in the ZEW  
Financial Market Survey
Number of experts Share
Total 375 1.00
According to country of origin
Germany
Foreign countries
thereof:
· Great Britain
· France
· Switzerland
· USA
· Others
343
32
12
5
3
3
9
0.91
0.09
0.38
0.16
0.09
0.09
0.28
According to sector
Industrial companies
Insurance companies
Banks
thereof:
· Commercial banks
· Investment companies/advisors
· Savings banks (“Sparkassen”)
· Credit co-operatives
· Mortgage banks, building and loan associations
·   Other banks (e.g., “Landesbanken”, banks with  
special functions)
Others (e.g., associations)
48
35
283
84
76
41
35
16
31
9
0.13
0.09
0.75
0.30
0.27
0.14
0.12
0.06
0.11
0.0250
In  general  the  demographic  change  has  an 
impact  on  many  aspects  of  capital  markets. 
Particularly of interest seems to be the devel-
opment of savings, the return to capital, and 
securities prices (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003; 
Lueg et al., 2003). Besides, international capi-
tal ﬂows and therefore also the balance-of-pay-
ments as well as exchange rates are affected.
An ageing population causes the relative sup-
ply  of  the  factors  of  production  (labor  and 
capital) to shift. The decline in the labor force 
means that labor becomes relatively scarce and 
therefore capital becomes relatively abundant. 
As a consequence, wages tend to rise and the 
return to capital tends to fall. Based on an 
overlapping generations model Börsch-Supan 
et al. (2003) forecast the return to capital in 
Germany to fall by some 120 basis points by 
2035 due to this purely demographic effect as-
suming that there are no opportunities to di-
versify internationally.
Often  it  is  argued  that  this  negative  effect 
on the return to capital could be further in-
tensiﬁed by the reform of the PAYG-pension 
systems towards more funded systems as this 
increases  retirement  savings.  The  additional 
supply of capital will exert pressure on returns. 
Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) forecast this effect 
to amount to some further 40 basis points if all 
old-age provision is invested in Germany.
Crucial in this context is the development of 
savings of households which determine private 
sector capital supply. According to the life-cy-
cle-hypothesis individuals try to smooth their 
consumption  by  varying  their  savings  over 
the life cycle (e.g., Bräuninger et al., 2002). 
Young adults should exhibit a negative savings 
ratio to ﬁnance major purchases. This phase of 
life is followed by a phase of saving for pension 
provision.  And  ﬁnally,  accumulated  savings 
should be reduced again after the end of ac-
tive working life to maintain living standards. 
Therefore, the savings rate is expected to be 
high when a large percentage of the population 
is employed (European Commission, 2002). 
Likewise, a low savings rate is expected when 
a large proportion of the population is either 
very young or above the retirement age.
As long as a large percentage of the population 
is  employed  the  rise  in  retirement  savings 
increases  capital  supply  and  exerts  pressure 
on the expected return to capital. This in turn 
should lead to an increase in securities prices 
(Heigl and Katheder, 2001). In Germany – as 
in many other ageing countries – the baby-
boomer cohorts will work and thus concen-
trate their savings activity until around 2010-
2020. When the baby-boomers retire they are 
expected to withdraw ﬁnancial assets and con-
sume large parts of their wealth. Since there 
will not be enough young buyers for these as-
sets the old want to sell, securities prices are 
expected to slump. This is what is often re-
ferred to as asset meltdown.
However, there are also contrary effects that 
make the impact of ageing populations on the 
return to capital and the securities prices less 
obvious, and the above described fear – at least 
to this extent – unwarranted.
With respect to the fall in the return to capital 
the following effects have to be considered:
•   An increase in the labor participation of women 
as well as a rise in the average retirement age 
may  mitigate  the  relative  shortage  of  labor 
supply  (Lueg  et  al.,  2003).1  Nevertheless 
1   In general, the same holds true for an increase in migration. However, migration effects are hardly predictable.51
these effects are certainly not strong enough 
to totally offset the demographic change.
•   An ageing society needs more capital since 
capital (IT, machines, etc.) must increasingly 
replace labor (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003). 
Consequently the demand for real capital is 
increased, stabilizing the return to capital.
•   International capital ﬂows help to mitigate the 
negative effects on the return to capital (Lueg 
et al., 2003; Börsch-Supan et al., 2003). Al-
though in general the ageing of the popula-
tion is a phenomenon to all industrial coun-
tries, there are differences. Countries such as 
France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States  do  not  share  Germany’s  problem  of 
a severe drop in the working population to 
the same degree. Investors in strongly ageing 
countries can beneﬁt from growth and higher 
returns to capital in slowly ageing countries. 
As  a  consequence,  countries  with  a  higher 
average age are expected to expand their net 
capital exports to countries of a lower aver-
age age which exhibit a stronger investment 
demand and a limited savings capacity (Bräun-
inger et al., 2002). Börsch-Supan et al. (2003) 
forecast that this diversiﬁcation effect will re-
duce the fall in the (annual) return to capital, 
which is due to the pure demographic effect, 
by about 10 to 20 basis points. 
   
It is sometimes argued that such diversiﬁcation 
in emerging markets might be restricted due 
to a limited absorption capacity for capital. 
The reasons for that could be, for instance, un-
derdeveloped ﬁnancial market infrastructure, 
institutions, regulation and supervision. This 
topic will be further analyzed in section 6.
Regarding the asset meltdown-hypothesis the 
following counter-arguments have to be con-
sidered (Lueg et al., 2003):
•   There is no clear empirical evidence for the 
life-cycle-hypothesis. Although there is evi-
dence for a decline in the savings ratio over 
the life-cycle, for Germany a negative savings 
ratio after retirement (i.e. dissaving) is not 
conﬁrmed  empirically.  In  contrast  wealth 
still  increases  after  retirement.  However, 
this may change with an increasing impor-
tance of funded pension systems.
•   The demographic development is by and large 
predictable, and capital markets will antici-
pate this development. Retirements of baby-
boomers will drag on for a period of some 
15 to 20 years. A potential asset meltdown 
is thus neither a sudden nor an unexpected 
event. The price effect of a potential over-
supply would be spread over a long period.
•   In an open economy with international capi-
tal ﬂows a reduction of domestic demand for 
ﬁnancial assets can be compensated by for-
eign demand.
•   Retirement savings are not only invested in 
ﬁnancial assets (e.g., equities and bonds) but 
to a large part also in real estate. This real 
capital can be consumed after retirement and 
does not have to be sold to younger genera-
tions immediately. In this case the problem of 
an asset meltdown should be not so severe.
•   According to the dividend discount model 
the fair value of stocks is determined by the 
expected value of future dividends, and not 
by the development of the number of people 
offering and demanding.
 •   Funded pension schemes will still not have 
reached maturity by 2030 (Börsch-Supan et 
al., 2003). Until 2050 fewer retirees will be 
drawing their pension than young employees 
will be paying into new private retirement 52
accounts up. Thus, the negative effect on se-
curities prices due to a withdrawal of funds 
by the baby-boomers will be curbed.
To sum up, the implications of ageing societies 
for capital markets, in particular for the return 
to capital and the securities prices, depend on 
a variety of different contrary effects. The out-
come is difﬁcult to forecast. There are several 
studies that try to make predictions based on 
overlapping  generations  models  or  general 
equilibrium  models  (Börsch-Supan,  2003; 
McMorrow and Röger, 2003; European Com-
mission,  2002).  In  what  follows  this  paper 
presents the results of a survey among ﬁnancial 
experts on their assessment of the effects of 
ageing societies on capital markets.
The  results  of  the  survey  are  organized  in 
three  sections.  The  issues  of  the  effects  on 
savings and on securities prices are discussed 
in section 5; and the role of international di-
versiﬁcation in section 6. Beforehand (section 
4), the future importance of capital markets in 
general and of speciﬁc investment products in 
particular for old-age provision are discussed.
4 Future Role of Capital Markets 
for Old-age Provisions
In ageing societies the PAYG pension systems 
are no longer sustainable, and indeed in many 
countries a reform towards funded systems has 
at least been started. Funded pension systems 
require  higher  private  savings.  This  section 
discusses the question of how private retire-
ment savings are invested.
Question no. 1 asks what role capital market 
investments  in  general  will  play  for  private 
retirement provision in the future. Almost all 
surveyed ﬁnancial experts expect capital mar-
ket investments to be more important within 
the next 15 years (see Figure 1). On a scale from 
“1” to “7”, “1” indicating a strong decrease and 
“7” a strong increase in importance, 242 of 
246 (98.4%) experts assign a value of “5”, “6” 
or “7”. No single respondent thinks the impor-
tance of capital market investments will be de-
creasing; only 4 think it will be unchanged.
 
The reasons for that may be twofold: First, po-
litical reform may make people to invest more 
on the capital markets. Second, there may be 
an increase in the awareness of the need for 
increased private retirement savings which are 
invested on the capital markets.
Before looking in greater detail on the expect-
ed future importance of speciﬁc investment 
forms and products, one should take a look at 
the current absolute amounts that households 
currently have invested in different products. 
Table 2 shows the investment structure of the 
ﬁnancial assets of private households for the 
year 2003.
At the moment apart from bank deposits the 
largest share (25%) of ﬁnancial assets is held 
with  insurance  corporations  (particularly  in 
life insurance products). Another important 
investment at present is building society savings 
which is not listed separately in Table 2 but 
is part of “bank deposits”. A survey amongst 
households  (Börsch-Supan  and  Essig,  2002) 
for the year 2000 showed that building society 
savings accounted for some 14% of the total 
investment portfolio of German private house-
holds. According to this ratio in 2003 about 
549 billion � should have been invested by Ger-
man  households  in  building  societies.  This 
amounts to about 39% of “bank deposits”.
One  should  keep  this  current  allocation  of 
assets in mind, when interpreting the results 
from our survey with respect to the future 
importance  of  speciﬁc  investment  products. 53
Figure 1: Expected future importance of capital market  
investments in general for private pension systems  
(percentage of respondents, time horizon: 15 years)
Table 2: Investment structure of the financial assets of private  
households in Germany  
(year 2003)
billion EUR share
Bank deposits1 (short-term and long-term)
Assets with insurance corporations2,3
Bonds4 (direct investments)
Shares (direct investment) 
Other equity
Mutual fund shares
Claims due to company pension commitments 
Total financial assets
1,399
997
442
231
170
464
220
3,922
0.35
0.25
0.11
0.06
0.04
0.12
0.06
1.00
1   In Germany and abroad.
2     Including  private  pension  funds  as  well  as  occupational  pension  schemes  and  supplementary   
pension funds.
3   Including other claims.
4   Including money market paper.
Source: Bundesbank Monthly Bulletin June 2004.
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The  assessment  of  experts  concerning  the 
future  importance  of  a  speciﬁc  investment 
form  is  made  relative  to  the  importance  of 
the other investment forms in the retirement 
portfolio. This does not say anything about the 
absolute development of assets ﬂowing into this 
investment product. It might well be the case 
that the total amount invested increases. As a 
consequence more assets would be invested in 
every speciﬁc product in absolute terms, even 
though some of the products will be relatively 
less important. In this case the other invest-
ment products will gain even more in absolute 
terms. 
With respect to speciﬁc investment forms and 
products, the expected future importance for 
retirement provision varies. Figure 2a summa-
rizes the answers by showing the average value 
the  respondents  assign  to  every  investment 
product. Figure 2b displays the distribution of 
answers. 
Investment funds and funds saving schemes as 
well as occupational pensions are expected to 
gain most in importance relative to the other 
products.  Financial  experts  assign  funds  a 
value of 5.75 on average (the scale ranges from 
“1” to “7”, “1” indicating a strong decrease and 
“7” a strong increase in importance). 232 re-
spondents (94%) give the value “5”, “6” or 
“7”. Only 6 (2%) think the importance of 
investment funds will decrease. With respect 
to occupational pension schemes, 212 experts 
(86%) assign a value of “5”, “6” or “7”. Only 
10 (4%) are of the opinion that occupational 
pension systems will decrease in importance.
Direct  investments  (such  as  equities  and 
Figure 2a: Expected future importance of specific  
investment forms and products for private pension systems  
(average value of respondents, time horizon: 15 years)
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bonds) are also expected to increase slightly 
in importance: The average value is 4.85. The 
same is true for alternative investments such 
as hedge funds and private equity investment 
(4.74);  derivatives  and  structured  ﬁnancial 
instruments (4.59); and life insurance (4.4). 
In greater detail: 67% think that direct in-
vestments  gain  in  importance  as  opposed 
to  only  9%  who  think  that  they  will  lose. 
Almost the same numbers apply to alternative 
investments: 67% as opposed to 14%. In the 
case of life insurance a share of 23% of the 
respondents assign a value lower than “4”, i.e. 
expect it to become decreasingly important 
Figure 2b: Expected future importance of specific  
investment forms and products for private pension systems  
(percentage of respondents, time horizon: 15 years)
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for old-age provision in the future. 28% give 
a value of “4”, i.e. expect its importance to be 
unchanged. Nevertheless, 49% of the ﬁnan-
cial  experts  expect  that  life  insurance  will 
gain further in importance.
A  somewhat  decreasing  importance  is  ex-
pected for building society savings with an 
average value of 3.68, money market and time 
deposit accounts (3.68) as well as bank sav-
ing schemes and bank deposits (3.76). In the 
cases of building societies and money market/
time deposit accounts, however, a majority of 
respondents (51% and 53%, respectively) as-
sign a value of “4”, i.e. they are of the opinion 
that the importance for retirement provision 
will be unchanged. With respect to bank sav-
ing scheme/bank deposits 40% of the respon-
dents  actually  think  that  these  investments 
become  decreasingly  important.  Recalling 
Table 2, these are all investment forms that ac-
count for a very large part of total household’s 
investment portfolio.
Retirement  savings  are  not  only  invested  in 
ﬁnancial assets but to a large part also in real 
estate. With respect to the threat of a potential 
asset meltdown this would have the advantage 
that real capital can be consumed after retire-
ment and does not have to be sold to younger 
generations. In the context of retirement savings 
real estate may play a signiﬁcant role. Figures 3a 
and 3b show the assessment of the surveyed ex-
perts with respect to the future importance of 
real estate for old-age provision.
Real estate in general is expected to become 
slightly more important relative to the other 
investment forms. On average experts assign 
a value of 4.3. 45% of the respondents give a 
value of “5”, “6” or “7” which means that real 
estate will even play a bigger role in the future 
than today. 22% think that the importance of 
real estate will decrease, 33% that it will be 
unchanged.  When  differentiating  between 
self-used, rented real estate and indirect real 
estate investments (e.g., real estate funds) the 
Figure 3a: Expected future demand for real estate in the  
context of old-age provisions 
(average value of respondents, time horizon: 15 years)
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following  picture  emerges: Whereas  experts 
are of the opinion that self-used real estate and 
indirect real estate investments will increase in 
relative importance (average values of 4.55 and 
4.23, respectively), they expect rented real es-
tate to become decreasingly important (3.72).
Often it is argued that today the awareness 
of the risk-return relationship is much more 
pronounced  than  in  the  past  (Bulthaupt  et 
al., 2001). A consequence is that households, 
particularly younger people, invest rather in 
equity and bond products than in, for exam-
ple, savings accounts. We asked the ﬁnancial 
experts  whether  there  will  be  more  invest-
ments  in  high-risk  capital  market  segments 
due to higher return requirements (Figure 4). 
The scale to this question ranges from “1” to 
Figure 3b: Expected future demand for real estate in the  
context of old-age provisions 
(as percentage of respondents, time horizon: 15 years)
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������“7”, “1” indicating that this statement does not 
apply at all (“deﬁnitely false”) and “7” that it 
is “deﬁnitely true”. On average the surveyed 
experts assign a value of 4.6, i.e. they think 
that higher risk-investments will gain slightly 
in importance. 62% of the respondents assign 
a value of “5”, “6” or “7”, i.e. have the opin-
ion that the above statement is true – in other 
words  think  that  more  investments  will  be 
made  in  higher  risk-market  segments.  Only 
17% think that this will not happen.
Recalling question 2 (see Figure 2) on the ex-
pected future importance of speciﬁc invest-
ment forms and products the answers ﬁt quite 
well. On the one hand, the list of products 
that will gain in relative importance includes 
high risk-investments such as derivatives and 
alternative investments (e.g., hedge funds and 
private  equity  investments).  On  the  other 
hand, diversiﬁed products such as investment 
funds and occupational pension schemes are 
expected to gain in importance, too. Although 
exhibiting higher risk-return than, e.g., sav-
ings accounts, these investments are usually 
not classiﬁed as highly risky. The same holds 
true for life insurance which is expected also 
to slightly increase in relative importance even 
though accounting already for a very large part 
of total investments.
Overall, the following expectations regarding 
future investments for retirement provisions 
emerge from the answers:
•   The awareness of the relationship between 
risk and return seems to be more pronounced 
than in the past.
•   (Very) Low risk-investments such as build-
ing society savings, money market and time 
deposit  accounts,  as  well  as  bank  saving 
schemes and bank deposits are expected to 
become relatively less important.
•   The highest increase in relative importance 
is  expected  to  experience  higher  risk-re-
turn  investments  that  are,  however,  well 
Figure 4: Will there be more investments in high risk-capital  
market segments due to higher rates of return requirements?  
(as percentage of respondents, time horizon: 15 years)
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diversiﬁed  such  as  investment  funds  and 
funds saving schemes as well as occupational 
pension schemes.
•   But also very high risk investments such as 
derivatives and hedge funds are expected to 
become relatively more important for old-age 
provisions.
5 Demographic Change and 
Capital Market Return
When assessing the effects of the demographic 
change on the capital market return and on 
the prices of securities it is crucial to gauge 
the development of savings of households. As 
mentioned above theoretically – i.e. according 
to  the  life-cycle-hypothesis  –  savings  are 
expected not only to decline after retirement 
but to become negative (dissaving). Thereby 
the wealth accumulated during the working 
life is consumed.
For Germany such dissaving behavior is not 
conﬁrmed empirically. Contrary, savings in-
crease  even  further  after  retirement.  This, 
may change with a shift from the state-run 
PAYG pension systems to more private pen-
sion provision. People will have to save more 
during working life and will actually have to 
sell assets, i.e. dissave or at least diminish sav-
ings after retirement in order to keep up the 
standard of living.
Figure 5 presents the results of the question on 
the expected development of the savings ratio 
after retirement.
The vast majority of respondents (197 of 245; 
some 80%) expect the savings rate after re-
tirement to decline in the future, only about 
12% think that the savings rate will increase; 
some 7% reckon that it will be unchanged. 
From  those  experts  who  expect  a  decline, 
more than 70% (some 58% of all respondents) 
think that the savings ratio will stay positive in 
spite of the decrease. 56 experts or about 23% 
of all respondents expect dissaving behavior 
after retirement.
Figure 5: Expected development of the savings ratio after retirement 
(percentage of respondents)
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savings rate to decline but to stay positive, i.e. 
do not reckon dissaving behavior to take place. 
As mentioned in section 3 it is often argued 
that a rapid decline in savings and a withdrawal 
of ﬁnancial assets in the course of retirement 
of the baby boomers may result in an asset 
meltdown. Figure 6 shows the expectations of 
the surveyed experts on the consequences of 
the change in the savings ratio for securities 
prices at the climax of the demographic crisis, 
i.e. around 2030.
Overall,  the  respondents  do  not  expect  a 
dramatic  asset  meltdown.  However,  for  the 
stock market they predict quite a negative ef-
fect. On average respondents assign a value of 
2.53 on scale ranging from “1” to “7”, where 
“1” represents very negative and “7” very posi-
tive effects on prices. For the bond market 
the surveyed experts give a value of 3.83 on 
average, i.e. expect almost no change due to a 
decrease in the savings ratio after retirement 
of the baby-boomers.
With respect to equities, about the half of the 
surveyed experts (51%) reckon a negative ef-
fect on stock prices, assigning a value of “1”, 
“2” or “3”. Most of those respondents, howev-
er, expect the negative price effect to be rather 
minor. Only some 13% reckon a positive ef-
fect. About 36% are the opinion that there 
will be neither a negative nor a positive effect 
in the course of retirement of baby-boomers 
and a fall in the savings ratio.
With  respect  to  bond  markets,  most  ex-
perts (46%) think that there will be neither 
a negative nor a positive effect. 34% reckon 
a negative and about 20% a positive effect. 
This means, that also long-term interest rates 
should be relatively unaffected.
Figure 6: Expected impact of the change in the savings ratio  
on securities prices at the climax of the demographic crisis 
(percentage of respondents)
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Given the observation that the risk aversion 
increases over the life-cycle the portfolio of re-
tirees should include a larger part of bonds than 
stocks. Thus, when retirees withdraw assets to 
consume part of their wealth one would expect 
the demand for bonds to decrease more heavily 
than the demand for stocks. Consequently, one 
would expect the negative price effect to be 
more pronounced on the bond than on the eq-
uity markets. However, long-run interest rates 
are highly correlated internationally and hence 
the impact on a currency are is expected to be 
rather small. Whereas on stock markets often 
home bias can be observed, i.e. people prefer 
investments at home. Therefore, a withdrawal 
of ﬁnancial assets by the baby-boomers to con-
sume their wealth results in a negative price 
effect that is relatively higher with respect to 
stocks than with respect to bonds.
Overall, however, one should keep in mind that 
the expectations of ﬁnancial experts do not en-
dorse the fear of a dramatic asset meltdown.
6 Internationa Diversiﬁation
In section 3 it is outlined that international 
capital ﬂows may help to mitigate the negative 
consequences of an ageing society. Firstly, the 
fall in the return to capital due to a shift in 
the relative supply of labor and capital may be 
lessened. The reason for that is that investors 
in strongly ageing countries can beneﬁt from 
growth and higher returns to capital in slowly 
ageing  countries.  Additionally,  in  an  open 
economy with international capital ﬂows an 
oversupply of ﬁnancial assets can be absorbed 
by  foreign  supply.  Thus,  a  potential  asset 
meltdown due to a withdrawal of funds of the 
baby-boomers after retirement may be retard-
ed. Figure 7 shows the answers to the question 
on whether possible negative effects of ageing 
societies  may  be  mitigated  through  interna-
tional diversiﬁcation.
Almost three thirds of the respondents (about 
71%) are conﬁdent that international diver-
siﬁcation can help (i.e. assign a value of “5”, 
“6” or “7”). Only some 15% are of the opinion 
that international diversiﬁcation is no mean of 
mitigating the negative effects of ageing societ-
ies. About 14% are undecided.
There remains of course the question whether 
investors will actually make use of internation-
al diversiﬁcation. Figure 8 displays the answers 
to this question which almost completely re-
semble the answers to the question on whether 
international diversiﬁcation can mitigate nega-
tive effects. Some 73% believe that people will 
actually diversify their retirement investments 
internationally. Only some 14% do not expect 
retirement savers to make use of international 
diversiﬁcation; and about 13% are undecided.
Sometimes  it  is  argued  that  diversiﬁcation 
above all in the emerging markets is restricted 
due to a limited absorption capacity. Reasons 
for that are, for example, underdeveloped ﬁ-
nancial  market  infrastructure,  institutions, 
regulation and supervision. The responses of 
the ﬁnancial experts partly conﬁrm this esti-
mation (see Figure 9).
On average ﬁnancial experts assign a value of 
4.91 on a scale ranging from “1” to “7”, “1” in-
dicating that this assessment is deﬁnitely false 
and  “7”  indicating  that  it  is  deﬁnitely  true. 
About 66% have the opinion that an under-
developed  ﬁnancial  market  infrastructure 
restricts diversiﬁcation in emerging markets 
(i.e. give a value of “5”, “6” or “7”), whereby 
most respondents (84 of 244) assign a value 
of “6”. Only some 21% think that an under-
developed  ﬁnancial  market  infrastructure  is 
no problem or that the infrastructure is sufﬁ-
ciently developed. About 12% are undecided.Figure 7: Can possible negative effects be  
mitigated through international diversification? 
(as percentage of respondents)
Figure 8: Will retirement savers  
actually use international diversification?  
(as percentage of respondents)
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Figure 10a: Change in the share of different  
regions in the portfolio for old-age provision  
(balance*)
*     Difference between the share of respondents that reckon an increase and those that expect a decrease.
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With  the  expectations  that  international 
diversiﬁcation  can  help  to  mitigate  the 
negative consequences of ageing societies and 
that retirement savers will actually make use 
of it, the question emerges to which regions 
and countries the capital will ﬂow. The re-
spondents could choose between the values 
“-1“ indicating a decrease in the share in the 
average  future  retirement  portfolio;  “0”  an 
unchanged  share;  and  “+1”  an  increase  in 
the share. In the ﬁrst part of question 10 we 
differentiate  between  industrial  countries, 
emerging markets and developing countries. 
In the second part, we differentiate between 
the  regions/countries  Western  Europe, 
Middle and Eastern Europe, North America, 
South America, Japan, Australia, China, Asia 
(excluding Japan and China), and Africa. Fig-
ure 10a summarizes the expectations on this 
issue by displaying the average values assigned 
to different regions and countries; Figure 10b 
gives the respective distribution of answers.
The responses of the surveyed experts con-
ﬁrm  the  expectation  that  retirement  savers 
will  diversify  by  increasingly  investing  in 
slowly ageing countries and regions.
The ﬁnancial experts expect that the share 
of  emerging  markets  in  the  future  retire-
ment portfolio will strongly increase (aver-
age value of 0.85). The responses here are 
very clear-cut: 87% reckon a rise; 11% no 
change; and only 2% a decrease in the share. 
Regarding developing countries most experts 
(56%) expect the share in the portfolio to be 
unchanged.  30%  estimate  a  rise,  and  14% 
a decrease, resulting in an average value of 
0.17.  Industrial  countries  are  expected  to 
lose weight; on average a value of -0.26 is 
given. 49% are the opinion that the share will 
decrease, 23% that it will rise, and 27% that 
it will be unchanged.
When looking at speciﬁc regions and countries 
the following picture emerges: Respondents 
expect a large increase in the portfolio share of 
Middle and Eastern Europe (average value of 
0.85), China (0.88) and Asia excluding Japan, 
China (0.76). With respect to these regions/
countries about 90% (in the case of Asia 80%) 
of the surveyed experts assign “+1”, i.e. are of 
the opinion that these regions/countries will 
gain from an increase in international diversiﬁ-
cation of retirement investments. The reasons 
for that are most likely that in those countries 
the problem of an ageing population is not as 
dramatic as in some Western European coun-
tries and/or that those countries exhibit fast 
growing economies.
The only region that is expected to lose weight 
is Western Europe (average value of -0.25). 
46%  of  the  respondents  assign  the  value  “-
1”;  33%  the  value  “0”;  and  21%  the  value 
“+1”.  Given  the  ageing  societies  there,  this 
prediction is not surprising.
For North America the respondents expect on 
average an unchanged portfolio share (-0.02), 
despite the fact that the population in North 
America is also ageing. 40% assign the value 
“0”; and some 30% the value “-1” and “+1”, re-
spectively. The US capital market is probably 
too important to experience signiﬁcant losses 
due to demographic changes.
Japan is given a value of 0.12 on average. About 
45% expect the weight to be unchanged; 34% 
reckon an increase, and 22% a decrease in the 
share in the retirement portfolio. This is rath-
er surprising given the severe ageing problem 
in Japan. Almost the same numbers apply to 
South America.
With respect to Australia and Africa a ma-
jority  of  some  60%  reckon  the  portfolio 66
share to be unchanged. For Africa the issue 
of  an  underdeveloped  ﬁnancial  market 
infrastructure may be decisive in spite of an 
slowly ageing population.
Figure 10c summarizes the results of question 
10 by showing a world map that highlights the 
countries/regions  that  are  expected  to  gain 
weight  in  the  retirement  portfolio  in  light 
grey; the countries whose share is expected 
to remain unchanged in dark grey; and the 
countries that are expected to lose weight in 
black.
Figure 10b: Change in the share of different  
regions/countries in the portfolio for old-age provision 
(percentage of respondents)
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an dieser Befragung einen kostenlosen Besuch 
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In vielen Industrieländern steigt das Durch-
schnittsalter der Bevölkerung und dieser de-
mographische  Wandel  ist  für  die  nächsten 
Jahrzehnte unumkehrbar. Diese Entwicklung 
hat  massive  sozialpolitische  Auswirkungen. 
In Deutschland wie auch in anderen Ländern 
wurde eine teilweise Verlagerung der Alterssi-
cherung  auf  kapitalgedeckte  Systeme  einge-
leitet. Diese Reformen wie auch der demogra-
phische Wandel an sich haben Auswirkungen 
auf die Kapitalmärkte. Dieser Zusammenhang 
zwischen Demographie und Kapitalmärkte ist 
Gegenstand des Fragebogens.
Im Folgenden möchten wir Sie nach ihrer Ein-
schätzung über die voraussichtliche Entwick-
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teilnehmen. Die Reisekosten müssen von den Teilnehmern selbst getragen werden. Der Rechtsweg ist ausgeschlossen.
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Appendix: Questionnaire1)   Welche Rolle im Vergleich zu heute werden Kapitalmarktanlagen in Zukunft bei der Finanzierung 
der privaten Altersvorsorge spielen?
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung
2)   Wie werden sich die folgenden Anlageformen und -produkte im Einzelnen in ihrer Bedeutung 
entwickeln?       
  a) Direkte Anlage an Kapitalmärkten (wie Aktien und Anleihen)
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung 
 
  b) Investmentfonds und Fondssparpläne
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung
  c) Produkte und Durchführungswege der Betriebliche Altersvorsorge
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung�
  d) Lebensversicherungen
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung
  e) Bausparen
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung
  f) Geldmarktkonten und Festgeldanlagen
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung    unverändert    viel größere Bedeutung
  g)Banksparpläne/Bankeinlagen
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung     unverändert     viel größere Bedeutung
 
  h) Derivate und strukturierte Finanzprodukte 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung     unverändert     viel größere Bedeutung
  i) Alternative Investments (wie Hedge Fonds und Private-Equity-Beteiligungen)
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  viel geringere Bedeutung     unverändert     viel größere Bedeutung 
3)  Wie wird sich die Nachfrage nach Immobilien für die Altersvorsorge entwickeln?
  a) Selbstgenutzt 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  stark sinken    unverändert    stark steigen
  b) Vermietet
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  stark sinken    unverändert    stark steigen
 
69  c) Indirekt (in Form von Immobilienfonds/-aktien)
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  stark sinken    unverändert    stark steigen
  d) Insgesamt
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  stark sinken    unverändert    stark steigen
4)   Werden aufgrund höherer Renditeerfordernisse vermehrt Anlagen in risiko-, aber auch  
chancenreicheren Kapitalmarktsegmenten durchgeführt werden?
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  trifft überhaupt nicht zu        trifft auf jeden Fall zu
�5)   In der ökonomischen Theorie wird in der Regel folgender Verlauf der Sparquote im Lebenszyklus angenom-
men: In jungen Jahren ist die Sparquote zunächst negativ; danach steigt sie allmählich an, um mit Eintritt 
ins Rentenalter wieder zu sinken und negativ zu werden (‚Entsparen‘). Im Moment ist in Deutschland eine 
negative Sparquote im Rentenalter jedoch im Durchschnitt nicht zu beobachten. Wie glauben Sie, dass sich 
in Zukunft die durchschnittliche Sparquote im Alter entwickeln wird?
6)   Wie schätzen Sie, ausgehend von der Entwicklung unter 5), die Kurseffekte auf den Kapitalmärkten 
auf dem Höhepunkt der demographischen Krise (ab etwa dem Jahr 2030) ein?
  a) Aktienmärkte
 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  sehr negativ          sehr positiv
  b) Anleihemärkte
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  sehr negativ          sehr positiv
7)   Können mögliche negative Effekte auf die Kapitalmarktrenditen durch eine stärkere 
internationale Diversifikation abgeschwächt werden?
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  trifft überhaupt nicht zu    trifft auf jeden Fall zu
8)   Glauben Sie, dass ein noch unterentwickelter rechtlicher und regulatorischer Rahmen in 
potenziellen Anlageländern eine internationale Diversifikation einschränkt?
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  trifft überhaupt nicht zu          trifft auf jeden Fall zu
9) Werden sich die Anleger tatsächlich verstärkt für internationale Kapitalanlagen entscheiden?
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
  trifft überhaupt nicht zu          trifft auf jeden Fall zu
10) Wie werden sich dabei die Anteile der folgenden Kapitalmärkte im Portfolio entwickeln 
(Abnahme: –, unverändert: 0, Zuwachs: +)?
Industrieländer           Emerging Markets             Entwicklungsländer                 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
West-Europa             Mittel-/Ost-Europa            Nordamerika             Südamerika            Japan             Australien             
China            Asien (ex Japan, China)            Afrika        
1
stark sinken 
und negativ 
werden
2
stark sinken 
aber positiv 
bleiben 
3
sinken aber 
positiv bleiben 
4
gleich bleiben 
5
steigen
6
stark steigen  
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71Abstract
In this essay I review the basic life cycle theory 
of saving to obtain predictions for aggregate 
savings dynamics in societies that undergo an 
aging process like the one predicted for all ma-
jor industrialized countries in the near future. 
The  data  indicates  that  the  phenomenon  of 
population aging is driven both by longer life 
expectancy as well as lower birth rates (and 
thus lower population growth rates). The life 
cycle model is then used to deduce the likely 
effect on aggregate savings from both longer 
life expectancy and lower population growth 
rates. While longer expected life, ceteris pa-
ribus, increases individual and thus aggregate 
savings, a lower population growth rate may 
increase per capita saving in the short run, but 
reduces it in the long run.
1 Introduction
Motivation and Some Data 
We are getting older. This fact not only be-
comes apparent every morning when trying 
to get out of bed. When plotting measures of 
the age distribution of industrialized countries 
over time, one observes a substantial increase 
in the share of the population of old age in the 
last decade, a trend that is predicted to persist 
and even accelerate in the near future. To make 
things precise, let’s deﬁne the Old Age Depen-
dency Ratio as the ratio of the total population 
of a country or region 65 years and older to the 
total population of ages 15 to 64, or 
Figure 1: Old Age Dependency Ratio, 65+/(15-64)
Notes: AFR = Africa; LAC = Latin American countries; JAP = Japan; CHI = People’s Republic of China; 
EU = European Union region; NA = North America; FSU = countries of the former Soviet Union; and 
ROW = the rest of the world.
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Roughly  speaking,  this  ratio  measures  how 
many people of retirement age a country has 
per person of working age. For countries with 
a public pension system it also is a good ap-
proximation as to how many pensions have to 
be supported per working age adult.
Figure  1,  taken  from  Brooks  (2003)  plots 
Old Age Dependency Ratios for eight major 
regions of the world from 1950 onwards, and 
predicts them into the future.
While the forecasted data beyond 2050 rely 
heavily  on  the  assumption  that  population 
growth rates will converge across regions at 
that date, the data before 2050 show several 
intriguing facts. First, population aging is pre-
dicted to occur for all world regions, albeit 
at  different  degree  and  speed.  Japan’s  and 
Europe’s aging process has already set in, and 
is predicted to continue until about 2035, at 
which old age dependency ratios of close to 
50% are reached. At that time, assuming all 
working age individuals actually work and no 
change in retirement ages (and disregarding 
early retirement), one working person has to 
support the pension of one pensioner. Taking 
into account labor market non-participation, 
the ratio is likely to be substantially higher. 
The ﬁgure also shows that population aging 
in North America, driven mainly by the US, 
is a phenomenon mostly of the future, and is 
predicted to occur slower than in Europe and 
Japan. The difference in timing of population 
aging is also an important determinant of the 
direction and size of international capital ﬂows 
likely to occur in the near future.
Before discussing the basic theory underlying 
the changes in aggregate savings, it is instruc-
tive to look one step deeper into the causes of 
the phenomenon of the aging population within 
the US, Europe and elsewhere. There are two 
basic reasons for this trend. First, individuals 
live  longer  and  longer.  Second,  households 
have fewer and fewer children. Table 1, tak-
en  from  Börsch-Supan  and  Lusardi  (2002), 
demonstrates  that,  conditional  on  surviving 
to the age of 65, a typical male in Germany 
is expected to live another 15 years, a typical 
woman can count on living another 19 years. 
The  numbers  for  other  European  countries 
and the US are similar, Japanese fare even bet-
ter, with residual life expectancies at 17 and 22 
years for males and females, respectively. 
In Table 2 we show how longevity has changed 
over time. Using data for the US we demon-
strate  how  live  expectancies  have  changed 
over the last hundred years.1  
Germany Italy Japan Netherlands UK USA
Life expectancy at birth 
(male/female; 1998)
74.5/80.5 75.3/81.6 77.2/84.0 75.2/80.7 74.8/79.7 73.9/79.4
Life expectancy at 65 (male/
female; 1998)
15.3/19.0 15.8/20.2 17.1/22.0 14.7/18.8 15.0/18.5 16.0/19.1
Share of population aged 65 
and over (1998)
16.4 18.2 17.1 13.8 16.0 12.5
Table 1: Demographic features
Sources. OECD Health Data (2001).
1     See the website of the National Center for Health Statistics. The data used stem from · http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/tables/
2003/03hus027.pdf.74
The increases are quite astonishing. Around 
the turn of the 19-th century a typical male 
could  expect  to  live  48  years;  in  the  last 
hundred years roughly 26 years of extra live 
have been added to that expectation, due to 
improvements  in  medical  technology,  basic 
hygiene,  improved  nutrition  and  other  im-
portant factors. Women even gained 29 extra 
years on average, or more than a 50% longer 
life now than a hundred years ago. Despite all 
the negative connotations the discussion of the 
phenomenon of population aging usually has2, 
we should not forget the basic fact that add-
ing fruitful and enjoyable years to the average 
person’s life is a very positive development (at 
least according to the most commonly used 
speciﬁcations of individual’s preferences).
The second major factor responsible for the 
aging of the population in industrialized coun-
tries is the decline in the number of children 
households  have,  that  is,  in  fertility  rates. 
Deﬁne as the Total Fertility Rate the average 
number of children a woman has during her 
reproductive years. Absent migration a total 
fertility rate of about 2,1 is needed to keep 
a population stable over time. Tables 3 and 4 
summarize total fertility rates (past and pre-
dicted) for rich and poor regions, as well as 
current  fertility  rates  in  Europe  and  North 
America.3  We  observe  from  Table  3  that  a) 
rich countries have lower fertility rates than 
poor countries, b) rich countries have, and are 
predicted to have in the future, fertility rates 
consistent with a shrinking population (gain 
absent immigration from poor countries).
Finally Table 4 summarizes the extremely low 
total fertility rates in Europe, especially Ger-
many and Southern Europe, whereas the US 
has a total fertility rate that just sufﬁces to 
keep the US population size stable even with-
Region 1990 2000 2010 2025
World 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.3
Poor Countries 4.7 3.1 2.7 2.4
Rich Countries 1.9 1.6 1.7 1.7
Table 3: Past and Future Total Fertility Rates
Group 2000 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 1900
Pop. 77 75 74 71 70 68 64 59 56 52 49
Female 80 79 78 75 73 71 66 61 57 53 51
Male 74 72 70 67 67 66 62 58 56 50 48
Table 2: US Life Expectancy at Birth, Over Time
2     For a refreshing exception, see the essay by E. Niejahr in Die Zeit, 43, 2004.
3     See McDevitt (1999), p. A-39. Alternatively, the data can be found at http://www.overpopulation.com/faq/basic_information/ 
total_fertility_rate/.75
out immigration (and thus expanding if one 
takes into account substantial legal and illegal 
immigration into the US).
The previous two facts (longer lifetimes, lower 
fertility rates) motivate performing two exper-
iments with the basic life cycle model of con-
sumption and saving to be constructed next. 
We want to investigate how aggeregate saving 
is expected to change over time as households 
live longer, and as the size of newborn cohorts, 
relative to existing cohorts, decreases (that is 
population growth rates decline), due to a de-
cline in total fertility rates. 
2 The Basic Life Cycle Model
The basic life cycle model developed by Franco 
Modigliani  and  Richard  Brumberg  (1954), 
and, with slightly different focus, by Milton 
Friedman (1957) envisions a single individual 
living for J years (in practice, J may equal to 
60, from 21, the age at which the individual 
becomes economically independent, to age 80 
at which she dies). She enjoys consumption in 
all her living years, denoted by (c1, c2, … , cJ ). 
The lifetime utility the individual derives from 
consumption is given by the discounted sum of 
period by period utility
where ß is the time discount factor, a number 
typically assumed to lie between 0 and 1 and 
measuring the degree of impatience of the house-
hold (the smaller ß; the more impatient). The 
period utility function is increasing and strictly 
concave, which simply means that the individual 
likes more consumption better than less, but 
that  each  additional  amount  of  consumption 
gives less and less additional utility.
We assume that households work for jr years 
(in practice jr may equal 45 years), earning 
income. After age jr no labor income (or pen-
sion income) is being earned. For simplicity 
it is assumed that as time progresses the real 
income of the household increases at a constant 
growth rate g, reﬂecting both general techno-
logical progress as well as individual learning 
on the job. If we let y1 = y denote real income 
of the individual in her ﬁrst working year, this 
assumption implies that income in the second 
year equals y2 = (1+g)y; and in general 
for all years j = 1, … , jr. For technical reasons 
we make the empirically plausible assumption 
that g < r.
In the simplest possible version of the model 
households  are  assumed  to  be  able  to  bor-
row and lend money at a ﬁxed common real 
net interest rate r. Abstracting from bequests 
from  parents,  the  individual  solves  the  fol-
lowing  maximization  problem:  by  choosing   
(c1, c2, … , cJ), 
Country Germany Italy France UK Spain Canada US
TFR (1998) 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.7 2.1
Table 4: Current Total Fertility Rates76
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
which simply states that the present discounted 
expenses  for  consumption  has  to  equal  the 
present discounted value of income. The right 
hand side of this equation can be simpliﬁed, 
using  the  assumption  of  constant  income 
growth, to4
The optimal consumption life cycle proﬁle an 
individual chooses depends on the relative size 
of the individual’s impatience and the market 
interest rate. For now we assume that these 
two forces exactly balance, so that ß (1+r) = 1. 
Then the assumption that the individual values 
additional  consumption  at  a  decreasing  rate 
(strict concavity of u) immediately imply that 
it is optimal for the individual to equalize con-
sumption in all periods of life5, or
Let  this  common  consumption  level  be  de-
noted by c. 
Using the budget constraint and some tedious 
algebra the optimal consumption level is given 
by
Several  implications  immediately  arise  from 
the optimal consumption rule (2):
•   An increase in income y increases consump-
tion in all periods of the individual’s life.
•   The higher the growth rate of income g (for 
a given level y); the higher is consumption in 
each period of a person’s life.
•   For  given  retirement  age  jr  and  given  in-
come, increasing a person’s life expectancy J 
decreases consumption in all periods.
•     For given life expectancy and income, in-
creasing the retirement age increases con-
sumption in all periods.
•     A change in the real interest rate has ambigu-
ous effects on lifetime consumption.
Our  main  interest  in  the  life  cycle  model 
arises from its predictions for savings behavior 
and asset accumulation. The lifetime budget 
constraint (1) obscures savings behavior over 
an individual’s lifetime. The period by period 
budget constraint of the individual reads as
for each period j of the individual’s life. Here sj 
are ﬁnancial assets (or debt, if negative) carried 
from period j to j +1. Casually this is often called 
savings, but this term should be reserved for
4   In general, for any number          (0, 1) we have the formula
5     If ß (1+r) < 1 it is optimal to have consumption to decline over time, and if (1+r) > 1 consumption should increase over time. The 
explicit solution of the problem cannot be characerized without making specific assumptions on the form of the utility function, unless 
ß (1 + r) = 1, as assumed in the text.
(3)77
that is, for the change in an individual’s asset 
position, equal to total income (labor income 
yj plus capital rsj-1 minus consumption cj). Since 
the individual starts her life with no assets, s0 
= 0. Furthermore we require sJ > 0, that is, 
individuals cannot die in debt. Therefore it is 
optimal to set sJ = 0, since, absent any altruism, 
it never makes sense to carry assets into the 
grave, given the preferences speciﬁed above.6
Since we know that yj = y (1+g) j-1 and have al-
ready solved for the optimal consumption level 
in (2); we can use (3) to obtain the optimal 
asset levels over an individual’s lifetime. The 
precise formula changes once a person retires, 
and is given by
for a retired person of age j > jr, and
where c is given by (2): Thus for a retired per-
son savings equal
which is negative (and increasingly so). For a 
nonretired person we obtain
Unfortunately we can’t say whether y > c from 
(2). Thus there are two possibilities. Either y 
> c, in which case savings savj are always posi-
tive, increasing over time until retirement, at 
which point they turn negative as individuals 
dissave  to  ﬁnance  retirement  consumption. 
Or, if y < c, savings are initially negative (and 
possibly at ﬁrst become more negative over 
time), but at some point during the individ-
ual’s working life start to increase and turn 
increasingly positive, until retirement. Then, 
as before, households, decumulate assets to 
ﬁnance retirement consumption, so that sav-
ings  turn  negative  again  after  retirement. 
Figure 2 shows stylized life cycle proﬁles of 
labor income, consumption and savings.
2.1 Extensions of the Basic Model
Several simplifying assumptions were made to 
derive analytical solutions of the model above. 
First, individuals were allowed to freely bor-
row (subject to the constraint of having to pay 
back the loan with certainty in the future. In 
practice, to borrow against future labor income 
may be di¢cult, in particular if a country’s 
personal bankruptcy code provides for only 
mild punishments for defaulting on noncollat-
eralized loans. Second, individuals in the real 
world  face  important  uncertainties  that  the 
model abstracted from, such as labor income 
uncertainty,  uncertainty  about  health  status 
and medical expensive, as well as uncertainty 
about the exact time of death. Third, while we 
modelled income as an exogenous manna from 
heaven, in reality households have to provide 
labor services to command labor income. If 
leisure and consumption are not separable in 
the utility function, the analysis above has to 
be altered to incorporate the interaction be-
tween consumption and labor supply choices. 
An important abstraction was the absence of 
government policy in the analysis, in particular 
income taxation and social security. As long as 
6     It is easy to show that if one consolidates the period by period budget constraints (3) into a single constraint, one obtains back equation 
(1): We also implicitly assume that individuals cannot go deeper in debt than the amount they can repay with their future income (the 
borrowing constraints arising from this consideration are often called solvency constraints).
(4)
(5)78
these policies do not distort the labor leisure 
decision or affect the after tax real interest 
rate, our analysis can proceed as above, with 
income streams adjusted for taxes. Finally, we 
have so far considered a household in isolation, 
taking the interest rate as exogenously given. 
More complex models like the ones discussed 
below determine the interest rate as a general 
equilibrium  outcome,  either  to  equilibrate 
domestic saving and investment, or, if an open 
economy is considered, to equilibrate interna-
tional investment demand and saving supply.
Starting  with  the  seminal  work  of Auerbach 
and  Kotlikoff  (1987),  models  incorporating 
the features described above have been solved 
on computers,with the basic features from the 
simple  model  remaining  intact:  individuals 
accumulate assets during their working years 
to ﬁnance consumption in retirement. Figure 3, 
Figure 2: Income, Consumption, Assets and Savings
Figure 3: Life Cycle Asset Accumulation in an Exended  
Life Cycle Model
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taken from Conesa and Krueger (1999) shows 
the asset accumulation path over the life cycle 
derived from a model with borrowing con-
straints,  income  and  mortality  uncertainty, 
endogenous labor supply, a government pen-
sion system and interest rates determined in 
general equilibrium. Here one of the proﬁles 
refers to a model with a Pay As You Go so-
cial security system, and one to a model with a 
private accounts-based pension system.
3 Model Predictions for Aggregate 
Savings of Population Aging
3.1 An Increase in Life Expectancy J
If people live longer, for a given income proﬁle 
and  retirement  age,  the  implications  of  the 
model are clear-cut. From equation (2) we see 
that per-period consumption has to decline, 
and from (4) and (5) we see (after a little al-
gebra) that savings increase in all periods of an 
individual’s life. This is perfectly intuitive, as 
a given income now has to be stretched over a 
longer life time horizon, thus requiring bigger 
savings for retirement. It is, of course, possible 
that individuals will respond with an increase 
in the number of years worked, in which case 
the total effect on savings of an increase in life 
expectancy is ambiguous. To the extent that 
current public pension systems provide strong 
incentives to retire at the normal retirement 
age, baring reforms in the pension system the 
standard life cycle model predicts an increase 
in individual, and thus aggregate asset accumu-
lation and savings in response to an increasein 
life expectancy.
3.2 A Decline in Fertility Rates
So far it was sufﬁcient to analyze an individual 
in isolation. In order to study the impact of a 
decline in fertility and thus population growth 
rates we now have to consider the economy as 
a whole, aggregating over all individuals, each 
of which is assumed to behave according to the 
standard life cycle model. Formally, suppose 
that the population grows at a rate n per year, 
where n may be negative. This means that there 
are (1 + n) times as many individuals of age 25 
as individuals of age 26. If we let µj denote the 
fraction of the population of age j, a population 
growth rate of n implies that
and, since all fractions have to sum to 1,
so that one can compute the population frac-
tions as
Per capita asset holdings are then given as
and per capita savings as
We are interested in the short and long run 
effect of declines in the population growth rate 
n on per capita asset holdings and per capita 
savings. The long-run effects can basically be 
read off Figure 2. A lower population growth 
rate, in the long run, yields a larger fraction 
of the population in older cohorts. Since older 
cohorts, as Figure 2 shows, tend to have more 
assets and save less (at least if they are already re-
tired), we would expect per capita asset holding 80
to increase and per capita savings to decline as 
a long-run consequence to a (permanent) de-
cline in the population growth rate.
The short run consequences of a sudden and 
permanent decline in the population growth 
rate are less clear. The decline in n gradually 
makes the population older. As the large co-
horts arising from the previous, higher popu-
lation growth rate, age, they move from being 
borrowers  to  being  savers  (during  the  high 
earning years from 45-65) to being dissavers in 
retirement. This suggests that asset accumula-
tion is increasing over time, while average sav-
ings should ﬁrst increase, but then decline, as 
the big cohorts enter their retirement age.
Since this cannot be shown theoretically for 
all parameter values, the paper now presents 
a simple simulation analysis. This is meant to 
be a thought experiment demonstrating the 
economic forces at work, rather than an exact 
quantitative predictions about future asset ac-
cumulation and savings. For the simulation we 
assume the following parameter values, sum-
marized in Table 5.
We carry out the following thought experi-
ment:  until  the  year  2000  the  population 
growth rate is assumed to be 1%; then it falls 
permanently to 0%. In Figure 4 we plot how, 
over time, per capita asset holdings and sav-
ings change, in response to the decline in the 
population growth rate.
First, we observe that changes in aggregate 
savings and asset accumulation terminate after 
sixty years. This is due to our assumption that 
individuals live for 60 years, plus the assump-
tion that the change in the population growth 
rate is permanent. This implies that all adjust-
ments  in  the  demographic  structure  of  the 
economy are completed after 60 years. Since
individual  behavior  does  not  change  as  the 
population  growth  rate  changes,  after  60 
years the economy has reached its new long 
run equilibrium. The dynamics of per capita 
assets  and  savings  is  as  conjectured  above. 
While asset holdings increase monotonically 
over time as the population ages, per capita 
savings ﬁrst increase (as the big cohorts reach 
their prime earnings years) and then decline 
as more and more people retire and dissave. 
In the long run, savings declines, compared to 
the initial situation with a higher population 
growth rate.
This completes our discussion of the predic-
tions  the  standard  life  cycle  model  has  for 
aggregate savings dynamics in the light of an 
Economic Birth 21
Retirement Age jr 65
Life Expectancy J 80
Interest Rate r 3%
Time Discount Factor ß 1
103
Income Growth Rate g 2%
Initial Pop. Growth Rate n 1%
Table 5: Parameter Values81
aging  population,  driven  both  by  increased 
life expectancy and reductions in fertility and 
thus population growth rates.
4 Conclusion
The population is aging, and, as I have argued 
above, theory predicts that this has profound 
consequences  for  individual  and  aggregate 
savings dynamics. Stepping beyond the par-
tial  equilibrium  life  cycle  model  is  beyond 
this essay, but analyzes of the consequences of 
population aging for the future of social secu-
rity, the direction and magnitude of interna-
tional capital ﬂows in a world where regions 
age at different paces and other applied ques-
tions usually start from the individual optimi-
zation problem discussed here. Recently, the 
papers by De Nardi, Imrohoroglu and Sargent 
(1999),  Brooks  (2003)  and  Börsch-Supan, 
Ludwig and Winter (2004) have analyzed the 
issues  of  international  capital  ﬂows  and/or 
public  pension  reforms  in  dynamic  general 
equilibrium  models  that  have  the  life  cycle 
model as its basic building block and demo-
graphic changes as exogenous driving force. 
Since the paper by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and 
Winter (2004) is contained in this volume, 
it is not useful to give an executive summary 
here. But by providing the partial equilibrium 
analysis for an analytically solvable version of 
the life cycle model this paper has hopefully 
provided  some  additional  intuition  for  the 
quantitative  results  obtained  by  the  papers 
cited above.
Figure 4: Savings and Asset Changes
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Abstract
This paper discusses the role of demographic 
and other household characteristics in risky as-
set participation and in portfolio composition, 
in view of the main computational and econo-
metric ﬁndings of recent portfolio studies. The 
overall message seems to be that household 
characteristics  can  be  quite  important,  but 
they tend to play a bigger role in determining 
participation than in inﬂuencing risky portfo-
lio shares conditional on participation. Based 
on observed portfolio inertia, it seems that the 
biggest challenges for the ﬁnancial sector in 
the medium run are likely to arise from man-
aging entry or exit of households from risky 
asset markets rather than from handling port-
folio  rebalancing  of  households  that  already 
participate in risky assets.
1 Introduction
The development of capital markets over the 
longer term is heavily inﬂuenced by the evolu-
tion of household preferences for different types 
of assets and by associated changes in observed 
patterns of asset accumulation. The 1990s have 
witnessed a dramatic change in this context, 
namely a substantial shift of household prefer-
ences on both sides of the Atlantic towards risk-
ier assets, especially ﬁnancial assets. This shift 
was encouraged by both market developments 
and by government policies. The stock market 
boom in the second half of the decade, the grad-
ual drop in stock market participation costs, as 
well as government policies (e.g., privatization 
programs or introduction of tax incentives for 
retirement accounts) are often noted as major 
driving forces behind this portfolio shift. 
Table 1 illustrates the portfolio shift by tracking 
changes over time in the proportion of house-
holds investing in risky ﬁnancial or risky real 
assets in the US and in major European coun-
tries. In some countries, such as the UK, we 
observe dramatic increases in the proportion of 
households investing directly in stocks, mainly 
as a result of government privatization efforts 
and of the associated advertising campaign. In 
other countries, notably in the US, participa-
tion in direct stockholding remains fairly con-
stant across the 1980s and 1990s, but major 
changes are observed in indirect stockholding 
mainly in the form of individual retirement 
accounts. In countries such as the US and the 
UK, stockholding participation is quite high, 
while in others, such as Italy, households are 
much slower to get into the stock market.
This increased tendency to participate in the 
stock market did not come at the expense of 
participation in other risky assets, such as cor-
porate bonds or private equity and investment 
real estate. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows 
that participation rates have increased in all 
countries shown, and across the spectrum of 
asset categories examined. It also shows an in-
teresting difference in the tendency of house-
holds to hold risky real versus risky ﬁnancial 
assets:  witness  the  very  high  proportion  of 
households investing in risky real but not in 
risky ﬁnancial assets in Italy, compared to the 
much smaller such proportion in the US.1 
The tendency of households to invest their sav-
ings in risky forms, and to continue to do so 
in the face of recent stock market downturns 
and difﬁcult economic conditions, is not uni-
form but seems to depend crucially on their 
demographic characteristics, attitudes towards 
risk taking, ﬁnancial resources and borrowing 
opportunities. 
1     This can be accomplished by subtracting the percentage of those investing in “Direct and indirect Stockholding” from the percentage 
of those investing in “Total risky assets” in a given country.85
US UK Neth-
erlands
Ger-
many
Italy US UK Neth-
erlands
Ger-
many
Italy
1983
1989
1995
1998
19.1 
16.8
15.2 
19.2
8.9 
22.6
23.4 
21.6
n.a. 
n.a.
11.5
15.4
9.7
10.3 
10.5
n.a.
n.a
4.5
4.0 
7.3
n.a.
31.6
40.4
48.9
n.a
n.a.
n.a.
31.4
n.a.
n.a.
29.4
35.1
11.2
12.4
15.6
n.a.
n.a.
10.5
14.0
18.7
Year  Direct stockholding  Direct and indirect stockholding
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2001b). The table reports the proportion of direct stockholders 
and of direct or indirect stockholders in each country. All statistics use sampl weights. 
US UK Neth-
erlands
Ger-
many
Italy US UK Neth-
erlands
Ger-
many
Italy
1983
1989
1995
1998
n.a.
31.9
40.6
49.2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
32.4
n.a.
n.a.
21.9
27.7
13.7
17.2
20.2
n.a.
n.a.
12.0
18.5
22.1
n.a.
46.4
51.6
56.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
28.4
32.8
17.8
24.1
25.2
n.a.
n.a.
47.0
46.9
43.8
Year  Risky financial assets  Total risky assets
Direct stockholding Shares held directly.
Direct and indirect 
stockholding
Shares held directly, mutual funds, investment accounts, retirement accounts. Except for 
the US, information on the specific types of mutual funds and investment accounts is not 
available, and one cannot disentangle indirect stockholding in mutual funds and managed 
investment accounts from investment in other financial assets. For this reason the report-
ed Figures overestimate the true value of indirect stockholding. In Germany there is no 
information on pension funds.
Risky financial assets In the US direct and indirect stockholding, plus corporate, foreign and mortgage-backed 
bonds. In the UK direct and indirect stockholding plus corporate bonds. In the Nether-
lands direct and indirect stockholding, but excluding defined-benefits pension funds. In 
Germany direct and indirect stockholding plus foreign bonds. In Italy direct and indirect 
stockholding plus long-term government bonds and corporate bonds.
Total risky assets Risky financial assets, business, investment real estate. In Germany there is no information 
on investment real estate in wave 1983 of the Income and Expenditure Survey, and no in-
formation on business property in 1993. In the UK there is no information on real assets.
Note: Risky Asset Definitions
Data Sources: Data for the US are drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finances. Data for the UK are 
drawn from the Family Expenditure Survey. Data for the Netherlands are drawn from the Center Sav-
ing Survey. Data for Germany are drawn from the German Income and Expenditure Survey (1983)and 
from the Soll und Haben Survey (1989 and 1995); for comparison with earlier periods, all data refer to 
West Germany. Data for Italy are drawn from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
Table 1: Proportion of Households Investing in Risky Assets86
Thus,  understanding  the  channels  through 
which demographics and other relevant house-
hold  characteristics  inﬂuence  asset  market 
participation  and  portfolio  composition 
seems crucial for ﬁnancial sectors interested 
in assessing the prospects for household asset 
accumulation, demand for ﬁnancial products, 
and  capital  market  development  over  the 
longer run.
Ten years ago, such analysis would have been 
nearly impossible. Use of portfolio data from 
National Accounts allows at best analysis of 
asset aggregates, without providing informa-
tion on whether movements are due to chang-
es in the extent of household participation in 
asset markets or to changes in the composition 
of savings conditional on such participation. 
Nor is it possible to assess how asset market 
participation, or  portfolio  composition  con-
ditional on participation, depends on house-
hold  demographics.  During  the  1980s  and 
especially during the 1990s, the development 
of household-level data bases with rich portfolio 
information has made such analyzes possible. 
At the same time, development of computa-
tional techniques has allowed us to solve cali-
brated theoretical models of household saving 
and  portfolio  choice  under  non-diversiﬁable 
income risk and attractive preference speciﬁ-
cations, providing a useful background against 
which to interpret empirical ﬁndings.
In this paper, we ﬁrst highlight in Section 2 
the main lessons from existing computation-
al  portfolio  models  regarding  the  channels 
through  which  household  demographics  and 
other factors could inﬂuence the composition 
of savings. We then turn to the data and review 
in Section 3 recent empirical ﬁndings on the 
role of such demographics, interpreting them 
in light of existing theory and computations. 
Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Why Should Demographic and 
Other Household Characteristics 
Matter?
2.1 Participation versus Conditional 
Portfolio Shares
Conceptually, analysis of demand patterns for 
risky assets and of the role of household char-
acteristics in shaping such demands should be 
broken down into two parts: (i) participation 
in risky assets; and (ii) portfolio share devoted 
to each risky asset conditional on participation 
in it. 
Our portfolio choice models can be used to 
derive and discuss optimal portfolio composi-
tion, assuming that the household solves such 
a problem, i.e. perceives risky ﬁnancial assets 
as part of its asset menu. However, households 
do not need to participate in all asset markets. 
Whether they do so depends on how expected 
lifetime utility under such participation com-
pares to that attainable under no participation 
in the risky asset over the relevant horizon. 
Analysis of this choice is implemented through 
comparison of the value functions associated 
with each type of behavior.
It can be shown that, under a broad set of condi-
tions, an expected utility maximizer would ﬁnd 
it optimal to participate in risky ﬁnancial as-
sets, in large or in limited amounts (see Arrow, 
1974; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995). In view of 
these  results,  extensive  non-participation  in 
risky instruments, such as stocks, constitutes a 
puzzle, which has been dubbed “the stockhold-
ing puzzle” in recent portfolio literature. Such 
behavior is usually attributed to the presence of 
ﬁxed entry or participation costs that discour-
age households from investing in such instru-
ments unless their demand for such assets is suf-
ﬁciently high to make it worthwhile for them to 
pay the ﬁxed entry or participation cost.87
Powerful evidence in favor of the ﬁxed-cost ap-
proach to non-participation in risky assets has 
been  provided  by  ﬁndings  that  participation 
tends to be higher when observable participa-
tion costs are lower both in a given country over 
time and across countries at a given point in 
time (see Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli, 2003). This 
is corroborated by ﬁndings in recent empiri-
cal studies suggesting that relatively small ﬁxed 
participation costs can explain the behavior of a 
large proportion of stock market non-partici-
pants (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002; Paiella, 1999). 
It should be noted, however, that the full set of 
participation costs facing a household contem-
plating investment in stocks is ultimately unob-
servable, as it consists not only of objective and 
observable costs but also of costs arising from 
inertia, misperceptions, and limited ability to 
process ﬁnancial information.
Participation and optimal portfolio shares con-
ditional on participation, are intimately linked 
under the ﬁxed-cost view. The greater the opti-
mal portfolio share and the optimal amounts of 
investment of a given household in risky ﬁnan-
cial assets over the relevant horizon, the greater 
is its incentive to pay any given ﬁxed costs in or-
der to make use of risky ﬁnancial instruments.
Still, there may be factors that discourage par-
ticipation without necessarily inﬂuencing opti-
mal portfolio composition once the household 
gains access to stocks. These are factors that 
operate mainly by inﬂuencing entry or partici-
pation costs. A striking example is that of igno-
rance of certain classes of assets (see Guiso and 
Jappelli, 2004). Households that are unaware 
of the existence of stocks or of mutual funds 
will obviously not choose to participate, but 
we would not expect such ignorance to con-
tinue to be a factor for participants in the pro-
cess of deciding their portfolio share. Luckily, 
recent econometric work on portfolio choice 
allows distinct treatment of demographics and 
other relevant factors in the ﬁrst stage of par-
ticipation choice from that in the second stage 
of portfolio share determination.
Bearing in mind the distinction between par-
ticipation in a risky asset and portfolio share of 
that asset conditional on participation, we now 
turn  to  discuss  important  channels  through 
which household demographic and other char-
acteristics can inﬂuence these two choices.
2.2 Age and Life-Cycle Considerations
Table 2 breaks down participation in the coun-
tries and assets shown in Table 1, according to 
age group. The general impression from this tab-
ulation is that of a usually hump-shaped pattern 
of participation rates in most countries, start-
ing small in early working life, peaking prior 
to retirement, and turning down again during 
the later part of life. Table 3 presents a similar 
breakdown by age for portfolio shares of each 
risky asset category, conditional on participat-
ing in this category. No clear pattern emerges, 
with some countries displaying increasing age-
portfolio share proﬁles (e.g., direct stockhold-
ing in the US), others decreasing (e.g., the UK), 
others ﬂuctuating (e.g., the Netherlands), and 
others  relatively  ﬂat  (e.g.,  Italy). Tabulations 
can, of course, be misleading, and econometric 
analysis is needed to disentangle the effect of 
each demographic or other household charac-
teristic on participation in risky assets, while 
controlling for other factors. As we will see 
below, empirical studies tend to ﬁnd weak and 
rather mixed inﬂuences of age on participation 
in risky assets, and even weaker or dubious ef-
fects of age on conditional portfolio shares. 
What  lies  behind  the  mixed  empirical 
evidence  on  participation  and  conditional 
portfolio shares at different ages is the variety 
of ways in which changing conditions over a 88
household’s life cycle can inﬂuence participa-
tion and portfolio shares. One relevant con-
sideration  is  “time  diversiﬁcation”,  which  is 
related to the remaining length of time until 
the  end  of  the  household’s  investment  hori-
zon (Gollier, 2001). An investor who suffers 
a portfolio loss at a particular point in time 
can spread the ﬁnancial consequences of this 
loss over the remaining periods in the horizon. 
Obviously, younger households have more re-
maining periods over which to spread losses 
(“time  diversify”),  compared  to  their  older 
counterparts. As a result, younger households 
can afford to hold greater proportions of their 
wealth in risky assets than older households 
with similar other characteristics.
A further important consideration is related 
to the length of the remaining working life, 
or more generally of the remaining time dur-
ing which the household earns income, and 
was ﬁrst pointed out by Cocco et al. (1997). 
Although  income  earners  face  non-diversiﬁ-
able risk associated with their income, there 
is a minimum level of income, typically non-
zero and time-varying, that can potentially be 
earned in each future period. Entitlement of 
a household to such a stream of “worst-case” 
incomes is equivalent to holdings of a riskless 
asset yielding these same payments. Such “sur-
rogate holdings of riskless assets” should be 
added to any observable holdings in the house-
hold’s portfolio to assess its overall holdings of 
riskless assets and exposure to asset risk. As 
the household ages, remaining years of work-
ing life and holdings of surrogate riskless assets 
diminish, making it optimal for households to 
reduce the portfolio share of risky assets. Put 
differently,  as  households  age,  they  tend  to 
rely  increasingly  on  accumulated  observable 
wealth and progressively less on human wealth 
for ﬁnancing consumption. This should make 
them moderate their exposure to risky assets.
Both time diversiﬁcation and increased reliance 
on accumulated wealth justify a shift in the com-
position of savings towards relatively riskless as-
sets as the household ages. Interestingly, this is 
also what households are urged to do by their 
ﬁnancial advisors, though not necessarily with 
these factors in mind. Whether age noticeably 
inﬂuences portfolio composition when control-
ling for other factors is, of course, an empirical 
matter to which we will turn below.
Besides the continuous aging process, discrete 
life-cycle  events  can  also  affect  willingness 
to  hold  stocks.  An  important  such  change, 
superimposed on the natural aging process, 
is retirement. In addition to getting closer to 
the end of the household’s horizon, retirement 
also signals a reduction in background income 
risk and usually a ﬂattening of the age-income 
proﬁle. Along with this come a reduction in 
the ability to buffer major expenditure shocks 
via adjusting labor supply, and a concomitant 
reduction in the ability to obtain loans. While 
the combined effect of all these considerations 
could  in  principle  be  ambiguous,  emerging 
computational models with an explicit retire-
ment period suggest that beneﬁts from access 
to  stocks  are  more  limited  among  retirees 
than  among  working-age  households  (see, 
for example, Bilias and Haliassos, 2004). For 
given ﬁxed costs, this would imply more lim-
ited participation rates during retirement, and 
more limited portfolio shares of risky ﬁnancial 
assets, controlling for other factors.
Another discrete event over the life cycle is the 
switch to homeowner status. The house repre-
sents the biggest purchase for a household and 
typically the biggest wealth item. Renters ac-
cumulating down payments for a home may be 
unwilling to introduce ﬁnancial risk into their 
down payment accumulation. The younger and 
poorer among households who have invested in 89
a home have limited ﬁnancial wealth to invest in 
stocks, and this reduces the beneﬁts of equity 
market participation (Cocco, 2004). Moreover, 
homeowners  with  mortgages  have  monthly 
payment  commitments  that  may  discourage 
them from holding their savings in risky form 
(Fratantoni, 2001). Still, homeownership can 
also have positive effects on the tendency to as-
sume ﬁnancial risk. For instance, homeowners 
have access to home equity loans not available 
to renters, and this may make them less averse 
to bearing risk in savings. 
Table 2: Proportion of Households Investing in Risky Assets, by Age
<30 30 -39 40 - 49 50 - 59 60 - 69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
11.8
10.8
4.7
8.5
3.4
16.0
19.6
6.8
11.3
9.9
21.2
24.5
13.4
12.1
8.4
24.8
28.1
18.4
11.2
9.3
23.7
26.2
17.8
10.1
6.4
18.2
18.5
21.2
6.1
4.2
9.2
21.6
14.4
10.0
7.3
Direct Stockholding
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli (2001b). All statistics use sample weights. 
For data sources and risky asset definitions, see Notes to Table 1.
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
34.3
20.4
12.1
18.6
11.9
51.8
31.5
25.6
21.8
27.5
58.3
37.0
33.7
22.0
24.2
61.4
41.2
40.1
21.0
23.4
47.1
34.8
38.6
17.1
15.8
32.4
21.9
35.9
11.7
7.8
48.9
31.5
33.5
18.9
18.9
Direct and Indirect Stockholding
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
34.5
20.9
8.7
23.9
17.3
51.8
32.0
15.6
28.2
30.3
58.5
37.7
21.0
28.0
26.9
61.5
42.2
31.1
27.8
26.3
47.9
36.4
31.1
23.1
20.6
33.4
23.1
35.1
18.0
10.3
49.2
32.4
24.8
25.1
22.1
Risky Financial Assets
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
38.7
n.a.
12.8
n.a.
32.4
58.6
n.a.
22.9
n.a.
50.6
67.0
n.a.
29.6
n.a.
50.6
68.4
n.a.
41.2
n.a.
51.7
59.2
n.a.
32.8
n.a.
45.9
42.4
n.a.
38.8
n.a.
26.4
56.9
n.a
31.5
n.a.
43.8
Total Risky Assets90
 Table 3: Conditional Asset Shares, by Age
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
22.5
57.1
24.2*
17.0
18.9*
28.3
51.3
48.8
15.2
22.3
29.4
46.7
30.2
15.0
23.4
32.7
38.9
41.1
16.6
23.7
37.5
33.0
57.2
22.1
22.8
41.3
37.6
56.3
27.5
22.7
34.6
42.7
47.6
18.6
23.0
Direct Stockholding
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli (2001b). All statistics use sample weights. A star indicates that the 
figure is based on fewer than 20 observations. For data sources and risky asset definitions, see Notes 
to Table 1.
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
52.0
n.a.
29.8*
20.6
47.9
53.4
n.a.
37.5
19.3
52.5
61.0
n.a.
42.9
16.9
52.2
61.4
n.a.
54.9
19.0
56.2
60.8
n.a.
61.6
26.2
53.2
57.9
n.a.
59.1
32.6
59.1
59.6
n.a
53.6
21.8
57.3
Direct and Indirect Stockholding
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
52.1
n.a.
32.1*
24.8
46.4
53.7
n.a.
40.0
23.2
58.0
61.8
n.a.
37.0
20.7
58.3
62.1
n.a.
43.2
22.3
67.0
61.4
n.a.
56.6
30.2
71.4
59.4
n.a.
64.0
40.8
71.1
60.5
n.a
49.7
26.3
65.4
Risky Financial Assets
<30 30 -39 40 -49 50 -59 60 -69 >70 Total
US
UK
Netherlands
Germany
Italy
44.4
n.a.
24.2*
n.a.
42.8
43.0
n.a.
27.1
n.a.
43.9
52.9
n.a.
28.0
n.a.
38.6
58.8
n.a.
34.8
n.a.
46.5
56.2
n.a.
32.3
n.a.
44.3
56.1
n.a.
44.7
n.a.
40.5
54.4
n.a
33.1
n.a.
42.9
Total Risky Assets
Though  important,  housing  is  not  the  only 
lumpy expenditure over the life cycle. Having 
children often implies a need to pay for at least 
part of their college education, encouraging the 
household to engage in ﬁnancial planning. Soule-
les (2000) has found evidence of considerable 
consumption smoothing by parents in anticipa-
tion of college. While exposure to stockholding 
risk may interfere with reaching a speciﬁc sav-
ings accumulation target by the time children 91
enter college, taking advantage of the equity 
premium may actually facilitate reaching this 
target with a smaller amount of savings over 
the medium term. Having children also makes 
it more likely that household ﬁnancial behavior 
is inﬂuenced by bequest motives likely to affect 
accumulation of risky assets, especially since 
capital gains on such assets are often exempt 
from  taxation  when  transferred  to  descen-
dants (“step up of basis”). On the other hand, 
a larger number of children carries with it, for 
given household income, a greater burden of 
supporting them and leaves smaller amounts 
for risky saving.
Other family conditions, such as marital status, 
can also impact the tendency to hold stocks, 
possibly in complicated ways. An interesting 
channel of inﬂuence is through the combined 
working  potential  of  two  spouses.  Having 
two (potential) workers helps reduce overall 
labor income risk and enhance the household’s 
willingness to save in risky assets. Again, how-
ever, given household income it means addi-
tional obligations that can discourage invest-
ment in risky assets.
Based on these considerations, prospects for 
risky asset demands and for development of 
capital markets for an aging population seem 
to  be  subject  to  conﬂicting  considerations. 
Demographers  expect  greater  population 
masses of middle- and old-aged people in the 
years to come. Such people have shorter ho-
rizons, and this should discourage them from 
holding  risky  assets.  However,  they  will  be 
displacing  in  importance  cohorts  of  young 
households which, despite their longer hori-
zons, tend to hold signiﬁcantly fewer assets. 
Despite their lower optimal portfolio shares 
in risky assets, such aged households may gen-
erate more overall demand for risky assets (at 
given returns) than a population tilted more 
towards the young. This should be reinforced 
by the fact that these aged households will be 
spending less time in retirement, as long as the 
prolongation of working life is not matched 
by miraculous improvements in longevity. Fi-
nally, middle- and old-aged households will be 
supporting fewer children, thus leaving more 
room for risky investments, but they will also 
have  weaker  bequest  motives,  which  could 
somewhat  discourage  asset  holding.  Net  ef-
fects are hard to predict, though it seems that 
the fact that aged households tend to have size-
able accumulated assets for retirement should 
be a dominant consideration, at least until re-
tirement. Thereafter, a lot will depend on the 
extent of asset liquidation and on demand by 
young savers abroad.
2.3 Education, Awareness, and  
Financial Sophistication
Although  economic  optimization  models 
typically  assume  that  households  are  aware 
of the full set of available assets and of their 
main  properties,  and  also  that  they  possess 
the ability to come up with optimal portfolio 
strategies, there are empirical considerations 
to suggest that the potential role of education, 
awareness, and ﬁnancial sophistication should 
not be ﬁnessed in portfolio analysis.
Guiso and Jappelli (2004) use 1995 and 1998 
household-level data from the Survey of House-
hold Income and Wealth (SHIW) collected by 
the Bank of Italy and ﬁnd that about 35 percent 
of Italian households are not aware of stocks, 
50 percent do not know about mutual funds 
and corporate bonds, and almost 70 percent 
are unaware of investment accounts. Indeed, 
they ﬁnd that less than 30 percent of the sam-
ple is simultaneously aware of stocks, mutual 
funds and investment accounts. This ﬁnding is 
in stark contrast with the standard assumption 
of theoretical models that households perceive 92
the full set of available savings instruments and 
choose among them. 
As stressed by Guiso and Jappelli, the pool of 
unaware households can be reduced by direct 
advertising and related efforts at information 
dissemination  undertaken  by  the  ﬁnancial 
sector itself. The ﬁnancial sector, though, re-
sponds itself to incentives, and it will thus be 
hesitant to undertake the costs of disseminat-
ing information if it knows that potential in-
vestors face high entry costs and are thus less 
likely to enter. 
Social interactions can provide an alternative 
or a complement to advertising by practitio-
ners, and there is evidence in Guiso and Jappel-
li that social interactions with knowledgeable 
peers increase the probability of asset market 
participation. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2001) 
use data from the US Health and Retirement 
Study to show that households who interact 
with their neighbors or who attend church are 
substantially more likely to invest in the stock 
market than those who do not, controlling for 
factors like wealth, race, education, and risk 
tolerance. Moreover, the impact of sociability 
is stronger in states where stock market par-
ticipation is more widespread. 
Formal education can inﬂuence stock market 
participation and conditional portfolio shares 
through at least two different channels: ﬁxed 
costs  and  income  processes.  Education  can 
improve a person’s overall level of informa-
tion,  alertness,  and  problem  solving  ability, 
thus making it more likely that the person will 
overcome any given (objective or subjective) 
obstacles  to  gaining  access  to  risky  instru-
ments. Formally, this is captured by assum-
ing that more educated households face lower 
ﬁxed entry or participation costs than their 
less  educated  counterparts,  thus  making  it 
more likely that they will choose to participate 
in risky assets.
In addition to the channel operating through 
(subjective  and  objective)  ﬁxed  entry  or 
participation  costs,  econometric  studies  of 
income determination show that households 
with  different  educational  attainment  face 
both different age-income proﬁles and differ-
ent  stochastic  processes  of  income  shocks.2 
Speciﬁcally, more educated households tend 
to face steeper age-income proﬁles and small-
er variance of both transitory and permanent 
income shocks.3 Computational models have 
shown  that  education-induced  differences 
in  income  processes  by  themselves  tend  to 
produce sizeable effects on gains from stock 
market access and on stock market partici-
pation (see Bilias and Haliassos, 2004). The 
steeper age-income proﬁles make more edu-
cated households less willing to accumulate 
savings for the future, ceteris paribus, while 
the  smaller  shock  variances  reduce  their 
precautionary  motives  for  accumulating 
wealth  in  general,  including  risky  assets. 
Thus, if the only difference between educated 
classes consisted in the income processes each 
faced  (and  not,  for  example,  in  differences 
in ﬁxed entry and participation costs, initial 
endowments, attitudes to risk, etc.), then the 
more educated households should be saving 
less and should be less likely to participate in 
risky assets. 
The  conﬂict  between  education  effects  on 
ﬁxed costs and on income processes, control-
ling for other household characteristics, can 
2   See, for example, Carroll and Samwick (1997), and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman (2000).
3   Lower variances are mostly due to the smaller unemployment risk faced by the more educated.93
be  assessed  through  calibrated  models  and 
through empirical estimation. In recent com-
putational work using a calibrated intertempo-
ral model of portfolio choice with background 
income  risk,  ﬁnite  but  uncertain  lifetimes, 
and an explicit retirement period, Bilias and 
Haliassos (2004) ﬁnd that small or moderate 
ﬁxed costs, close to existing empirical esti-
mates,  do  not  seem  sufﬁcient  to  overcome 
the  negative  inﬂuence  of  education  on  par-
ticipation probabilities in the stock market, if 
household characteristics other than education 
are controlled for. The existing empirical evi-
dence on the role of education, controlling for 
other characteristics, is reviewed below. 
Although formal education is likely to facili-
tate sound ﬁnancial choices by reducing costs 
associated with entry and participation, it may 
be argued that effects should be even more 
visible for ﬁnancial education directly relevant 
to such choices. Household-level databases do 
not contain data on ﬁnancial education at the 
household level, but there is some evidence 
that  countries  with  high  levels  of  ﬁnancial 
education, at least as perceived by manage-
ment leaders, tend to be also countries with 
higher rates of participation in stockholding 
(see Guiso et al., 2003). While not conclu-
sive, this together with other indicators could 
lend some support to the relevance of ﬁnancial 
education for participation in risky assets.
Finally,  formal  education  may  be  linked  to 
speciﬁc  attitudes  to  risk  taking,  length  of 
investment horizon, etc. For example, there 
is evidence in household surveys, such as the 
Survey of Consumer Finances, that willing-
ness to undertake ﬁnancial risk, or above aver-
age such risk, is more pronounced in the more 
educated households compared to households 
in the lower levels of educational attainment. 
While one can debate about the direction of 
effects, the typical approach in empirical but 
also in theoretical portfolio research is to ex-
amine the role of education for asset market 
participation and portfolio composition, con-
trolling for other household characteristics, 
such as aversion to ﬁnancial risk and invest-
ment horizon length.
2.4 Occupation and Employment Status 
The  typical  approach  in  recent  studies  of 
household portfolio choice is to consider labor 
income as exogenous, generating background 
income risk that inﬂuences asset accumula-
tion and portfolio composition. An important 
way in which occupation inﬂuences portfolio 
choice is in determining the size of this back-
ground  risk.  Carroll  and  Samwick  (1997) 
provide  estimates  of  variances  of  earnings 
shocks for various occupational categories, but 
computational models have tended to provide 
solutions either for a single type of households 
or for a small number of education categories. 
There is certainly room to explore the precise 
implications of different occupations.
A different channel through which occupation 
can inﬂuence the composition of savings is via 
knowledge of assets and of their properties, 
transmitted in the course of everyday profes-
sional life. There are various strong indica-
tions that familiarity with particular compa-
nies tends to contribute to holding stocks in 
those companies, ranging from the celebrated 
“home equity bias”4 of stock ownership to the 
important case of employees who own stock in 
their own companies. This tendency appears 
to be strong enough to generate suboptimal or 
4     For a description of this tendency of households to own domestic stocks rather than foreign stocks with similar or superior characteristics, 
see Lewis (1999).94
puzzling behavior on the part of households. 
Lewis (1999) demonstrates that the observed 
degree of home equity bias results in subopti-
mal portfolios, reviewing also similar work by 
others. The practice of employees to hold own 
company  stock  is  certainly  puzzling  from  a 
pure diversiﬁcation perspective, as it generates 
positive correlation between labor income and 
portfolio returns. Familiarity could contribute 
to both.
More  factors  than  mere  knowledge  of  the 
company and of its prospects seem to play a 
role in the choice of entrepreneurs to devote a 
large part of their savings to a single ﬁrm (see 
Carroll, 2001). Carroll (2001) reports that 
over 80% of the business equity of the US rich 
owning such equity is in a single entrepreneur-
ial venture, and about 50% of all their house-
hold income comes directly from enterprises 
in which the household has an ownership stake. 
On the one hand, these entrepreneurs are put-
ting too many eggs in one basket, while on the 
other they are generating substantial positive 
correlations between their portfolio returns 
and their employment income.
This suggests that there are aspects to being 
an entrepreneur other than the desire to hold 
a diversiﬁed portfolio, sufﬁciently strong to 
overcome it. Examples of such considerations 
include a desire for power and control, pride 
in owning and running a ﬁrm, strong bequest 
motives,  and  even  capital  market  imperfec-
tions precluding investments in a multitude of 
small entrepreneurial ventures. After review-
ing available data and alternative explanations 
of  the  behavior  of  the  rich,  Carroll  (2001) 
presents a formal model in which the pattern 
of savings is dictated by a “capitalist spirit” or 
equivalently a view of “bequests as a luxury 
good”. Smaller risk aversion concerning the 
size of bequests than that concerning the level 
of consumption leads to a greater proportion 
of lifetime resources being devoted to bequests 
as  their  resources  increase.  The  model  can 
also explain the tendency of the rich to display 
smaller aversion to risk taking (noted above), 
as well as their tendency to hold riskier portfo-
lios even excluding their private equity. 
Unemployment can affect the composition of 
savings in at least two important ways. First, 
the prospect of unemployment, even in small 
probability,  can  signiﬁcantly  discourage  ex-
posure to ﬁnancial risk and depress demand 
for risky assets. Bad or catastrophic states can 
have major effects on behavior, because they 
typically involve considerably lower consump-
tion  and  thus  considerably  higher  marginal 
utility  of  consumption.  They  can  thus  have 
visible inﬂuence on expected future marginal 
utility  of  consumption  and  consequently  on 
current  optimal  household  choices.  Second, 
unemployment as a current state can inﬂuence 
the composition of savings. Limited current 
cash on hand, combined with uncertainty as 
to the length of the unemployment spell can 
depress current demand for risky assets and 
willingness to assume ﬁnancial risk. Whether 
savings composition effects of transitions to 
unemployment  are  visible  in  the  aggregate 
does depend on the extent to which unem-
ployment affects poorer population segments, 
as these tend to have very limited or zero as-
sets anyway.
What do these observations imply about lon-
ger-run demographic effects on the compo-
sition  of  savings?  The  factors  discussed  in 
this  subsection  provide  a  channel  through 
which  economic  growth,  macroeconomic 
stabilization policies, and risk pooling by gov-
ernments  can  inﬂuence  the  composition  of 
savings. Developments that increase earnings 
uncertainty and unemployment risk tend to 95
discourage  households  from  investing  con-
siderable parts of their portfolios in risky as-
sets. Correspondingly, measures that reduce 
earnings or unemployment risk, such as sound 
macroeconomic  policies,  novel  insurance 
mechanisms, training programs and employ-
ment agencies should make households more 
willing to assume risk. Increased importance 
of services, especially ﬁnancial services, and 
development of information and communica-
tion ﬂows, e.g. via the internet, should also 
make it more likely that households know and 
trust risky ﬁnancial instruments, thus contrib-
uting to their importance as a component of 
household savings.
2.5 Race, Ethnic, and Other 
Background Factors
One  of  the  most  robust  empirical  ﬁndings 
in stockholding participation regressions for 
the United States is a statistically signiﬁcant 
role of race and ethnic background. Speciﬁ-
cally, such studies consistently ﬁnd that being 
white, non-hispanic signiﬁcantly increases the 
probability of participation in stockholding, 
controlling for other factors such as current 
income and wealth, education level, employ-
ment status, etc. On the face of it, this is a 
puzzling ﬁnding and interpreting it is far from 
straightforward.
One  possible  explanation  that  is  often  ad-
vanced is based on the supply side of ﬁnancial 
services.  It  is  argued  that  the  ﬁnancial  ser-
vices sector targets minority households less 
when advertising mutual funds and other risky 
ﬁnancial instruments. Another possible factor 
is that current income, education, and wealth 
are imperfect proxies for future income pros-
pects of minority households, and inclusion of 
the ethnic dummy captures complicated fac-
tors that inﬂuence future earnings but are not 
reﬂected in the other control variables. 
A different channel through which race and 
ethnic  variables  can  inﬂuence  the  composi-
tion of savings is provided by social interac-
tions  and  other  background  considerations. 
As mentioned above, there is some recent evi-
dence that interacting with people who know 
about certain new or complicated risky assets 
tends to encourage participation in such as-
sets. Belonging to population groups that did 
not have much exposure to such assets in the 
past may contribute to perpetuating this situa-
tion of more limited participation. Unless such 
groups avoid investment in risky assets for re-
ligious,  historical,  ethical  or  other  reasons, 
the source of such effects has relatively little 
to do with the fundamental characteristics of 
the group itself and much more to do with its 
past portfolio practices. For instance, Eymann 
and Börsch-Supan (2001) found evidence that 
former  East  German  households  tended  to 
have more limited participation in stockhold-
ing compared to their former West German 
counterparts, even after controlling for educa-
tion level, current resources, and other demo-
graphics. Assuming that their future prospects 
were similar in a united Germany, this ﬁnding 
suggests that limited past exposure to stocks 
may have been a key factor.
Turning to longer-term prospects, an impor-
tant factor should be the increasing cultural 
and ethnic diversity of the EU, both as a result 
of  the  recent  and  of  planned  future  expan-
sions, and as a result of immigration. Some 
of these ethnic groups may ﬁnd it more difﬁ-
cult to start investing in risky assets than their 
counterparts who are more familiar with such 
investments. Yet, if we believe in the impor-
tance of social interactions, increased ethnic 
diversity should eventually be beneﬁcial as it 
brings together people less familiar with risky 
assets and immerses them into environments 
where investment in such assets is much more 96
widespread. Investment in risky assets can be 
expected to spread as a result of these interac-
tions, even though such spread is unlikely to 
occur very quickly, if the German (or indeed 
the US) experiences can be used as a guide.
2.6 Factors Spanning Demographic 
Groups
In the previous section, we focused on house-
hold-speciﬁc  demographic  factors.  Here  we 
discuss brieﬂy factors important for portfolio 
choice which are not themselves demographic 
but can inﬂuence different demographic groups 
to different extents. Changes in demographics 
could thus inﬂuence the size and nature of the 
effects of these factors on the composition of 
savings.
2.6.1 Government Policies 
An  important  factor  inﬂuencing  longer-run 
trends in the composition of savings is gov-
ernment policy. While policy can take many 
forms and inﬂuence savings through various 
channels, here I will mention a few that relate 
directly to household portfolio choice.
The demographic transition and the funding 
problems that an aging population poses for 
social security systems have already encour-
aged several governments, notably the US gov-
ernment and major EU states, to set up indi-
vidual retirement accounts and to provide tax 
incentives for using them to accumulate retire-
ment assets, mainly in the form of tax defer-
rals. Use of such accounts has spread quickly. 
In the United States, the share of households 
having a tax-deferred retirement account --ei-
ther IRA or 401(k)-type-- rose from about 31 
percent in 1983 to about 49 percent in 1998, 
and to about 52 percent in 2001 (Bertaut and 
Starr-McCluer, 2001; Aizcorbe et al, 2003)5. 
As households are allowed to include stocks in 
these accounts, their spread has been a major 
factor behind the spread of indirect stockhold-
ing and of equity culture more generally. Con-
tinued use and spread of retirement accounts, 
both within the US and across other countries 
can prove to be a powerful engine of growth in 
demand for risky assets over the longer run.
Government policy can also have effects on 
participation in risky assets by providing the 
necessary elements for making potential inves-
tors feel secure about the ﬁnancial risk they un-
dertake. Safe accounting practices and inves-
tor protection are two such elements. Guiso, 
Haliassos  and  Jappelli  (2003)  report  some 
evidence that countries with higher levels of 
transparency, as judged by domestic managers, 
tend to exhibit higher levels of participation in 
risky assets. Giannetti and Koskinen (2003) 
ﬁnd that, in countries where minority investor 
rights  are  poorly  protected,  both  domestic 
portfolio investors and foreign investors have 
a disincentive to hold stocks. Such countries 
tend to exhibit lower participation rates. 
Unfortunately, governments often face con-
ﬂicting  objectives.  A  relevant  example  is 
that of universal banking. In their effort to 
promote banking, various governments have 
allowed commercial banks to hold stocks in 
addition  to  making  loans  and  to  providing 
ﬁnancial advice to customers. This ﬂexibil-
ity  has  created  conﬂicts  of  interests  within 
such banks. If a bank owns stock or has made 
loans to a troubled company, it has an incen-
tive to encourage its retail customers to put 
their savings in stocks of this troubled com-
pany, thus raising its price. While there are 
5     By comparison, mutual fund ownership rose from 4.5 percent in 1983 to 12.3 percent in 1995, to 16.5 percent in 1998 and 17.7 in 
2001.97
some disincentives to providing bad ﬁnancial 
advice, one wonders whether these are suf-
ﬁcient  to  discourage  bad  practices  that  the 
institutional  framework  makes  possible  and 
proﬁtable.  All  in  all,  the  way  governments 
respond to the demographic transition and to 
political pressures imposed by this transition 
can have important implications for the future 
tendency of households to invest their savings 
in risky assets.
2.6.2 Credit Market Conditions and 
Borrowing Constraints
Borrowing  constraints  and  overall  credit 
market conditions have been shown to have 
powerful  inﬂuences  on  household  choices 
regarding  the  level  and  the  composition  of 
savings.6 A recurring result in much of the 
theoretical literature is that, in the absence 
of  quantity  constraints  on  borrowing, 
households expecting their resources to in-
crease in the future would tend to borrow in 
order  to  increase  current  consumption  and 
their holdings of the risky asset. The pres-
ence  of  borrowing  constraints  discourages 
participation  in  risky  assets  and  lowers  the 
amount of risky assets held by those who do 
participate. 
This  theoretical  ﬁnding  is  corroborated  by 
empirical stockholding participation regres-
sions, where the presence of borrowing con-
straints is typically found to lower the prob-
ability of participation (see, for example, the 
contributions  in  Guiso  et  al.,  2001a).  The 
incidence  of  borrowing  constraints  is  now 
typically measured by survey responses, with-
out requiring households to have close-to-zero 
assets in order to be classiﬁed as borrowing-
constrained.  Households  are  asked  whether 
they have been turned down for credit, or 
been  given  less  than  requested,  or  been 
discouraged to apply by fear that they would 
be  turned  down.  Demographic  groups  that 
normally display greater incidence of borrow-
ing constraints are the young, the less educat-
ed, and the poorer population segments. The 
oldest  population  segments  could  also  face 
loan rejections as a result of limited horizons 
and restricted ability to increase work effort 
in order to repay the loan, but they make up 
for this by having accumulated assets that can 
be used as collateral or liquidated to ﬁnance 
consumption  needs  without  seeking  loans. 
Thus, a general aging of the population can 
be expected, at given levels of asset returns, 
to increase the supply of loanable funds, re-
duce the incidence of binding borrowing con-
straints, and increase demand for risky assets, 
at least before the bulk of the population en-
ters retirement and asset liquidation.
2.6.3 Household Attitudes to Risk and 
Precautionary Motives
It is natural to suppose that higher risk aver-
sion discourages savings in risky assets and 
encourages accumulation of a riskless asset. 
Recent computational work involving models 
with background income risk has uncovered 
a potential conﬂict between risk aversion and 
“precautionary”  motives  to  save  for  a  rainy 
day  or  more  generally  as  a  result  of  facing 
background  income  or  health  risk.7  These 
models conﬁrm that households with higher 
relative risk aversion will ﬁnd it optimal to 
have smaller portfolio shares in risky assets 
at (most) given levels of current resources, 
consistent  with  the  commonly  held  view. 
However,  for  utility  functions  displaying 
precautionary motives8, higher risk aversion is 
6   See, for example, Deaton (1991) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2003).
7   See Heaton and Lucas (1997), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), Bilias and Haliassos (2004).
8   Important utility functions that do not display such motives are the linear and the quadratic.98
usually combined with stronger precautionary 
motives that encourage wealth accumulation. 
The  net  effect  on  demand  for  risky  assets 
depends on the relative strength of the two 
factors (i.e., lower portfolio share and higher 
wealth level), but it is often the case that the 
stronger precautionary motive dominates and 
higher risk aversion is found to imply greater 
demand  for  risky  assets,  at  least  over  some 
range of current resources.
It is hard to draw clear implications for prac-
titioners  from  such  ﬁndings  yet,  especially 
because risk aversion of the utility function, as 
well as the strength of the precautionary mo-
tive (“prudence”) are not directly observable, 
despite some recent attempts to measure them 
based on survey responses (see, for example, 
Guiso and Paiella, 2001). These ﬁndings do 
suggest,  however,  that  demographic  shifts 
towards groups displaying greater tendencies 
to save for a rainy day (given their background 
income  risk)  could  also  result  in  greater 
demand for risky assets, even when combined 
with greater risk aversion and with lower shares 
of risky assets in savings.
3 Econometric Findings
In this Section, we report indicative economet-
ric results regarding most of the demographic 
and other household characteristics discussed 
above. The advantage of econometric research 
over  mere  cross-tabulation  by  characteristic 
is that it allows us to disentangle the effect of 
each factor, while controlling effects of all oth-
er factors. Sometimes this changes completely 
the picture given by tabulations. Econometric 
research in the area of household saving and 
portfolio choice has relied mostly on probit or 
logit regression for analyzing the participation 
decision, and on second-stage regressions for 
portfolio shares that allow for selection in the 
ﬁrst stage. 
3.1 Asset Market Participation
Table 4 reports probit regressions for direct 
participation in stockholding for the United 
States and for six European countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
UK). Data refer to 1998 for all countries, ex-
cept for Sweden for which 1999 data are used. 
The table is taken from Guiso, Haliassos, and 
Jappelli  (2003).  Control  variables  include 
marital status, family size, education (speciﬁ-
cally whether the household head has college 
education), age of household head, and posi-
tion in the income and in the wealth distribu-
tion within the country.
Financial resources (i.e., income and wealth) 
are seen to have a consistently positive and 
statistically signiﬁcant effect on participation 
across the countries shown. This is entirely 
consistent  with  computational  models  of 
household  portfolio  choice  reviewed  above, 
which predict both increased consumption and 
increased stockholding with higher resources. 
The resulting greater gains from participation 
make it more probable that any given level of 
ﬁxed entry or participation costs will be over-
come.
College education of the household head (i.e. 
of the household member responsible for han-
dling ﬁnances) is also shown to contribute to 
participation  in  directly  held  stocks  (at  the 
10% level of signiﬁcance). This ﬁnding is in 
accordance with the majority of the empirical 
literature based on standard probit and logit 
estimation of stockholding participation (see, 
for example, the country studies in Guiso et 
al., 2001a). 
Recently, application of modern binary quan-
tile regression estimation techniques has chal-
lenged  the  robustness  of  these  ﬁndings  and 
has found instead that education effects may 99
 Table 4: Probit Regressions for Direct Participation in Stockholding
France Germany Italy Nether-
lands
Sweden UK US
Married -0.0088
(0.0084)
0.0024
(0.0060)
0.0143
(0.0049)**
-0.0437
(0.0205)*
0.0390
(0.0120)**
0.0294
(0.0069)**
0.0017
(0.0219)
Family size -0.0050
(0.0033)
-0.0156
(0.0022)**
-0.0068
(0.0021)**
0.0098
(0.0090)
-0.0257
(0.0049)**
0.0031
(0.0115)
0.0023
(0.0077)
College-Educated 
Head
0.0555
(0.101)**
0.0422
(0.0046)**
0.0287
(0.0082)**
0.0390
(0.0169)*
0.0800
(0.0093)**
0.0581
(0.0070)**
0.0846
(0.0160)**
Age 31-40 0.2036
(0.0145)
-0.0474
(0.0074)**
0.0216
(0.0160)
0.0055
(0.0509)
0.0053
(0.0137)
0.0218
(0.0120)
-0.0841
(0.0279)**
Age 41-50 0.0066
(0.0137)
-0.0891
(0.0068)**
0.0044
(0.0125)
0.0253
(0.0524)
-0.0033
(0.0135)
0.0419
(0.0126)**
-0.1195
(0.0262)**
Age 51-60 0.0207
(0.0149)
-0.0906
(0.0066)**
0.0123
(0.0136)
0.0528
(0.0580)
0.0372
(0.0139)**
0.0388
(0.0131)**
-0.0612
(0.0289)*
Age 61-70 0.0002
(0.0145)
-0.0839
(0.0069)**
0.0067
(0.0131)
0.0749
(0.0637)
0.0146
(0.0146)
0.0266
(0.0135)*
-0.0646
(0.0300)*
Age > 70 -0.0134
(0.0139)
-0.1101
(0.0063)**
-0.0005
(0.0123)
0.1146
(0.0782)
-0.0453
(0.0121)**
-0.0022
(0.0129)
-0.0529
(0.0310)
II income quartile 0.0396
(0.0127)**
-0.0125
(0.0076)
-0.0082
(0.0071)
0.0010
(0.0285)
0.0699
(0.0141)**
0.0477
(0.0100)**
0.0928
(0.0380)**
III income quartile 0.0643
(0.0132)
0.0241
(0.0074)**
-0.0012
(0.0073)
-0.0118
(0.0255)
0.1090
(0.0151)*
0.1541
(0.0114)**
0.1032
(0.0386)**
IV income quartile 0.1316
(0.0149)**
0.0966
(0.0076)**
0.0319
(0.0103)**
0.0268
(0.0283)
0.2258
(0.0177)**
0.2200
(0.0128)**
0.2163
(0.0365)**
II wealth quartile 0.1284
(0.0187)**
0.2054
(0.0121)**
0.0362
(0.0177)*
0.1478
(0.0625)**
0.2403
(0.0096)**
0.2094
(0.0508)**
III wealth quartile 0.2224
(0.0199)**
0.3407
(0.0115)**
0.1237
(0.0248)**
0.2975
(0.0662)**
0.3422
(0.0129)**
0.3893
(0.0125)**
0.4121
(0.0493)**
IV wealth quartile 0.4280
(0.0200)**
0.4977
(0.0105)
0.3132
(0.0347)**
0.5235
(0.0623)**
0.5519
(0.010)**
0.5183
(0.0094)**
0.6331
(0.0322)**
Number of 
observations
10207 39393 7147 1679 17043 22858 4305
Source:  Guiso,  Haliassos,  and  Jappelli  (2003).  In  Sweden  very  few  households  in  the  first  wealth 
quartile have stocks. The regression therefore uses financial wealth tertiles. The coefficients in the 
table indicate the effect of the independent variable on the probability of stockownership. Standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. One star indicates that the coefficient is statistically different 
from zero at the 5 percent level, two stars at the 10 percent level
France Germany Italy Netherlands Sweden UK US
1998 
INSEE Survey 
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1998 
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ing Survey
1999 
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Economy
1998 
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Resources 
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1998 
Survey of 
Consumer 
Finance
 
Survey Data Sources for Tables 4 and 5100
not be statistically signiﬁcant across the en-
tire spectrum of the distribution of net gains 
from stock market access (Bilias and Halias-
sos, 2004). A possible interpretation of such 
more mixed results on the role of education 
for participation rests in the conﬂict between 
education effects on participation costs and 
on income processes noted above. 
One cannot help but notice the very mixed 
ﬁndings  regarding  age  variables.  In  some 
countries  (such  as  France,  Italy,  and  the 
Netherlands), the authors fail to ﬁnd a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant role for age variables. In oth-
ers, notably the US, UK, and Germany, they 
do ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant effects, but the 
pattern is not common among the countries 
and not the same as that indicated in tabula-
tions above (Table 2).9
In  Italy,  Sweden,  and  the  UK,  being  mar-
ried is found to contribute to the probabil-
ity of direct stockholding, while in the rest 
of  the  countries  no  signiﬁcant  effect  (or  a 
negative  effect)  is  found.  Greater  family 
size, when signiﬁcant, is found to discourage 
participation,  controlling  for  ﬁnancial  re-
sources. It is possible that greater family size 
leaves fewer resources for savings and some-
times makes households less willing to jeop-
ardize their accumulation by investing part of 
it in stocks.
Table 6, taken from Bertaut and Starr-McClu-
er (2001) who used US Survey of Consumer 
Finances pooled data, studies participation in 
broader risky asset categories, namely risky ﬁ-
nancial assets and risky total assets. These re-
gressions also include a wider range of control 
variables, exploiting the breadth of the SCF. 
Ownership regressions are shown in the 3rd 
and 5th columns.
 
The roles of ﬁnancial resources and of edu-
cation are similar for participation in risky 
ﬁnancial assets (3rd col.) as for direct stock-
holding. Aging now seems to lower the prob-
ability of participation, while being married 
to  increase  it.  Results  are  consistent  with 
the negative effect of belonging to a minority 
discussed in Section 2, as well as with the 
negative  effect  of  being  retired,  even  after 
controlling for age. 
Declared  unwillingness  to  undertake  any 
ﬁnancial  risk  (“no  risk”)  has  a  statistically 
signiﬁcant  negative  effect  on  participation 
probability,  while  willingness  to  undertake 
high  risk  has  the  opposite  effect,  both 
relative  to  the  case  of  being  willing  to  as-
sume average risk. This clear pattern of de-
pendence on stated attitudes does not invali-
date our theoretical discussion in which we 
painted a much less clear picture of the link 
between the degree of relative risk aversion 
and the demand for stocks. It rather suggests 
that  survey  responses  about  willingness  to 
undertake ﬁnancial risk refer directly to the 
demand for risky assets rather than to the un-
derlying risk aversion parameter in the util-
ity function stressed by theory. Finally, be-
ing self-employed is estimated to lower the 
probability of investing in risky ﬁnancial as-
sets.
Turning to total risky assets, which include 
also risky real assets such as private equity 
and investment real estate (col. 5), gives a 
9     In interpreting effects of age, we should note that the age effect may be confounded with time and cohort effects. For instance, if 
older cohorts are more reluctant than younger cohorts to enter the stock market, in the cross section this creates the impression of a 
negatively sloped age-stockownership profile. It is not possible to control for such an effect in the absence of panel or repeated cross-
sectional data.101
 Table 5: Probit Regressions for Direct Participation in Stockholding
France Germany Italy Nether-
lands
Sweden US
Married -0.0065
(0.0142)
-0.0342
(0.0076)**
0.0534
(0.0348)
-0.0549
(0.0436)
0.0017
(0.0155)
-0.0493
(0.0263)
Family size -0.0049
(0.0055)
-0.0155
(0.0028)**
-0.0031
(0.0117)
-0.0563
(0.0199)**
-0.0290
(0.0067)**
0.0069
(0.010)
College-Educated Head 0.0351
(0.0137)**
0.0425
(0.0054)**
0.0576
(0.0277)*
-0.0187
(0.0379)
0.0919
(0.0114)**
-0.0009
(0.0207)
Age 31-40 0.0537
(0.0250)*
-0.0257
(0.0105)**
0.0772
(0.0741)
0.0716
(0.1283)
-0.0300
(0.0195)**
-0.0257
(0.0389)
Age 41-50 0.0482
(0.0247)*
-0.0669
(0.0109)**
0.0640
(0.0737)
0.0236
(0.1238)
-0.0518
(0.0192)**
-0.0452
(0.0376)
Age 51-60 0.0415
(0.0254)
-0.0769
(0.0111)**
0.0897
(0.0733)
0.0573
(0.1237)
-0.0347
(0.0182)
-0.0473
(0.0379)
Age 61-70 0.0641
(0.0265)*
-0.0366
(0.0117)**
0.0769
(0.0747)
0.1037
(0.1256)
-0.0970
(0.0196)**
-0.001
(0.0419)
Age > 70 0.0614
(0.0272)*
-0.0027
(0.0132)
0.0329
(0.0784)
0.0894
(0.1298)
-0.159
(0.0183)**
0.0478
(0.0416)
Income 0.4363
(0.2489)
0.5028
(0.1273)**
0.1216
(0.4212)
0.0205
(0.7999)
0.1420
(0.0202)**
-0.2257
(0.1871)
Financial wealth 0.0644
(0.0217)**
0.2358
(0.0252)**
-0.0046
(0.0688)
0.3961
(0.0763)**
0.1212
(0.0163)**
0.1037
(0.0196)**
Constant -0.0056
(0.0362)
0.0749
(0.0160)**
-0.0998
(0.0935)
0.3440
(0.1605)*
0.0461
(0.0253)
0.1941
(0.0569)**
Number of uncensored 
observations
1702 8247 578 276 5036 775
Source: Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2003). The first stage regression includes dummies for married 
and college degree, family size, and dummies for income and financial wealth quartiles. Income and 
wealth  are  measured  in  million  of  euro.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis.  One  star 
indicates that the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level, two stars at 
the 10 percent level. 
For data sources, see Notes to Table 4.
broadly similar picture with a few interest-
ing exceptions. One exception is that there 
seems to be no statistically signiﬁcant effect 
of age on participation in this broader class of 
risky assets. Another is that self-employment 
now switches sign, but this is understandable 
given the inclusion of private business in this 
category of assets. Limited resources, educa-
tion, or willingness to bear risk, and retire-
ment  status  all  make  participation  in  risky 
total assets less likely.
From the point of view of assessing effects of 
longer-run demographic trends on participa-
tion in risky assets, perhaps the most impor-
tant empirical ﬁndings are the negative effect 
of being in the retirement period on partici-
pation in such assets, controlling for age; and 
the mixed ﬁndings regarding effects of age on 
participation that do not suggest a common 
direction across countries. Thus, our discus-
sion in Section 2 seems relevant in the face of 
existing empirical evidence.102
 Table 6: Models of risky financial assets: ownership and risky share
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Constant -.7721* (.03) -4.5803* (.16) -.0149 (.16) -6.0648* (.20 -.8267* (.07)
Married  .0326* (.01)  .1885* (.04) -.0133 (.02) .0013  (.04) -.0681* (.01)
Female-headed  .0148  (.01)  .1523* (.05) -.0135 (.02) -.0277  (.05) -.0607* (.02)
Age <35 -.0247* (.01)  .0352 (.04) -.0303+ (.02) -.0008  (.04)  .0037 (.01)
Age 55-64 -.0398* (.01) -.1157* (.04) -.0091 (.01) .0693  (.05)  .0144+ (.01)
Age 65+ -.1029* (.01) -.3652* (.05) -.0393* (.02) -.0879+  (.06) -.0173+ (.01)
Log income -.0076* (.00)  .0385* (.01) -.0026 (.00) .0819*  (.01) -.0153* (.00)
Log wealth .0955* (.00) .3779* (.01) .0356* (.01) .4572* (.01)  .1032* (.00)
Nonwhite or 
hispanic
-.0746* (.01) -.2471* (.04) -.0323 (.02) -.1576* (.04)  .0099 (.01)
Below high school -.0793* (.01) -.1753* (.04) -.0194 (.03) -.1378* (.04) -.0045 (.02)
College degree .0372* (.01) .1194* (.03) .0285* (.01)  .0970* (.03) -.0082 (.01)
DB pension .0393* (.01)  .1124* (.03) .0107 (.01)  .0223* (.03) -.0220* (.01)
Self-employed -.1292* (.01) -.4994* (.04) -.0642* (.02) .4914* (.05) .1333* (.01)
Retired .0936* (.01) -.3061* (.05) -.0419* (.02) -.1986* (.05)  .0003 (.01)
No risk -.1606* (.01) -.4477* (.03) -.0908* (.03) -.4381* (.03) -.0586* (.01)
High risk .0680* (.01)  .1071* (.04) .0802* (.01) .2369* (.04)  .0470* (.01)
Unemployment 
rate
 .0009 (.00) -.0039 (.01) .0019 (.00) -.0139 (.01) -.0026 (.00)
1989 -.1000* (.01) -.2377* (.04) -.0914* (.02) -.0790+ (.04) -.0271* (.01)
1992 -.0415* (.01) -.0749+ (.04) -.0379* (.01)  .0347 (.04)  .0177+ (.01)
1998 .0981* (.01)  .1431* (.04) .1023* (.01) .0660+ (.04) .0326* (.01)
% FIRE 
employment
– – .0181+ (.01) – –  .0015  (.01) – –
% large employer – –  .0164* (.00) – – .0146* (.00) – –
Shop around – –  .0114* (.01) – – .0142* (.01) – –
Inverse Mills 
Ratio
– –  1601+ (.10)  .2261* (.06)
Estimate of  p 
Joint 
significance of 
age variables
.0000 .0000 .0633 .0541 .0321
  Risky Financial Assets  Total Risky Assets
    .5374  .8354
             .0000                 .0116
  –  Tobit  –  Heckman selection model  –  Heckman selection model
Share  Ownership  Share  Ownership          Share
Source: Bertaut and Starr-Mc Cluer (2001), Table 8. 
Note:*: Significant at 5 percent level; +: Significant at 10 percent level.103
3.2 Portfolio Composition Conditional 
on Participation
Table 5 reports portfolio share regressions for 
directly held stocks that allow for selection in 
the ﬁrst (participation) stage. The countries 
are the same as in Table 4. Although the level 
of  ﬁnancial  wealth  is  seen  to  contribute  to 
greater portfolio shares as well as to greater 
participation, there are on the whole fewer 
consistent inﬂuences of household character-
istics  on  conditional  portfolio  shares  of  di-
rectly held stocks than on participation. 
The same is true comparing participation and 
share regressions in Table 6, which refer to 
risky ﬁnancial assets and to total risky assets 
in the US, though more factors are signiﬁcant 
for explaining portfolio shares than in Table 
5. Findings in Table 6 suggest a negative ef-
fect of retirement on the portfolio share of 
risky ﬁnancial assets (though not of total risky 
assets), controlling for age. Age itself does not 
appear to have an important inﬂuence on con-
ditional  portfolio  shares.  College  educated 
households tend to have greater proportions 
of their savings in risky ﬁnancial assets, but 
such effects are not present for the broader 
class of total risky assets. The same reversal of 
sign is observed between the two categories 
of assets for the variable showing self-employ-
ment status as that noted for participation, 
and it can be attributed to the same reasons. 
Finally,  declared  willingness  to  undertake 
ﬁnancial risk also inﬂuences portfolio shares 
in the expected direction.
Weak  ﬁndings  on  the  role  of  demograph-
ics in shaping portfolio shares of risky assets 
are consistent with ﬁndings of considerable 
portfolio  inertia  in  the  limited  number  of 
longitudinal studies of portfolio shares, such 
as those of Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) based 
on the TIAA-CREF data base of retirement 
portfolios of educators in the US. Ameriks and 
Zeldes found that 47 percent of these highly 
educated account holders made no changes in 
how the ﬂow of their contributions gets allo-
cated to alternative investment accounts over 
a ten-year period, while another 14 percent 
made only one change. Account holders can 
also  change  portfolio  allocation  by  moving 
accumulated funds from one account to the 
other, but roughly 73 percent made no such 
change in the ten-year period, while another 
14 percent made only one change. 
It  seems  hard  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that 
households are more preoccupied with choos-
ing which assets to hold in their portfolio than 
with  changing  their  portfolio  composition 
when their age or other characteristics change. 
Although we are far from having a concrete 
explanation for this inertia, one can specu-
late that it is related to the greater difﬁculty 
and  costs  of  adjusting  optimally  portfolio 
composition rather than participation when 
individual  circumstances  change.  In  other 
words, it seems likely that households ﬁnd it 
much easier to know whether they should be 
holding a particular risky asset than to calcu-
late the optimal portfolio share of this asset. 
Whatever the cause of such inertia, it seems 
fair to conclude that most of the effects of 
demographic changes on capital markets over 
the longer run are likely to be felt in changing 
participation patterns rather than in dramatic 
changes  in  portfolio  shares  conditional  on 
participation.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have discussed the role of de-
mographic and other household characteristics 
in risky asset participation and in portfolio 
composition,  in  view  of  the  main  compu-
tational and econometric ﬁndings of recent 
portfolio studies. The overall message seems 104
to  be  that  household  characteristics  can  be 
quite important, but they tend to play a bigger 
role  in  determining  participation  than  in 
inﬂuencing risky portfolio shares conditional 
on participation. Based on observed portfolio 
inertia,  it  seems  that  the  biggest  challenges 
for the ﬁnancial sector in the medium run are 
likely to arise from managing entry or exit of 
households  from  risky  asset  markets  rather 
than from handling portfolio rebalancing of 
households  that  already  participate  in  risky 
assets.
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Abstract
This paper summarizes results from a simula-
tion study of the capital and labor market effects 
of demographic change and pension reform. 
Population aging is just beginning to hit the in-
dustrialized countries in full force, and it will 
have a tremendous impact on capital markets. 
The  younger  generations  in  these  countries 
are becoming aware of the need to provide 
for an increasing share of their retirement in-
come through own private saving, and these 
effects  will  be  accentuated  by  fundamental 
pension reforms that aim at more pre-fund-
ing. Population aging therefore changes house-
holds’ saving behavior, and more assets will 
be invested in the capital market. At the same 
time, differences in the age structure across 
countries result in differences in the domestic 
rates of return that will be equalized by capital 
ﬂows, to the extent that capital is internation-
ally mobile. Population aging, therefore, will 
not only affect domestic capital markets in the 
fast-aging industrialized countries, but global 
capital markets more broadly. 
1 Introduction
The present paper summarizes results from a 
quantitative simulation study of the capital and 
labor market effects of demographic change 
and pension reform. In particular, we focus 
on  the  capital  ﬂows  induced  by  differential 
aging processes across countries. This paper is 
part of an ongoing research project conducted 
at the Mannheim Research Institute for the 
Economics of Aging (MEA); a more detailed 
and more technical discussion can be found in 
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004).
Our research program is related to different 
strands  of  the  academic  literature.  First, 
several  recent  papers  evaluate  the  ability  of 
overlapping  generations  models  to  predict 
long-term  trends  in  international  capital 
ﬂows (see, e.g., Brooks, 2003; Feroli, 2002; 
Henriksen, 2002; Dmoeij and Floden, 2004). 
These papers as well as our analysis show that 
calibrated  overlapping  generations  models 
explain a good fraction of the low frequency 
movements of international capital ﬂows as ob-
served in the data. In addition, we show that 
the existence of pay-as-you-go pension systems 
in different world regions adds an additional 
indirect  channel  to  the  interaction  between 
capital ﬂows and demographic change. This 
channel is of particular importance if countries 
severely affected by the impact of population 
aging such as the continental European coun-
tries reform their pension systems, creating 
additional savings.
Second,  our  paper  adds  to  the  discussion 
about the so-called “asset market meltdown 
hypothesis”.  Several  articles  in  the  popular 
press  have  attributed  recent  turbulences  in 
stock market prices to population aging and 
raised the fear that an asset market meltdown 
might occur when the baby boom generation 
decumulates its assets. In the academic litera-
ture, there is no consensus on the asset market 
meltdown hypothesis (see e.g. Poterba, 2001; 
Abel, 2001; and Brooks, 2002). We argue that 
standard  closed-economy  models  that  have 
been used in the academic literature ignore 
the potentially important role of international 
capital ﬂows and international diversiﬁcation. 
Our  simulations  show  that  the  dynamics  of 
capital accumulation and rates of return gener-
ated by models that account for international 
capital mobility are different from what would 
be predicted by closed-economy models.
 
Third,  our  research  sheds  light  on  the  ef-
fects  of  international  diversiﬁcation  on  sav-
ings behavior and its interaction with pension 
reforms. Deardorff (1985) contains an early 
analysis  of  these  issues,  and  Reisen  (2000) 109
provides a comprehensive overview. Reisen ar-
gues that there are pension-improving beneﬁts 
of global asset diversiﬁcation. In a theoretical 
paper, Pemberton (1999) highlights the im-
portance of international externalities caused 
by the effects of national pension and savings 
policies on the world interest rate. Pemberton 
(2000) goes a step further and shows that an 
intergenerational Pareto improvement through   
coordinated pension reforms is possible. We 
do not address this policy issue in this paper, 
but  our  results  indicate  that  accounting  for 
capital mobility may well change the welfare 
implications of pension reforms.
We  conclude  this  introduction  with  a  brief 
preview of our simulation results. Our main 
ﬁnding  is  that  population  aging  generates   
substantial  capital  ﬂows  between  world  re-
gions. Countries most affected by aging such 
as the European Union will initially be capi-
tal exporters, while countries less affected by 
aging like the United States und other OECD 
countries will import capital. However, once 
baby-boom households decumulate their assets 
after entering retirement, capital exports from 
these fast-aging countries to the rest of the 
world decrease. Consequently, these countries 
are projected to become capital import coun-
tries around the year 2020. Pension reforms 
that involve increasing the degree of pre-fund-
ing are likely to induce more capital exports, 
but they also increase labor supply consider-
ably. The effects on the rate of return to capital 
are small. Overall, our results conﬁrm that the 
rate of return to capital declines in response to 
population aging, but the projected decrease is 
rather small. We conclude that a devastating 
“asset market meltdown” due to population ag-
ing is unlikely.
The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  structured 
as follows. Section 2 presents the basic facts 
of  population  aging  around  the  world.  In   
Section 3, we review the empirical evidence on, 
and theoretical explanations for, the effects of   
population aging on international capital ﬂows. 
In  Section  4,  we  describe  the  main  features 
of  a  multi-country  overlapping  generations 
model  that  allows  to  evaluate  these  effects   
quantitatively.  We  present  some  simulation 
results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Some facts about population aging 
Throughout the world, demographic processes 
are determined by the demographic transition 
which is characterized by falling mortality rates 
followed by a decline in birth rates, resulting in 
population aging and reducing the population 
growth rate (in some countries, even turning 
it  negative). While  patterns  of  demographic 
change are similar in most countries, extent and 
timing  differ  substantially.  Europe  and  some 
Asian countries have almost passed the closing 
stages  of  the  demographic  transition  process 
while Latin America is only at the beginning 
stages (Bloom and Williamson, 1998). North 
America is in between. 
In order to capture projected differences in de-
mographic change across the world (particular-
ly within the European Union) and differences 
in the generosity of public pension systems, we 
distinguish ﬁve world regions: (i) France, Ger-
many,  and  Italy  as  three  European  countries 
that are severely affected by population aging 
and at the same time share large pay-as-you-go 
pension systems, (ii) the remainder of the Eu-
ropean Union, (iii) North America (the US and 
Canada), (iv) the remaining OECD countries, 
and (v) all other countries in the world.2 
2     While we treat France, Germany, and Italy as separate countries in our simulations, we simplify the presentation by aggregating the 
results into one region.110
Figures  1  and  2,  based  on  United  Nations 
(2001),  show  the  effects  of  demographic 
change on two important demographic mea-
sures, the working age population ratio (the 
number of persons aged 15 to 65 as a percent-
age of total population) and the old-age de-
pendency ratio (the number of persons older 
than 65 as a percentage of the working age 
population).
A  number  of  lessons  can  be  learned  from 
these graphs. First, all world regions that we 
consider are affected by the consequences of 
demographic  change;  as  a  result,  they  face 
decreasing  working  age  population  ratios 
and  increasing  old-age  dependency  ratios. 
Second,  while  working  age  population  ra-
tios are more or less identical in 2000 for the 
OECD countries, the decrease in the work-
ing age population ratio is strongest for the 
European  Union  countries,  especially  the 
three-country  group  of  France,  Germany, 
and Italy. Third, the latter group has the high-
est  old-age  dependency  ratio.  Forth,  there 
are signiﬁcant differences in the timing and 
the pattern of demographic change across re-
gions. As we will see, these different patterns 
have profound implications for the evolution 
of saving rates, rates of return, and interna-
tional capital ﬂows.
3 Demography and capital 
markets: Intuition and empirical 
evidence
From a macroeconomic point of view, popu-
lation aging will change the balance between 
capital and labor, in particular in industrialized 
countries.  Labor  supply  will  be  relatively 
 
Figure 1: Ratio of working-age population (16-65) to total population
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 
(2004), based on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001).
Notes: These Figures show projections of the working-age population ratio (the number of people aged 15 
to 65 as a percentage of total popu-lation) for five different world regions. F+G+I: France, Germany, and 
Italy; REST EU: the remaining countries of the European Union; USA+CAN: the United States and Canada; 
REST OECD: the remaining OECD countries; REST WORLD: the remaining world countries. 
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scarce whereas capital will be relatively abun-
dant. This will drive up wages relative to the 
rate of return on capital, reducing households’ 
incentive to save (if the interest elasticity of 
saving is positive). 
Theoretical arguments that establish this link 
build on the well-known life-cycle theory of 
consumption and savings by Modigliani, Ando 
and  Brumberg  (Modigliani  and  Brumberg, 
1954; Ando and Modigliani, 1963). The ag-
gregation  of  individual,  cohort-speciﬁc  life-
cycle  savings  proﬁles  leads  to  a  decrease  of 
national saving rates in an aging economy. In a 
general equilibrium model of forward-looking 
individuals, it is not only the current demo-
graphic structure that alters the time path of 
aggregate savings, but also future demographic 
developments.  These  effects  can  best  be 
analyzed  in  overlapping  generations  models, 
following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 
Once we leave the closed-economy perspec-
tive and consider international capital mobil-
ity, additional effects arise. Differences in tim-
ing of demographic change across countries 
and regions induce international capital ﬂows. 
In an open economy, the link between saving 
and investment is broken to the extent that 
capital  is  internationally  mobile.  Empirical 
evidence on how demographic change has af-
fected saving behavior across countries in the 
past is reviewed by Poterba (2001). Following 
earlier work by Higgins (1998) and others, 
Lührmann (2003) presents a comprehensive 
study of demographic change and capital ﬂows, 
using a broad panel of 141 countries that cov-
ers the period 1960-1997. She conﬁrms that 
 
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 
(2004), based on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001).
Notes: These Figures show projections of the old-age dependency ratio (the number of people older than 65 
as a percentage of the working age population) for five different world regions. F+G+I: France, Germany, 
and Italy; REST EU: the remaining countries of the European Un-ion; USA+CAN: the United States and 
Canada; REST OECD: the remaining OECD countries; REST WORLD: the remaining world coun-tries.
Figure 2: Ratio of old-age population (65+) to working  
age population (15-65)
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cross-country capital ﬂows have indeed been 
inﬂuenced by demographic variables. More-
over, she shows that relative differences in the 
age structure across countries are the most 
important determinants of capital ﬂows and 
that future changes in the age structure are 
important determinants of current saving and 
investment decisions, a ﬁnding that conﬁrms 
forward-looking household behavior.
For  quantitative  projections  of  international 
capital ﬂows induced by population aging, the 
degree of capital mobility is crucial. This is es-
sentially an empirical question. In their semi-
nal contribution, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 
show that national saving and investment rates 
are highly correlated in virtually all OECD 
countries.  While  the  coefﬁcient  has  fallen 
over time, it is still remarkably high. These 
ﬁndings have been interpreted as an indica-
tion that capital is imperfectly mobile. Even if 
capital is fully mobile, this does not necessarily 
imply  that  households  do  actually  diversify 
their  portfolios  optimally.  There  is  a  large 
empirical literature on “home bias” in inter-
national portfolio choice (e.g., French and Po-
terba, 1991), and it is not yet fully understood 
why  households  do  not  optimally  diversify 
their portfolios across countries. Applied to 
retirement saving and pension reforms, this 
literature suggests that households might be 
more willing to invest their savings in “similar” 
countries (for France, Germany, and Italy, this 
would be the other EU or OECD countries) 
than in, say, developing countries.
 
For the lack of a better model of capital mo-
bility, we consider several stylized scenarios in 
our simulations. One extreme capital mobility 
scenario treats France, Germany, and Italy as a 
closed capital market while the others assume 
perfect capital mobility within large regions 
such as the entire EU, the entire OECD, or 
the entire world. This approach allows us to 
understand  the  potential  effects  of  capital 
mobility  on  savings,  domestic  and  interna-
tional capital formation, and rates of return. 
The true effect should be bounded between 
the extreme scenarios, its actual magnitude 
depending on how mobile capital will be in 
the future.
4 The multi-country macroeco-
nomic simulation model
This section contains a brief and non-tech-
nical description of the dynamic macroeco-
nomic model used to analyze the effects of 
population aging and of a shift from a pay-as-
you-go system to a (partially) funded pension 
system on global capital markets. A detailed, 
technical presentation of this model can be 
found in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 
(2004).
The simulation model is based on the version 
of  the  overlapping  generations  model  in-
troduced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, 
– chapter 3). Overlapping generations mod-
els have been used extensively to study the 
effects of population aging on social security 
systems, a purpose for which they are well 
suited  since  they  are  based  on  households’ 
and ﬁrms’ optimal reactions to movements in 
the demographic structure and public policy 
measures. It is less known that overlapping 
generations models have also been employed 
to analyze international capital ﬂows, starting 
with Buiter (1981). More recently, several au-
thors have developed large-scale multi-coun-
try overlapping generations models to study 
the effects of population aging and pension 
reform on international capital ﬂows. While 
Attanasio and Violante (2000) focus on how 
the  Latin  American  demographic  transition 
affects international capital markets, Brooks 
(2003), Feroli (2002), Henriksen (2002) and 113
Domeij and Floden (2004) examine capital 
ﬂows  in  multi-regional  overlapping  genera-
tions models.
Börsch-Supan,  Ludwig,  and  Winter  (2004) 
improve in several dimensions on the existing 
literature. The papers cited above do not mod-
el pay-as-you-go pension systems and accord-
ingly do not address the important issue of 
pension reform with its associated changes in 
saving patterns which in turn have implications 
on international capital ﬂows.3 Issues related 
to  pension  reform  are  have  been  addressed 
by INGENUE (2001) and Fehr, Jokisch, and 
Kotlikoff (2003, 2004). We improve on these 
papers in that we use more detailed demo-
graphic projections which reﬂect the various 
dimensions of demographic change and distin-
guish between the effects of population aging 
and population shrinkage. We argue that the 
delicate effects of the differential timing of 
demographic change across countries on mac-
roeconomic aggregates and capital ﬂows can 
only be assessed with realistic demographic 
forecasts; these effects are largely ignored in 
the stylized demographic transition schemes 
used  in  other  work.  Finally,  we  focus  on 
three European countries (France, Germany, 
and  Italy)  which  share  large  pay-as-you-go   
pension systems. Modeling these countries as 
one region, and the rest of Europe, the United 
States and Canada, and the rest of the OECD,   
respectively, as the other regions of our world 
model,  we  account  for  differences  in  the   
generosity of pension systems and simulate the 
impact of a stylized pension reform in one of 
the regions of our model.
The model has three building blocks: a de-
mographic  projection  sub-model,  a  stylized 
pension system, and a macroeconomic over-
lapping  generations  model  which  generates 
a  general  intertemporal  equilibrium  of  the 
internationally  linked  economies.  The  dy-
namic equilibrium of this model is comput-
ed numerically. We describe these building 
blocks in turn.
4.1 Demography
The  individuals  (households)  of  our  model 
enter economic life at age 20; the maximum 
age as implied by the demographic projections 
is 104 years. Detailed demographic projections 
form the background of our analysis. Demog-
raphy is taken as exogenous and represents the 
main driving force of our simulation model. 
Our demographic projections are based on the 
assumptions (such as age-group speciﬁc mor-
tality  rates,  life  expectancy,  and  aggregate 
migration) used in the United Nations’ demo-
graphic projections (United Nations, 2001). 
Our demographic model extends the United 
Nations’ forecasts beyond 2050. To this end, 
we assume that demographic processes stabi-
lize after year 2200 with constant mortality 
and fertility rates. 
4.2 Pension systems
Each  region  has  a  two-tier  pension  sys-
tem. The ﬁrst tier represents a conventional 
public pay-as-you-go system characterized by 
country-speciﬁc contribution and replacement 
rates. For each region, the exogenous policy 
variable  is  the  time-speciﬁc  gross  replace-
ment rate, deﬁned as the ratio of average gross 
pension to average gross wage income. The 
budget of the pay-as-you-go pension system 
is balanced in all periods. As a consequence, 
the  contribution  rate  is  determined  endog-
enously. Given the projected demographic de-
pendency ratios, holding the replacement rate 
constant implies that contribution rates will 
rise. Alternatively, a government may choose 
to ﬁx the contribution rate which would result 
in declining replacement rates. 114
The second tier of the pension system con-
sists of private pensions. This funded compo-
nent builds up over time by voluntary private 
savings that result from households’ optimal 
life-cycle decisions. Note that households re-
act to their intertemporal budget constraints 
which include the beneﬁt level of public pen-
sions.  Rational  (forward-looking)  behavior 
implies that households adjust their voluntary 
savings in response to the public pension re-
placement rates.
To separate the direct effects of population ag-
ing on capital markets and potential feedback 
effects from pension reform, we present our 
simulations for two pension scenarios. These 
two scenarios are extreme cases, and they are 
both counterfactual. However, they allow us 
to separate the effects of population aging and 
the (additional) effects of fundamental pen-
sion reform. These two pension scenarios are 
deﬁned as follows.
(a)   In the “status quo scenario”, the 2006 re-
placement rates are maintained through-
out our projection period, which results in 
rising contribution rates.
(b)   In  the  “fundamental  reform  scenario”, 
the  2006  contribution  rates  are  frozen 
in France, Germany, and Italy, which re-
sults in decreasing replacement rates. In 
response,  households  in  these  countries 
(which historically have almost exclusively 
relied on pay-as-you-go pensions) build up 
a funded component.
4.3 Household behavior and production 
in the overlapping generations model
The  macroeconomic  general  equilibrium 
model  is  an  elaborate  version  of  the  well-
known  overlapping  generations  framework. 
The  two  main  sectors  are  the  production 
sector and the household sector. The govern-
ment sector is rather small – the government’s 
only role is to organize its country’s pay-as-
you-go pension system, as described above.
The production sector in each country con-
sists of a representative ﬁrm that uses a CES 
production  function  with  capital  and  labor 
as inputs, and further characterized by age-
speciﬁc  labor  productivity,  technological 
progress, and international variation in pro-
ductivity  levels.  The  production  efﬁciency 
of labor supplied by a household depends on 
the  household’s  age,  the  time  period,  and 
the  country  (region).  Labor  productivity 
changes over the life-cycle according to age-
speciﬁc productivity parameters. Technologi-
cal progress is modeled via a “growth in time 
endowment”  speciﬁcation  that  is  equivalent 
to the standard labor augmenting technologi-
cal  change  speciﬁcation  for  the  production 
sector. The technology level of each country 
is calibrated such that aggregate GDP aver-
aged over the calibration period is replicated. 
Finally, we assume that investment is subject 
to convex adjustment costs.
Under these technological constraints, ﬁrms 
maximize  an  intertemporal  proﬁt  function. 
The  ﬁrst  order  conditions  resulting  from 
proﬁt  maximization  characterize  ﬁrm  be-
havior. In particular, the return on ﬁnancial 
investment is equal to the marginal product 
of capital plus capital gains on non-depreci-
ated  capital  plus  the  reduction  in  marginal 
adjustment costs minus depreciation. 
Household  behavior  is  derived  from  inter-
temporal utility maximization. By choosing 
an optimal consumption path, each cohort of 
households maximizes, at all points in time 
and at all ages, the sum of discounted future 
utility.  The  within-period  utility  function 115
exhibits constant relative risk aversion, and a 
CES functional form describes the trade-off 
between consumption and leisure. Over time, 
preferences are additive and separable with 
exponential  discounting.  Households  also 
take into account their survival probabilities 
for all future periods. Here, a complication 
arises because households face the risk of pre-
maturely dying with positive wealth. We as-
sume perfect annuity markets which implies 
that accidental bequests are distributed across 
future generations. We do not include intend-
ed  bequests  in  our  model.  Other  than  our 
treatment of bequests, the budget constraint 
is standard in the overlapping generations lit-
erature.
The solution to the households’ optimization 
problem  can  be  characterized  by  two  ﬁrst-
order  conditions.  First,  the  intertemporal 
Euler  equation  describes  the  consumption 
growth rate of each household. Second, the 
intratemporal Euler equation relates current 
period consumption to current period leisure 
choice.  For  given  factor  prices  (i.e.,  wages 
and interest rates), shadow wage rates and the 
parameters of the public pension system (i.e., 
contribution and replacement rates), the life-
time consumption paths of all generations can 
be computed using these Euler equations.
4.4 Dynamic equilibrium and 
numerical solution of the model
The dynamic general equilibrium of the model 
is deﬁned by four conditions: (i) allocations 
are feasible; (ii) factor prices equal their mar-
ginal productivities; (iii) ﬁrms and households 
behave optimally, i.e., ﬁrms maximize prof-
its and households maximize life-time utility 
subject to the constraints they face; (iv) all 
markets clear. Market clearing on the inter-
national capital market and the assumption of 
perfect capital mobility across regions require 
that the rate of return on ﬁnancial investment 
equalize across all countries.
 
We  determine  the  equilibrium  path  of  this   
overlapping  generations  model  numerically 
using  the  recursive  block  Gauss-Seidel  algo-
rithm  (see Auerbach  and  Kotlikoff,  1987)  in 
an improved version (Ludwig, 2004), referred 
to as the “Gauss-Seidel-Quasi-Newton Algo-
rithm” Our simulations consist of four periods: 
a phase-in period, a calibration period (1960-
2001), a projection period (2002-2100), and 
a phase-out period. For details of the calibra-
tion procedure used to determine the values of 
the free parameters of households’ preferences 
and  countries’  production  technologies,  see 
Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004).
To  evaluate  whether  our  calibrated  model 
captures the main historical trends of inter-
national capital ﬂows, we consider how well 
capital ﬂows are replicated in the calibration 
period. Note that capital ﬂows ﬂuctuated heav-
ily during this time, obfuscating the long-run 
trends which we are interested in. Moreover, 
and  at  least  as  importantly,  the  benchmark 
assumption  of  free  capital  mobility  within 
the OECD did not hold for the beginning of 
the benchmark period when stiff capital ﬂow 
controls  were  imposed  even  among  France, 
Germany, and Italy. Nevertheless, Figure 3 dis-
plays predicted and actual current-account to 
GDP ratios.4 
The  patterns  of  international  capital  ﬂows 
generated by our model for the period 1970-
2001 are encouraging, in particular for the 
4     In line with our theoretical model, we define the current account as the difference between gross national savings and gross fixed capital 
formation (domestic investment).116
three large continental European countries and 
the rest of the OECD. We overpredict capital 
ﬂows of the rest of the EU until the mid 1980s, 
and  underpredict  thereafter.  Overall,  even 
though any capital market frictions are absent 
from our model, magnitudes of international 
capital  ﬂows  are  within  reasonable  ranges. 
Moreover, our model correctly replicates the 
facts that core European countries have been 
net capital export countries for most of the 
post-war period and that the rest of the OECD 
countries (in particular, North America) is a 
net capital import region. While our model 
replicates  the  broad  trends  of  international 
capital ﬂows, it cannot capture high-frequency 
variations. This should not come as a surprise 
given that our model is non-stochastic and has 
a clear long-run focus.
5 Simulation results: capital 
formation, rates of return, and 
capital ﬂows
In this section, we present selected results of 
our macroeconomic simulation model; again, 
a more detailed discussion of the rather com-
plicated dynamic effects that are behind these 
results can be found in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, 
and Winter (2004). 
Figure 3: Actual and predicted current account to output ratios
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter 
(2004), based on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the 
World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows historic and predicted current-account-to-output ratios. Current account 
is defined as the difference between gross national savings and gross fixed capital formation (domestic 
investment). F+G+I: France, Germany, and Italy; EU: all countries of the European Union excluding 
France, Germany, and Italy; REST OECD: the remaining OECD countries. 
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Notes: Figures shown in the table refer to the open-economy scenario “OECD”.
Table 1: Predicted contribution and replacement rates of  
public pension systems
2000 2030 2050 2000 2030 2050 2000 2030 2050
Status quo system
Contribution rate
Net replacement rate
0.273
0.7
0.369
0.7
0.411
0.7
0.277
0.654
0.354
0.654
0.375
0.654
0.330
0.646
0.457
0.646
0.523
0.646
Fundamental reform
Contribution rate
Net replacement rate
0.273
0.7
0.292
0.572
0.292
0.507
0.277
0.654
0.294
0.553
0.294
0.514
0.330
0.646
0.347
0.512
0.347
0.437
  Germany  France  Italy
To separate the direct effects of population ag-
ing on capital markets and potential feedback 
effects from pension reform, we present our 
projections for the two pension policy scenar-
ios described above, the “status quo scenario” 
which maintains current generous public pen-
sion systems in France, Germany, and Italy, and 
the “fundamental reform scenario” which forces 
a transition to a partially funded pension system 
in these three countries by freezing contribu-
tion rates. The other regions’ pension systems 
remain unchanged. By comparing these polar 
scenarios, we can show that a good portion of 
the capital market effects of population aging 
arises even without a fundamental pension re-
form. As discussed above, our simulations also 
distinguish four capital mobility scenarios. The 
ﬁrst scenario corresponds to a closed economy 
where all investment of France, Germany, and 
Italy takes place within these three countries. 
The other three capital mobility scenarios as-
sume that France, Germany, and Italy diver-
sify their investments (i) across all countries 
of the European Union, (ii) across all OECD 
countries, and (iii) across the entire world. 
Population  aging  has  immediate  effects  on 
labor supply and the balance of the pension 
system. During the entire observation period, 
labor supply shares in France, Germany, and 
Italy decrease from current levels of slightly 
below 42 percent to below 36 percent in 2050. 
The  economic  dependency  ratio,  deﬁned  as 
the ratio of pensioners to workers, is projected 
to increase from roughly 50 percent in 2002 
to about 80 percent in 2050. As a result of the 
decrease in labor supply shares and the corre-
sponding increase in the economic dependency 
ratio, the contribution rate to the pay-as-you-
go pension system increases sharply under the 
status quo scenario, i.e. if current generous 
pension systems are maintained. Recall that 
these contribution rates are equilibrium con-
tribution rates such that the budget of the pen-
sion system of each country is balanced at ev-
ery point in time. The projected time patterns 
of net replacement and contribution rates for 
France, Germany, and Italy are summarized 
in Table 1.
If  current  generous  replacement  rates  are 
maintained, our model predicts increases in 
the equilibrium contribution rate in Germany 
from its current levels of roughly 27 percent 
to 41 percent in 2050. In stark contrast, our 
stylized pension reform freezes contribution 118
rates at the level reached in 2006, roughly at 
29 percent. As a result of this reform, aver-
age pension levels decrease: the net pension 
replacement  rate  is  projected  to  decrease 
from 70 percent in 2000 to about 50 percent 
in 2050. Hence, for Germany, our model pre-
dicts a one-third transition towards pre-fund-
ing until 2050. Results for the other countries 
are similar.
Households respond to these decreases in pen-
sion beneﬁt levels not only by increasing sav-
ings, but also by increasing labor supply. Our 
stylized pension reform would lead to quite 
substantial increases in aggregate labor supply. 
Labor supply shares are predicted to increase 
by more than 6.5 percent or 2.5 percentage 
points  until  2050.  This  increase  is  roughly 
the same for all capital mobility scenarios. For 
instance, labor supply shares in the France-
Germany-Italy region increase from about 36 
to 38.5 percent in the year 2050. As a con-
sequence, the economic dependency ratio is 
projected to decrease by almost 6 percentage 
points.  Endogenous  labor  supply  reaction  is 
therefore a helpful mechanism to dampen the 
effects of population aging. 
Figure  4  shows  the  aggregate  average  saving 
rate of France, Germany, and Italy in our four 
capital mobility scenarios, all in the status quo 
pension scenario. In the year 2000, savings 
rates  are  substantially  higher  in  the  open 
economy scenarios than in the closed France-
Germany-Italy region. This is in line with the 
higher rates of return (see below) generated in 
an open economy which diversiﬁes a great deal 
of the demographic effects that create lower 
saving rates (and rates of return) in economies 
with a large share of older persons.
This level effect is superseded by the demo-
graphic changes during the 2000 to 2070 pre-
diction window. Saving rates decrease until 
2050 across all capital mobility scenarios since 
the baby boom generation decumulates assets. 
Saving rates are projected to rebound after the 
year 2050. The decrease of the savings rate 
caused by population aging – the difference 
between the value in 2000 and the minimum 
reached just after 2040 – is roughly 4.5 per-
centage points if capital mobility is restricted at 
most to the EU region (scenarios “F+G+I” and 
“EU”). If we allow for capital mobility within 
the OECD or the entire world, this decrease is 
6.5 or 8 percentage points, respectively. 
Figure 5 shows that projected aggregate saving 
rates under a fundamental pension reform are 
substantially higher and the effect of a pension 
reform is stronger in the OECD / World open-
economy scenarios (the saving rate is project-
ed to increase by slightly more than one per-
centage point in the EU scenario as compared 
to 2 percentage points in the OECD / World 
scenarios).  An  increase  in  national  savings 
leads to an increase in the capital stock and 
thereby to a decrease in the rate of return to 
capital which then crowds out further savings. 
In those scenarios with a larger international 
capital market, substantially more savings is 
generated since – as we show below – the rate 
of return decreases by much less. These pro-
jections show that optimal life-cycle behavior 
generates additional saving under a fundamen-
tal pension reform – in our model, it is not the 
case that additional retirement saving induced 
by a pension reform crowds out other saving 
totally, as has often been claimed.
We also accumulate aggregate savings to ob-
tain  the  world  region’s  asset  holdings  and 
capital stocks and the related capital-to-output 
ratios (Figures 6 and 7). As a consequence of 
decreasing labor supply, the capital-to-output 
ratio increases from its current level of about Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected aggregate saving rate of households living in France, Germany, 
and Italy. Scenario F+G+I: perfect capital mobility within France, Germany, and Italy; Scenario EU: per-
fect capital mobility within the European Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the OECD; 
Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions. 
Figure 4: Projections of the saving rate 
(status quo pension system)
Figure 5: Projections of the saving rate 
(fundamental pension reform)
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected aggregate saving rate of households living in France, Germany, and Italy. 
Scenario F+G+I: perfect capital mobility within France, Germany, and Italy; Scenario EU: perfect capital mobility 
within the European Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the OECD; Scenario WORLD: perfect 
capital mobility across all world regions. 
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��������������Figure 6: Projections of the capital-to-output ratio 
(status quo pension system)
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected capital-to-output ratio in France, Germany, and Italy. Scenario F+G+I: per-
fect capital mobility within France, Germany, and Italy; Scenario EU: perfect capital mobility within the European 
Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the OECD; Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across 
all world regions. 
Figure 7: Projections of the capital-to-output ratio 
(fundamental pension reform)
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected capital-to-output ratio in France, Germany, and Italy. Scenario F+G+I: 
perfect capital mobility within France, Germany, and Italy; Scenario EU: perfect capital mobility within the Euro-
pean Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the OECD; Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility 
across all world regions. 
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3 until it reaches a level of about 3.25 around 
2040 and then decreases slightly when baby 
boomers  decumulate  assets  (capital  mobil-
ity scenario “OECD”). This decrease is much 
more pronounced if we restrict the interna-
tional capital market to the EU area only. The 
simultaneous fundamental pension reform of 
France, Germany, and Italy leads to substan-
tial increases in the capital-to-output ratio if 
we restrict capital mobility to these countries 
or to the EU area (Figure 7). The increase is 
much lower if we relax this constraint which 
suggests that the additional savings are largely 
invested abroad.
Much of the political and academic debate on 
the capital market consequences of demograph-
ic change and of pension reforms is centered 
around the rate of return to capital. First, we 
observe some level effects. Since the pay-as-
you-go systems are slimmer in the aggregate 
rest-of-the-world  region  than  in  France,   
Germany, and Italy, the capital stock accu-
mulated for retirement savings is larger which 
depresses rates of return. Second, as a conse-
quence of population aging and the resulting 
increase in capital-to-output ratios, our model 
predicts the rate of return of return to capital to   
decrease by a bit less than one percentage point 
if capital moves freely within the OECD, see   
Figure  8.  This  decrease  is  less  than  what 
would be associated with a “meltdown of as-
set prices”. Third, while the rate of return 
decreases across all capital mobility scenarios, 
substantial gains would be possible by shift-
ing investments to demographically younger 
countries  since  our  model  predicts  higher 
returns if we allow for free capital mobility 
across all world regions. However, as demo-
graphic processes are highly correlated across 
countries (see Figure 1), differences in demo-
graphic  processes  across  countries  more  or 
less only affect the level of the rate of return. 
Furthermore,  diversiﬁcation  advantages  de-
crease over time.
As a comparison of Figures 8 and 9 suggests, 
there would be an additional decrease in the 
rate of return to capital if France, Germany, 
and Italy would simultaneously reform their 
pension systems in a fundamental way. This 
decrease  would  amount  to  about  0.25  per-
centage points until 2070 if capital was mobile 
only within these countries. Due to the in-
crease in labor supply, this long-run decrease 
in the rate of return is lower than a model 
with  exogenous  labor  until  2070  if  capital 
was mobile only within these countries. Due 
to the increase in labor supply, this long-run 
decrease in the rate of return is lower than 
a model with exogenous labor supply would 
suggest. Moreover, and in line with our earlier 
results, the decrease in the rate of return is 
negligibly small if capital moves freely across 
OECD  countries  (or  the  entire  world).  In 
contrast to a model of exogenous labor supply, 
the present model even predicts an increase in 
the rate of return until about 2030 or 2040 
(as a result of the endogenous labor supply re-
action). While saving rates immediately start 
to increase after the reform, labor supply in-
creases as well. As a net effect, this initially 
leads to a decrease in the capital to output ra-
tio and an associated initial increase in the rate 
of return to capital.
Finally, our simulations show that internation-
al capital ﬂows from the France, Germany, 
and Italy to other OECD countries roughly 
follow  the  pattern  of  savings  and  decrease 
steadily until 2050 (Figure 10). In the OECD 
and World capital mobility scenarios, they are 
initially positive at about 2 and 3.2 percent-
age points and turn negative to -2 and -2.5 
percentage points in 2050, respectively. Figure 
11 shows similar patterns in the fundamental Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected rate of return on the aggregate capital stock in France, Ger-
many, and Italy. Scenario F+G+I: perfect capital mobility within France, Germany, and Italy; Scenario 
EU: perfect capital mobility within the European Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the 
OECD; Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions. 
Figure 9: Projections of the rate of return 
(fundamental pension reform)
Figure 8: Projections of the rate of return 
(status quo pension system)
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected rate of return on the aggregate capital stock in France, Germany, and 
Italy. Scenario F+G+I: perfect capital mobility within France, Germany, and Italy; Scenario EU: perfect capital 
mobility within the European Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility with the OECD; Scenario WORLD: 
perfect capital mobility across all world regions. 
��������������
�����������
�������������
��������������
����
���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�����
����
�����
����
�����
��������������
�����������
�������������
��������������
����
���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ���� ����
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�����
����
�����
����
�����
����Figure 11: Projections of the current-account-to-output ratio 
(fundamental pension reform)
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected current-account-to-output ratio in France, Germany, and Italy. 
Scenario EU: perfect capital mobility within the European Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobil-
ity within the OECD; Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions.
Source: Computations using the macroeconomic simulation model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004), based 
on demographic projections by the United Nations (2001) and macroeconomic data from the World Bank (2003).
Notes: This Figure shows the projected current-account-to-output ratio in France, Germany, and Italy. 
Scenario EU: perfect capital mobility within the European Union; Scenario OECD: perfect capital mobility 
within the OECD; Scenario WORLD: perfect capital mobility across all world regions.
Figure 10: Projections of the current-account-to-output ratio  
(status quo pension system)
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reform scenario. Hence, the model predicts 
reversals in current account positions for fast 
aging countries such as France, Germany, and 
Italy.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a simulation analy-
sis of the effects of population aging and pen-
sion reform on international capital markets, 
based on the multi-country overlapping gen-
erations model by Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and 
Winter (2004). The main insights from this 
analysis are as follows. Demographic change 
alters the time path of aggregate savings with-
in each country. This process may be ampli-
ﬁed  when  a  (fundamental)  pension  reform 
shifts old-age provision from pure pay-as-you-
go towards more pre-funding. Finally, while 
the patterns of population aging are similar 
in most countries, timing and initial condi-
tions differ substantially. Hence, to the extent 
that capital is internationally mobile, popula-
tion aging will induce capital ﬂows between 
countries. All three effects inﬂuence the rate 
of return to capital and interact with the de-
mand for capital in production, and with labor 
supply. 
Our  simulations  predict  substantial  capital 
ﬂows due to population aging. The countries 
most affected by aging such as the European 
Union will initially be capital exporters, while 
countries less affected by aging like the Unit-
ed States und other OECD regions will im-
port capital. This pattern will reverse around 
the year 2020 when baby boomers decumu-
late their assets and the fast aging economies 
therefore become capital import regions. Pen-
sion reforms with higher degrees of pre-fund-
ing are likely to induce more capital exports. 
They also increase labor supply considerably, 
but the effects on the rate of return to capital 
are small. Overall, while the rate of return to 
capital declines in response to population ag-
ing, our simulation results suggest there will 
not be a devastating “asset market meltdown”. 
Another  important  insight  is  that  the  tim-
ing of these adjustments is complex, and one 
has to carefully distinguish level effects from 
changes over time.
 
In  the  light  of  our  simulation  results,  the 
most important open issue is: How interna-
tionally  mobile  will  capital  be?  The  results 
presented in this paper are based on the as-
sumption of perfect capital mobility within 
speciﬁed regions such as the EU, the OECD, 
or the entire World, but all these scenarios 
are of course abstractions. We should stress 
that much more research on the determinants 
of  international  capital  ﬂows,  in  particular 
the role of country-speciﬁc risks, is needed. 
Nevertheless, the degree of capital mobility as 
captured by our scenarios has a substantial im-
pact on macroeconomic variables such as do-
mestic saving rates, capital ﬂows, and the rate 
of return to capital. Overall, we conclude that 
the adverse macroeconomic effects of popula-
tion aging can be dampened by capital mobil-
ity, and our economic intuition says that our 
basic results are likely to hold in more com-
plex models as well. In any case, an impor-
tant political message from our analysis is that 
free capital mobility is a crucial component of 
macroeconomic policies in the face of popula-
tion aging and should not be tampered with.
 
5     Börsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter (2004) analyze the effects of some other crucial modeling assumptions on the simulation results. 
The main results remain unchanged in this sensitivity analysis.125
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Demography, Exchange Rates and 
Financial Assets: A Two-Country 
Perspective
Let me start with apologies and caveats ﬁrst. I 
have been asked by the conference organisers 
to address the issue of ‚International portfolio 
diversiﬁcation and exchange rate movements‘, 
with  a  focus  on  the  effect  of  international 
savings patterns on exchange rates, the risks 
of  an  asset  melt-down,  and  the  connection 
between  capital  market  depth,  risk,  and 
returns. While I remain interested in the sub-
ject, I have not worked on it for quite a while 
now.1  Nor  am  I  speciﬁcally  knowledgeable 
about the German situation. But I will try my 
best, using my own earlier research as well 
more recent studies from the OECD secre-
tariat in particular. In doing so, I will devide 
the world into a country group with rapidly 
ageing populations (with some exceptions, the 
OECD) and a group with slowly ageing popu-
lations.
1 Some Demographic Features
Despite some uncertainties in forecasting de-
mographic trends over the next 50 or so years, 
uncertainties which are mostly due to assumed 
changes in fertility rates, some demographic 
trends can be predicted with a high degree 
of conﬁdence. Three salient aspects deserve 
to be highlighted, because of their great im-
portance for the future economic interdepen-
dence between the ageing OECD and the non-
OECD area:
•   While population ageing is a global phenom-
enon,  OECD  populations  are  ageing  from 
the ‘middle’ of the age pyramid, in contrast 
to  non-OECD  which  is  ageing  from  the 
‘bottom’.  In  other  words,  the  prospective 
demographic changes imply divergent trends 
across the two regions. Labor force growth 
rates  will  strongly  decline  in  the  ageing 
OECD area and turn negative after 2010. 
In strong contrast, ageing is increasing the 
labor force in the non-OECD area; the pro-
portion  of  the  working-age  group  in  total 
non-OECD population will roughly remain 
constant (see Figure 1).
•   Ageing from the ‘middle’, the ageing OECD 
area will face a strong drop in the ratio of 
workers  to  retirees,  in  particular  after 
2010. Likewise, the support ratio will start 
to  fall  in  the  non-OECD  area,  but  from 
much higher levels than in the OECD area 
(Figure 2).
•   A much-neglected aspect of prospective de-
mographic changes is that it will shift the 
balance between the age groups that may be 
characterized as net borrowers and net sav-
ers. Changes in the age composition of the 
population will have consequences for the 
rate of net ﬁnancial asset accumulation and 
on the rate of return of ﬁnancial assets. The 
United States shows relatively high household 
savings  in  the  high-income  age  cohorts   
(40-60), whereas net savings in the other 
age cohorts is low or negative. As the ‘baby 
boom’  generation  ﬁlters  through  its  peak 
asset accumulation years, the ratio of prime 
savers to the working age population will 
rise until the year 2007 and then decline. 
For the entire ageing OECD, the prime sav-
ers ratio will peak somewhat later (2015), 
before it starts to drop. By contrast, the rise 
of the prime savers ratio in the rest of the 
world, which started around 1990, will not 
halt before the year 2050 (Figure 3).
1     For more detail, see H. Reisen (2000), which collects my papers on pensions, emerging markets and savings. Poterba (2004) has at a 
recent symposium of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City dealt with the same issues as this paper; but the basic insights still hold.Figure 2: Support ratio = age group (15-60)/age group 60++
OECD and NMEs, 1950-2050
Figure 1: Relative change of labor force (= age group 15-60)
OECD and NMEs, 1950-2050
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Multiplying  the  prime  savers  ratio  (40-60 
years old/15-60 years old) with the support 
ratio  (15-60  years  old/60+)  yields  another 
ratio  that  relates  the  prime  savers  cohort 
in the United States with the age cohort of 
people 60 years and older. This demographic 
variable, which corresponds to the peak asset 
accumulation relative to the peak asset decu-
mulation cohorts according to the life cycle 
hypothesis, can be expected to drive ﬁnancial 
asset  accumulation  and  stock  market  valua-
tions, at least in the United States (Figure 4). 
Indeed, it does. I have shown elsewhere (Rei-
sen, 1998) that US stock market valuations 
have been signiﬁcantly supported by the rise in 
the prime savers ratio (since 1983), while the 
support ratio has remained fairly stable. That 
favorable demographic support for valuations 
will not last for much longer, as around the 
year 2000 the support ratio is prospected to 
start a 30-year long decline, to be reinforced 
by the prospected decline of the prime savers 
ratio from the year 2007. For the entire ageing 
OECD, the prime savers ratio will peak some-
what later (2015), before it starts to drop. By 
contrast, the rise of the prime savers ratio in 
the rest of the world, which started around 
1990, will not halt before the year 2050; this 
should provide incentives to increase portfolio 
investments  into  non-OECD  regions  where 
prime savers cohorts will become strong. Ob-
viously,  PAYG  schemes  cannot  exploit  such 
divergent  demographic  trends,  but  funded 
pensions can. 
2 Savings-Investment Balances and 
Exchange Rates
As stated above, population aging is a global 
phenomenon. Thus, the effect on a country’s 
current  account  position  is  determined  by 
whether its population ages relatively faster or 
Figure 3: Prime savers ratio = age group (40-60)/age group (15-60)
OECD and NMEs, 1950-2050
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����slower than average, rather than by its absolute 
demographic position. The dependency ratio 
variable for each country should be expressed 
as the deviation from the average dependency 
ratio for all countries in the sample, rather 
than the level of the ratio. 
General-equilibrium  multi-country  studies 
have  either  used  the  Solow  optimal  growth 
model, where the aggregate savings rate re-
sponds to age-induced changes in the relative 
scarcity of labor and capital, or a macroeco-
nomic dynamic model, such as IMF’s MUL-
TIMOD or OECD’s MINILINK, where the 
demographic  shock  impacts  on  output  and 
investment, with endogenous changes to cor-
porate, public and household savings.
In the OECD model (Turner et al., 1998), 
pressures  on  savings  and  investment  origi-
nate from three main sources: a world-wide 
slowdown in growth; a decline in the weight 
of the OECD in world output; and the negative 
impact on savings, concentrated in the OECD. 
First, the decline in population growth causes 
a gradual slowdown of growth in the OECD 
and non-OECD, which in turn reduces the 
marginal return to capital and interest rates 
in both regions. Lower global growth lowers 
investment  needs  to  maintain  the  required 
capital stock and hence lowers interest rates, 
with virtually no effect on exchange rates and 
net  foreign  asset  positions.  (Note  that  with 
consumption-smoothing, a permanent drop in 
interest rates should affect current account po-
sitions in net debtor, resp. net creditor coun-
tries.) Second, an age-induced decline of the 
OECD share in world output leads initially 
to larger OECD current account surpluses, a 
downward pressure on OECD relative to non-
OECD interest rates, but – with increasing rel-
ative demand for OECD goods – to an upward 
Figure 4: Support ratio = age group (15-60)/age group 60++
United States, 1950-2050
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 Figure 5: Countries with Mandatory Schemes
Figure 6: Countries with Non Mandatory Schemes
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pressure on the OECD exchange rate. A third 
simulation features a fall in the OECD private 
savings  propensity,  which  leads  to  a  relative 
scarcity of global savings relative to investment 
and hence increases interest rates in both re-
gions. The overall effect on world interest rates 
depends on whether the effect of the slowdown 
in world growth dominates the demographic 
pressures on savings, but interest rates will be 
higher in the non-OECD in any case (regard-
less of the level of sovereign risk premia). The 
OECD exchange rate is likely to rise, because 
the relative scarcity of OECD goods is likely to 
dominate  the  demographic  pressures  on  sav-
ings. There will be an initial build-up of OECD 
net foreign assets, driven by faster growth in 
the non-OECD region, which is subsequently 
reversed as a result of demographic pressures 
on OECD savings.
Much will depend on the degree of pension 
funding  with  which  the  OECD  regions  will 
enter the coming decades of acute demographic 
pressures. Bailliu and Reisen (1998) ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant negative impact of the level of PAYG 
beneﬁts per elderly on the aggregate national 
savings  rate,  while  funded  pensions  tend  to 
stimulate savings (but only in the presence of 
strong-incentive/mandatory  schemes  and  li-
quidity constraints). By contrast, the arithmetic 
of unfunded, earnings-related PAYG pensions 
is largely governed by changes in the support 
ratio and by real wage growth (which in turn 
depends on labor productivity in the long run). 
These  pension  arrangements  are  essentially 
locked into the ageing economy, unable to es-
cape  the  prospective  demographic  pressures 
resulting from the expected drop in support 
ratios.
It is less understood, however, that even fully 
funded pension schemes will not escape demo-
graphic pressures in the absence of consider-
able capital ﬂows (retirement-related or other) 
between the ageing OECD and the younger 
part of the world. First, higher life expectancy 
will put pressure on the arithmetic of funded 
pensions.  Second,  the  demographic  changes 
highlighted above may well add to that pres-
sure by driving down the rate of return on 
pension investments.
3 Pension Decumulation, Asset Re-
turns, and Global Diversiﬁcation
During the 1990s, ﬁnancial markets in general 
and equity markets in particular may have ben-
eﬁted from large inﬂows into pension funds and 
other institutionalised forms of saving. These 
inﬂows reﬂected to a considerable extent sav-
ing for retirement by baby boom generations. 
These  baby  boom  generations  are  expected 
to start to move into retirement after 2010. 
Almost as a natural corollary to the develop-
ments during the 1990s, some observers have 
argued that when baby boomers start entering 
retirement they will become net sellers of ﬁ-
nancial assets to ﬁnance retirement consump-
tion. As subsequent generations are smaller in 
numbers, other things equal, this would put 
downward pressure on ﬁnancial asset prices 
(“asset meltdown hypothesis”). Others have 
pointed out that large-scale liquidations of as-
sets are unlikely to occur because of bequest 
motives and lifetime uncertainty and that in-
ternational capital mobility and forward-look-
ing capital markets will mitigate any possible 
impact of mass retirement of baby boomers on 
ﬁnancial asset prices.
Based on a simple regression analysis (from Rei-
sen, 1998) where the SP 500 P/E ratio is deter-
mined within a standard stock market valuation 
model, with the demographic variable depicted 
in Figure 5 (40-60 years old/60 years+), the (in-
verse of the) US Federal Reserve discount rate 
and the annual change in average hourly wages 134
as explanatory variables, Figure 6 provides an 
out-of-sample forecast, assuming interest rates 
staying at constant levels and hourly wage rises 
along  the  pace  experienced  over  the  recent 
decade.  The  out-of-sample  scenario,  which 
is fully driven by the ratio of prime savers to 
people older than 60, tells us that the US stock 
market  valuations  will  peak  soon  (2006/7) 
and then start a long decline, before P/E ratios 
will stabilize around 2030. The prospective 
drop in the SP 500 P/E ratio would represent 
a decline of 30 per cent, on account of deterio-
rating demographic fundamentals. 
This scenario would conﬁrm earlier concerns 
(Schieber  and  Shoven,  1994)  that,  as  US 
funded pensions cease to be a source of net 
savings, asset prices will be negatively affect-
ed. This can reinforce the maturity-induced 
shift of pension portfolios from equities and 
long-term  bonds  into  short-term  securities 
or cash, as Schieber and Shoven suggest, but 
it can also lead to a shift of equity portfolios 
into the younger economies where the prime 
savers ratio will continue to rise well into the 
year 2050.
However, several arguments suggest that there 
may not be a strong adverse impact of the re-
tirement of baby boom generations on ﬁnancial 
asset prices. First, the assumption of rational 
expectations provides an argument against the 
‘asset meltdown hypothesis’, provided that de-
mographic developments are predictable with 
some degree of accuracy. Well-functioning as-
set markets would price ﬁnancial assets so that 
their current market price would equal the 
expected present discounted value of future 
earnings and demographic developments and 
their impact on future earnings should be re-
Figure 7: S&P 500 price/earning ratio: fitted values and projection
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ﬂected in current prices once the information 
on  demographics-induced  developments  be-
comes  available.  However,  while  ﬁnancial 
markets have been assumed to be efﬁcient, no 
arbitrage opportunities exist if demographics 
affect the demand for assets in a similar way.
Second, bequest motive and lifetime uncer-
tainty may imply that ﬁnancial assets are decu-
mulated at a less rapid rate than the standard 
life  cycle  hypothesis  would  suggest.  Given 
increasing longevity and life time uncertainty, 
decumulation of assets may be slow and only 
start at a more advanced age, as retirees at-
tempt to ensure that sufﬁcient capital remains 
available for the entire uncertain lifetime. As 
well, there may be intergenerational transfers 
out of the bequest motive.
Third,  deregulation  and  liberalisation  of  ﬁ-
nancial systems over the past decades have in-
creased  international  capital  mobility,  which 
could weaken any link between domestic asset 
prices  and  domestic  demographic  develop-
ments.  Increasingly  integrated  international 
ﬁnancial markets should provide better oppor-
tunities for the global allocation of saving and 
investment.
In principle, the case for mutual beneﬁts arising 
from the global diversiﬁcation of portfolios is 
nowhere stronger than for funded retirement 
savings (Reisen, 1994). The diversiﬁcation of 
OECD  pension  assets  into  the  non-OECD 
stock markets provides the prospect of higher 
expected return for a given level of risk or, put 
alternatively, lower risk by eliminating non-sys-
temic volatility without sacriﬁcing expected re-
turn. It is less the superior growth performance 
of the non-OECD area than the low correlation 
of  returns  generated  by  the  emerging  stock 
markets with those of the OECD stock markets 
that governs this expectation. The correlation 
between returns on OECD and emerging stock 
markets will remain low even when diversiﬁca-
tion gains are seriously exploited. Differences 
between the two areas with respect to the ex-
posure to country-speciﬁc shocks, the stage of 
economic and demographic maturity and the 
(lack of) harmonization of economic policies 
suggest that the diversiﬁcation gains for OECD 
pension assets will not disappear quickly.
The evidence has not been kind to the reasoning 
outlined above. Two distinct regional currency 
crises, the 1994-95 tequila crisis in Latin Amer-
ica and the 1997-98 Asian crisis, have tarnished 
the reputation of emerging stock markets to 
provide superior returns to OECD-based in-
vestors. While  the  emerging  economies  have 
grown more quickly than the OECD countries, 
this has not translated into higher earnings per 
share  growth  in  the  emerging  markets. The 
emerging markets have to increase corporate 
proﬁtability  if  they  are  to  attract  a  growing 
share of OECD pension assets.
Moreover, a series of ﬁnancial crises over the 
last decade has triggered strong contagion ef-
fects.  Contagion  leads  to  higher  correlation 
of stock market returns among the emerging 
markets, taking away their potential diversi-
ﬁcation beneﬁts. Contagion leads to shrinking 
beneﬁts of international portfolio diversiﬁca-
tion as returns to emerging stock markets are 
driven by systemic factors external to these 
markets  themselves.  Global  diversiﬁcation 
can reduce only non-systemic risk. Therefore, 
emerging markets will only then be able to 
improve OECD pension returns if they catch 
up with OECD levels of corporate proﬁtabil-
ity and if they reduce their vulnerability to the 
currency crises witnessed in the 1990s.
Financial globalization can only attenuate, not 
compensate the demographic impact on capi-
tal returns and net savings. Table 1 reports some 136
selected results from simulating age-structure 
effects  and  two  scenarios  on  future  ﬁnancial 
integration between the OECD and the non-
OECD area. The results are based on MacKel-
lar and Reisen (1998) who use a neoclassical 
economic-demographic  accounting  model  in 
which age-speciﬁc saving and labor force par-
ticipation rates are held constant. In the base-
line scenario, which in view of assumed growth 
differentials in favor of the South corresponds 
roughly to a situation of autarky, OECD inves-
tors – including pension funds – allocate 10 per 
cent  of  their  annual  investment  expenditure 
to the non-OECD. In the alternative scenario, 
designed  to  illustrate  the  impact  of  ﬁnancial 
globalization, this share is increased to reﬂect 
the growing share of non-OECD in global stock 
market capitalization and in global output.
With ﬁnancial autarky, the drop in the North-
ern labor force will lead to higher capital-la-
bor ratios in the OECD, resulting in a drop to 
capital returns by 150 basis points in the OECD 
area. Lower capital returns in turn drive net 
savings lower, from 6.9 per cent of GDP in 
1995 to 2.7 per cent in 2050. But even under 
Table 1: Summary results of the MacKellar/Reisen simulation
Source: MacKellar and Reisen (1998), A Simulation Model of Global Pension Fund Investment’, OECD 
Development Center Technical Paper No. 137.
1995 2020 2050
Rate of return to capital, OECD (%)
Autarky scenario 
Globalization scenario 
Difference 
8.0
8.0
  – 
7.1
7.3
0.2
 6.5
6.9
0.4
Net saving rate, OECD (% of GDP)
Autarky scenario 
Globalization scenario
Difference
6.9
6.9
–
5.0
5.4
0.4
2.7
3.4
0.7
Non-OECD share of OECD pension assets (%)
Autarky scenario
Globalization scenario 
Difference
0.9
0.9
–
6.4
14.1
7.7
7.5
22.0
14.5
Net foreign assets, OECD (% of GDP) 
Autarky scenario 
Globalization scenario
Difference
2.6
2.6
–
9.3
24.3
15.0
10.3
54.9
44.6
Autarky scenario
Globalization scenario 
 Difference (per cent)
16 830
16 830
–
17 947
18 092
0.8
19 005
19 754 
3.9
Income at retirement age, OECD (1995 US dollars per person aged over 60) 137
the autarky scenario, net pension ﬂows from 
the OECD to the non-OECD will strongly rise 
by the year 2020 and rise further (albeit more 
slowly) for the rest of the century. These trends 
result from growth differentials that favor the 
non-OECD  area,  reinvested  pension  returns 
and higher OECD pension assets. Other capi-
tal ﬂows to the non-OECD will even rise more 
strongly, as high capital returns are reinvested 
(by half of earnings). This will result in a higher 
non-OECD share of OECD pension assets until 
2050, before the run-down of pension assets in-
vested abroad and more favorable demographic 
trends in the OECD area will lead to reversals 
in these trends.
Financial globalization can only attenuate, not 
compensate the demographic impact on capi-
tal returns and net savings in the neoclassical 
simulation model. Globalization leads to a par-
tial convergence of capital returns between the 
two regions, reducing the ageing-induced drop 
in the North by 40 basis points by 2050. Glo-
balization is estimated to slow the drop in the 
net saving rate in the OECD countries by one 
half of one percentage point over the next half-
century. Analysis of the components of saving 
reveals that this increase in aggregate savings is 
entirely attributable to increased corporate sav-
ings. Higher capital returns on domestic capital 
and a higher share of foreign investment abroad 
where capital returns are higher account for 
this result. By contrast, globalization depresses 
household savings below their already sluggish 
level in the baseline scenario, as OECD labor 
is equipped with relatively less capital and thus 
earns lower wages.
The distributional effects of globalization are 
much discussed, but the generational dimension 
is underappreciated. Improved performance of 
retirement saving portfolios in the globalization 
scenario raises the income of the OECD retirees 
signiﬁcantly, by roughly 3 per cent in 2020-30, 
when retirement of the baby boom generation 
will peak. Lower availability of capital in the 
OECD, on the other hand, slightly hurts the in-
come of workers. In other words: ﬁnancial glo-
balization may hurt OECD retirees as long as a 
large share of their pensions is pegged to wages 
through the PAYG system; it only will beneﬁt 
retirees with funded pensions.
Finally,  net  foreign  asset  positions  and  net 
capital ﬂows grow so important in terms of 
OECD  output  under  the  globalization  sce-
nario that they will become clearly vulnerable 
to sovereign risk and changes in investor senti-
ment (witness Asia’s crisis in 1997-98). As the 
MacKellar/Reisen  simulation  suggests  only 
modest  beneﬁts  for  capital  returns  and  sav-
ings from ﬁnancial globalization which in turn 
implies massive exposure of OECD pension 
assets to sovereign risk, it is suggested that 
global diversiﬁcation will not be able to ‘beat 
demography’.
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1 Striking the balance between 
regulation and performance
There is no such thing as a risk free pension. 
Risk is a very powerful four letter word with 
many meanings. Most of these meanings can 
be applied to pension systems particularly if 
one includes both absolute and relative risk.
 
Pensions  are  dealing  with  uncertain  events. 
We do not know whether the events will ac-
tually  occur  or  how  long  they  will  persist. 
The greatest uncertainty of all in a pensions 
environment is longevity. Although actuarial 
science  can  circumscribe  the  uncertainty  at 
a collective level, neither the actuary nor the 
medical specialist would wish to place too big 
a bet on individual life expectancy.
Pension policy making – and more particularly 
the updating of such policies – is made difﬁcult 
because of a lack of honesty. Politicians have to 
be honest with their electorates that risk and 
pension systems are inextricably linked.
2 Pensions are inherently risky
For society, the over-riding risk is that some 
citizens will face absolute poverty in old age. 
This is particularly so if modern society no 
longer expects those who are old to work until 
they die. If we did expect people to work un-
til the very end, old age poverty would be one 
element of broader income inequality. Some 
societies or some sub-cultures may ﬁnd retire-
ment an alien concept. However, most mod-
ern societies do not expect people to work, 
full-time at least, until they die. If absolute 
poverty in old age does exist to a meaningful 
extent, the risks of electoral fallout or social 
strife may be unavoidable.
For an employer the risks are both ﬁnancial 
and reputational. Financially they may not be 
able to meet commitments entered into. Even 
though promises may have been made in good 
faith,  subsequent  developments  may  under-
mine the basis upon which the promise was 
given. In many countries, employers are hav-
ing to honor promises which they never made 
since initial offerings have been augmented by 
legislative intervention. In an era where brand 
values are cherished, the prospect of branded 
companies having former employees enduring 
absolute poverty in old age may result in them 
being branded in quite a different way.
For commercial providers of ﬁnancial services 
there  is  both  business  risk  and  reputational 
risk again. Business risks manifest themselves 
in many forms while reputational risk may be 
inﬂuenced by their own behavior or may result 
from guilt by association.
Professional advisers face increasing risks in 
our contemporary litigious society. Many pro-
fessionals may be unwilling to give good clear 
advice in future for fear of being sued. In many 
countries the debate rages about the extent 
to which professionals can legitimately avoid 
responsibility  for  the  impact  of  subsequent 
events or hindsight on advice carefully given in 
the context of all known facts. 
 
Then we have the risks faced by individuals. 
They too face a risk of absolute poverty in old 
age. However, they risk being disappointed. 
They may feel that politicians have not deliv-
ered what they expected, employers have re-
neged on promises which might not have been 
the  guarantee  which  many  folk  perceived, 
advisers may have been salesmen masquerad-
ing in advisers’ clothing. They also run the risk 
of being let down by the market in general or 
by particular market participants. 
 
Actuaries,  underwriters  and  markets  can 
always  put  a  price  on  risk.  There  may  not 141
always be agreement on such pricing. This lack 
of agreement is what makes markets. 
If we seek to price and then pay for the avoid-
ance  of  every  conceivable  risk,  society  will 
operate  sub-optimally.  Unless  societies  are 
prepared  to  take  risks,  progress  will  never 
be made. Sometimes the price will never be 
worth paying. Sometimes it will be paid up-
front while on other occasions it will be paid 
retrospectively, perhaps by some form of com-
pensation or additional injection of ﬁnance. 
 
Where  the  uncertainty  affects  everyone,  the 
price of dealing with the associated risk will be 
reduced if we increase the size of the popula-
tion covered. Thus, the state and the taxpayer 
are ideally placed to provide a guarantee against 
absolute poverty in old age. This is why the 
state should remain a proud provider of pen-
sions which will clearly lift every citizen above 
the level of absolute poverty determined by na-
tional parliaments. At the other extreme, costs 
are reduced if we engage in clear segmentation. 
If it is decided to insure against the risks of 
mountaineering, only those involved in moun-
taineering should be covered. Only then can 
proper risk rated premiums be identiﬁed which 
provide a reasonable proﬁt margin for the un-
derwriter at an appropriate price to those who 
are exposed to a particular risk.
Between  these  two  extremes,  there  is  scope 
for  risk  sharing. At  the  workplace,  risks  can 
be shared by employers and employees. In the 
marketplace, commercial providers and their 
customers can do a deal on the extent to which 
customers will be protected against uncertain 
outcomes. It is for the parties to a deal, in the 
workplace or the marketplace, to identify risks 
and then determine the extent to which these 
risks should be covered by some form of insur-
ance or guarantee. Guarantees cost money and 
should not generally be imposed by politicians 
on those who enter into voluntary agreements 
in either the workplace or the marketplace.
3 The role of regulation
Some critics have argued that the Pensions Di-
rective was inappropriately located within the 
Financial Services Action Plan. This criticism 
would have been relevant if that was the end of 
the story. It is not. Market efﬁciency is essen-
tial if pension systems are to work optimally. It 
was, therefore, sensible to pursue a prudential 
framework  for  pension  provision  within  the 
context of the FSAP. 
 
Increased attention is now being placed on the 
social dimension of our pension system. The 
awareness  of  increased  longevity  and  actual 
or perceived market failing have increased the 
temperature of this particular debate. 
 
Because  the  ﬁnancial  aspects  of  our  pen-
sion system are somewhat technical, there is 
a danger in believing that technical solutions 
will be sufﬁcient if our social objectives are to 
be fulﬁlled. There is no shortage of technical 
solutions. However, there are severe resource 
constraints. In pension provision as in other 
aspects of economic activity, we cannot make 
good  things  happen  simply  by  wishing  for 
them. Whilst the heart may determine objec-
tives, the head must allocate priorities.
As the debate moves from the ﬁnancial to the 
social, we must be aware of an inherent con-
ﬂict. On the one hand, we are seeking to ex-
pand access to good quality pension coverage 
while, on the other, we are seeking to increase 
the quality of that coverage. In a voluntary en-
vironment one has to be careful that improved 
quality, with its associated cost, does not act 
as a barrier to entry which thereby serves to 
reduce access.142
4 The role of the regulator
The words supervisor and regulator are used in 
a pensions context as if they were interchange-
able. However, this is not always the case since 
in some countries either body can be fulﬁlling 
a  quasi-political  policymaking  role  while  the 
other might have operational responsibility at a 
systems level. Here, I propose to use the word 
“regulator” as if it was an interchangeable deﬁ-
nition of those to whom politicians delegate the 
responsibility for the safe fulﬁllment of ﬁnancial 
objectives in a social policy environment.
Nobody loves a regulator. Politicians will, on 
the one hand, espouse a light regulatory touch. 
On the other hand, those same politicians will 
blame regulators if things go wrong. Because 
members of the public are encouraged to be-
lieve that market failures are due to inadequate 
regulation rather than inept policymaking, they 
too will blame the regulator.
 
Against this background, there is a real danger 
that regulators will see their over-riding func-
tion as the protection of regulators. After all, 
their reputation and personal ﬁnancial security 
is based on avoiding blame. This may drive them 
to over-regulate to a point where nothing could 
go wrong but nothing could go right either. Be-
cause politicians are short-term in perspective, 
they may be happier with moribund markets 
where nothing happens than with vibrant mar-
kets where there is the potential for blemishes, 
some of which may be high proﬁle.
Those of us who do not have an axe to grind 
must regularly make the case for a balanced ap-
proach to regulation. There is no such thing as a 
fail-safe ﬁnancial system. If we are prepared to 
tolerate a transport system where things could 
go wrong, we must not seek a higher degree of 
security in areas of ﬁnance where the issues in-
volved are not of such a life and death nature.
Regulators will be helped with the pursuit of a 
balanced approach to regulation if it is clearly 
understood that it is the state’s responsibility 
to provide absolute security in old age. In those 
countries, such as the UK and Ireland, where 
the state pension system does not currently of-
fer such a guarantee, there is a real danger that 
private provision is seen as privatized welfare. 
Against such a background, it is not surprising 
that public and politicians alike wish to pursue 
risk-free private provision. In such an environ-
ment, regulators will inevitably over-regulate 
and the system will operate sub-optimally.
5 Putting trust back into the 
system
Traditionally, there has not been much trust 
in cross border ﬁnancial arrangements. Hope-
fully, things are changing and the institutions 
spawned by the Pensions Directive, and other 
aspects of the FSAP will foster a rapid increase 
in consumer and employer trust within the Eu-
ropean pensions and ﬁnancial services system.
More challenging, however, might be the res-
toration of trust within domestic systems. The 
only way in which we can do this is through 
increased honesty based on a steady increase 
in ﬁnancial literacy. 
Politicians need a long-term vision which tran-
scends the normal electoral cycle. We then 
need  wide-ranging  and  inclusive  debates  on 
how we get from where we are to where the 
consensus wants us to end up. I think there 
is an emerging consensus in many countries 
based on a public/private partnership. Public 
systems  deal  with  absolute  poverty  while 
private  systems  deal,  in  a  lightly  regulated 
fashion, with relative aspirations. 
If politicians are to be trusted, they must not 
make promises which, in their heart of hearts, 143
they know are ﬁnancially undeliverable. Em-
ployers and commercial providers, in return 
for  less  regulation,  should  use  their  utmost 
best  endeavors  to  deliver  promises  made  in 
good faith. Peer pressure within both the em-
ployer  and  commercial  provider  communi-
ties should be used to drive out bad practice. 
Those who are guilty of such practice should 
be hit hard ﬁnancially.
Workers and consumers cannot, however, ab-
solve themselves of responsibility. Improved 
ﬁnancial  literacy  will  help  bring  this  about 
over time. In the short term, however, con-
sumers must always remember that, if some-
thing looks too good to be true, it probably is 
too good to be true.144